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Part	  I	  
Introduction	  and	  scope	  of	  application	  
	  
This	   in	  depth	  review	  provides	  the	  reader	  with	  a	   fact	   findings	  analysis	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  some	  of	  the	  
most	  prominent	  banking	  and	  financial	   regulatory	  authorities	   in	   the	  UK:	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	  (BoE);	  
the	  Prudential	  Regulation	  Authority	  (PRA)2;	  the	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  (FCA)	  and	  the	  Monetary	  
Policy	  Committee	  (MPC)3.	  Even	  though	  the	  Pension	  Regulator;	  the	  Payment	  Systems	  Regulator4;	  and	  
the	  FPC	  are	  as	  important,	  due	  to	  time	  constraints	  these	  could	  not	  be	  included.	  However,	  please	  note	  
that	  the	  Payments	  Systems	  Regulator	  and	  the	  FPC	  follow	  broadly	  the	  same	  policies	  of	  the	  FCA	  and	  
the	  Bank	  of	  England	  respectively.	  Other	  Banking	  and	  Finance	  authorities	  have	  been	  included	  in	  the	  
CSPL	  Regulators’	  Survey5.	  	  	  
Whereas	   ethical	   conduct	   within	   the	   workplace	   includes	   the	   existence	   and	   the	   quality	   of,	   policies	  
related	   to	   whistleblowing,	   gender	   equality,	   career	   progression,	   bullying	   and	   harassing,	   creditors’	  
payment,	  staff	  satisfaction	  surveys,	  and	  consideration	  for	  personal	  privacy	  of	  employees,	  these	  will	  
not	   constitute	   the	   main	   focus	   of	   this	   inquiry,	   as	   they	   can	   be	   considered	   more	   measures	   of	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2	  At	  the	  time	  this	  review	  started,	  October	  15	  2015,	  the	  PRA	  was	  still	  an	  independent	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  
England.	  With	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  Financial	  Services	  Bill	  the	  former	  will	  be	  incorporated	  
by	  the	  latter,	  becoming	  a	  committee	  of	  the	  Bank	  (the	  PRC).	  	  
	  
3	   Please	   note,	   the	   Bank	   of	   England,	   the	   PRA	   and	   the	   FCA	   are	   also	   supervisory	   authorities.	   The	   distinction	  
between	  regulation	  and	  supervision	  is	  blurred,	  but	  from	  a	  purely	  theoretical	  point	  of	  view	  regulation	  refers	  to	  
the	  establishment	  of	  rules	  whereas	  supervision	  to	  their	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement.	  
	  
4	   Please	   note	   that	   the	   Financial	   Services	   (Banking	   Reform)	   Act	   2013	   required	   the	   FCA	   to	   incorporate	   the	  
Payment	   Systems	   Regulator	   and	   this	   was	   done	   on	   1	   April	   2014.	   The	   Payment	   Systems	   Regulator	   is	   now	   a	  
wholly-­‐owned	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  FCA.	  
	  
5	  A	  full	   list	  of	  responses	  received	  is	  available	  at	  www.gov.uk/government/publications/annexes-­‐to-­‐ethics-­‐for-­‐
regulators-­‐report	  
	  
 “organisational	   integrity”6	   rather	   than	   being	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   Nolan’s	   Seven	  
Principles	  of	  Public	  Life.	  Again,	  time	  constraints	  and	  terms	  of	  reference	  forced	  us	  to	  limit	  the	  scope	  
of	  application	  to	  the	  broader	  picture	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  pointillist	  details	  of	  employees’	  handbooks	  
or	   codes	   of	   conduct.	   This	   notwithstanding,	   reference	   is	   made	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   these	   policies	  
whenever	  needed.	  	  
In	   discussing	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	  Nolan	  principles	   to	  B&F	   authorities,	   certain	   issues	   have	  been	  
intentionally	  left	  out.	  	  
For	  instance,	  this	  study	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  among	  supervisory	  and	  monetary	  
functions	  when	  both	  are	  housed	  within	  a	  single	  authority.	  Lobbying	  has	  not	  been	  considered	  either.	  
In	  the	  past,	  the	  CSPL	  (2013a)7	  has	  warned	  on	  the	  double	  faceted	  function	  of	  lobbying:	  «Conducted	  
properly,	   lobbying	   is	   an	  essential	  part	  of	   the	  process	  by	  which	   individuals	  and	  organisations	  make	  
sure	  their	  views	  and	  perspectives	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  public	  policy.	  But	  two	  main	  concerns	  are	  
frequently	   expressed.	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   press	   and	   politicians	   Lord	   Justice	   Leveson	   concluded	   that	  
these	  concerns	  amounted	  to	  “a	  genuine	  and	  legitimate	  problem	  of	  public	  perception,	  and	  hence	  of	  
trust	   and	   confidence”».	   Even	   though	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   authorities	   resist	   or	   are	   influenced	   by	  
lobbyists	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  indicator	  of	  integrity,	  this	  would	  have	  required	  different	  tools	  of	  
investigation	  and	  a	  greater	  amount	  of	  time,	  both	  unavailable	  to	  the	  Author.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  paper	  
does	  analyse	  the	  broader	  problem	  of	  regulatory	  capture.	  
Finally,	   as	   stated	   in	   the	   terms	   of	   reference	   of	   the	   CSPL	   review,	   this	   review	  will	   not	   consider	   the	  
effectiveness	  and	  efficacy	  of	   financial	   regulation,	   its	  quality	  and	  methodologies;	  and	   the	  need	  and	  
the	  impact	  of	  regulation8.	  
The	  review	  is	  organised	  as	  follows:	  the	  first	  part	  will	  give	  a	  bird’s	  eye	  view	  over	  some	  critical	  issues	  
that	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  to	  make	  a	  fair	  assessment	  of	  how	  banking	  and	  finance	  authorities	  
live	   up	   to	   the	   Nolan	   principles;	   the	   second	   part	   will	   analyse	   how	   authorities	   apply	   the	   relevant	  
principles;	  the	  third	  part	  makes	  recommendations.	  	  
	  
                                                
6	   For	   instance,	   the	   UN	   defines	   “ethics	   infrastructures”	   as	   including	   “measures	   to	   enhance	   and	   preserve	  
organizational	   integrity,	  access	   to	   information	   that	  promotes	   transparency	  and	  accountability,	  and	  oversight	  
by	   independent	   institutions	   and	   the	   public	   at	   large”.	   See	   UN	   Public	   Administration	   programme,	   Ethics,	  




7	   CSPL,	   (2013)	   Standards	  Matter.	  A	   review	  of	   best	   practice	   in	   promoting	  good	   behaviour	   in	   public	   life,	   14th	  
Report.,	   p	   53.	   The	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   has	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   a	   specific	   report	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   the	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   Strengthening	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  lobbying,	  2013	  
	  
8	   See	   CSPL,	   Ethics	   for	   regulators	   review.	   Project	   description,	   13	   August	   2015,	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   at	   CSPL	   blog	   www.	  
cspl.blog.gov.uk	  	  
	  
 Methodology	  	  
Compliance	  with	  each	  principle	  will	  be	  assessed	  against	  some	  indicators.	  In	  choosing	  the	  indicators,	  
consideration	  has	  also	  been	  given	   to	  previous	  CSPL	   reports,	   specifically	   to:	   the	  First	  Report	   to	   the	  
Committee	   of	   Standards	   in	   Public	   Life;	   Standards	   Matters;	   Ethics	   in	   practice;	   Strengthening	  
transparency	  around	  lobbying.	  The	  yardsticks	  used	  may	  be	  questioned	  and	  could	  have	  been	  broader.	  
However,	   they	   seem	   to	   represent	   at	   least	   fair	   reference	   points	   to	   test	   how	   Banking	   and	   Finance	  
authorities	  perform	  against	  the	  Nolan	  principles.	  	  
Reference	  will	  be	  made	  to	  cases	   that	   received	  public	  attention	  related	  to	  a	  possible	  breach	  of	   the	  
principles.	  	  
Reference	   to	   relevant	  academic	   literature	  has	  been	  purposely	  kept	   to	   the	  minimum	  to	   focus	  on	  a	  
facts	  finding	  analysis.	  	  
Accountability	  and	  other	   requirements	   that	  are	  already	  embedded	   into	   law	  will	  not	  be	  considered	  
either,	   as	   the	   primary	   scope	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	   assess	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  Authorities	   go	   beyond	  
statutory	  prescriptions.	  	  
In	  what	  follows	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  the	  FCA	  the	  PRA	  and	  the	  MPC	  will	  be	  collectively	  referred	  to	  as	  
B&F	  authorities	  (Banking	  and	  Finance	  authorities).	  	  
	  
The	  ethics	  of	  banking	  and	  financial	  regulators:	  some	  thorny	  issues	  
	  
a. The	  legislative	  framework	  	  
Activities,	  procedures,	  powers,	  duties	  and	  governance	  of	  B&F	  authorities	  are	  strictly	  disciplined	  
by	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  mostly	  at	  national,	  and	  with	  a	  limited	  extent,	  at	  European	  level	  too.	  For	  
instance,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  is	  part	  of	  the	  European	  System	  of	  Central	  Banks	  and	  some	  of	  the	  
powers	  of	  the	  FCA	  originate	  from	  EU	  legislation.	  	  	  
	  
And	  yet,	  the	  common	  view	  on	  B&F	  authorities	  is	  that	  they	  retain	  too	  much	  discretion	  and	  enjoy	  
too	   much	   independence.	   Whereas	   authorities	   do	   retain	   discretion	   over	   policies	   and	   decision	  
making,	   they	  may	   act	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   instructions,	   and	   always	  within	   the	   four	   corners	   of	   the	  
statutes.	   As	   it	   will	   be	   discussed	   later,	   their	   independence	   is	   a	   creature	   of	   the	   law	   and	  works	  
within	   stringent	  accountability	  mechanisms	  which	   subject	  authorities	   to	   strict	   scrutiny.	   In	   fact,	  
one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  space	  left	  beyond	  laws	  and	  regulations	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  
highly	  aspirational	  nature	  of	  the	  Nolan	  principles.	  
	  
 At	  national	  level,	  the	  Financial	  Services	  and	  Markets	  Act	  (FSMA)	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Charter	  
1998	  are	  the	  main	  pieces	  of	  legislation9.	  However,	  authorities	  will	  have	  to	  comply	  with,	  among	  
the	  others,	   the	  UK	  Bribery	  Act,	   Public	   Law,	   Freedom	  of	   Information	  Act,	   and	   so	  on.	   They	   also	  
have	  to	  take	  into	  account	  soft	  law,	  such	  as	  code	  of	  practices,	  Memoranda	  of	  Understanding,	  the	  
regulators’	  code,	  principles	  of	  good	  corporate	  governance	  and	  other	  standards.	  
The	  Advisory	  Committee	   for	  Business	  Appointments	   (ACoBA)	  may	  be	  consulted	   for	   candidates	  
applying	   for	   senior	   positions;	   and	   in	   making	   certain	   appointments,	   the	   Code	   of	   Practice	   for	  
Ministerial	  appointments	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  too.	  
	  
Against	   this	  background,	  authorities	   strive	   to	  go	  beyond	   the	  black	   letter	  of	   the	   law	   to	   lead	  on	  
ethical	  conduct,	  albeit	  with	  mixed	  results.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
b. The	  “specialty”	  of	  banking	  and	  finance	  regulators	  
	  
The	  protection	  of	  investors,	  of	  financial	  stability,	  and	  of	  market	  integrity	  are	  the	  main	  objectives	  
of	   B&F	   authorities’	   regulatory	   and	   supervisory	   action.	   To	   pursue	   them,	   they	   enjoy	   a	   high	  
concentration	  of	  powers,	  a	  fair	  degree	  of	  discretion,	  independence,	  and	  are	  subject	  to	  statutory	  
confidentiality	  requirements	  to	  avoid	  market	  manipulation.	  	  
	  
This	  may	   create	   some	   apparent	   tension	  with	   certain	  Nolan	   principles.	   For	   instance,	   too	  much	  
transparency	   may	   hinder	   financial	   stability	   because	   market	   players	   may	   try	   to	   second	   guess	  
regulators’	  decisions.	  It	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  market	  manipulation	  because	  of	  possible	  disclosure	  of	  
confidential	   information,	  or	   it	  may	  unduly	  have	  a	  negative	   impact	  on	   the	   reputation	  of	   a	   firm	  
which	  may	  then	  give	  rise	  to	  speculative	  market	  behaviour.	  	  
	  
Most	  importantly,	  it	  may	  hinder	  policy	  effectiveness.	  For	  instance	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  may	  want	  
to	   delay	   the	   disclosure	   of	   certain	   items	   on	   its	   balance	   sheet	   to	   allow	   for	   covert	   liquidity	  
assistance,	  or	  it	  may	  decide	  not	  to	  disclose	  upfront	  its	  intention	  to	  provide	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  
assistance	   in	   a	   given	   scenario.	   The	   FCA	   may	   want	   to	   delay	   the	   public	   disclosure	   of	   its	  
enforcement	  action	  against	  a	  firm	  until	  it	  has	  reached	  a	  final	  decision.	  The	  MPC	  may	  not	  want	  to	  
disclose	   internal	   disagreement	   on	   interest	   rate	   decisions	   to	   avoid	   speculation	   or	   expectations	  
over	  future	  decisions.	  	  
                                                
9	  These	  are	  constantly	  amended.	  Any	  reference	  to	  FSMA	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Act	  shall	  be	  considered	  to	  
include	  any	  amendments	  until	  January	  2016.	  	  
	  
 	  
B&F	  authorities	  need	  also	  to	  preserve	  their	  good	  reputation,	  not	  because	  they	  don’t	  	   intend	  to	  
be	  subject	  to	  accountability	  mechanisms	  rather	  because	  unfounded	  negative	  publicity	  that	  may	  
derive	   from	   a	   superficial	   level	   of	   public	   scrutiny	   (especially	   when	   steered	   by	   the	   press)	   may	  
hinder	  trust	  and	  credibility	  in	  their	  actions.	  This	  in	  turn	  may	  negatively	  affect	  market	  confidence.	  	  
	  
Another	   possible	   effect	   of	   bad	   publicity	   is	   on	   staff	   morale.	   Feeling	   the	   constant	   subject	   of	  
negative	  remarks	  by	  the	  press	  and	  the	  public	  in	  general,	  may	  affect	  staff	  productivity,	  loyalty	  and	  
turnover10.	   Especially	   the	   latter	   has	   recently	   been	   one	   of	   the	   causes	   of	   poor	   regulatory	  
performance.	  
	  
c. The	  relationship	  with	  the	  regulatees	  and	  with	  the	  Government	  
The	  proximity	  of	   regulators	  with	   the	   regulated	   firms	   is	   another	   contested	   issue.	  On	   the	  one	  hand	  
they	  need	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  (political	  and)	  business	  interference;	  on	  the	  other	  they	  need	  not	  
be	  so	  detached	  from	  the	  regulated	  as	  to	  not	  understand	  their	  business.	  It	  shall	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  
finance	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  fast	  evolving	  sector,	  driven	  by	  innovation	  and	  technology.	  So	  it	  is	  beneficial	  
for	   authorities	   to	   be	   able	   to	   attract	   talents	   from	   the	   industry	   as	   well	   as	   to	   nurture	   a	   healthy	  
relationship	  with	   the	   latter.	   In	   fact,	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   B&F	   authorities’	   action	   relies	   also	   on	   the	  
trust	  placed	  on	  them	  by	  the	  regulated	  entities.	  The	  principles	  of	  the	  regulators	  code	  (which	  apply	  to	  
the	  PRA	  and	  the	  FCA)	  are	  all	  informed	  by	  the	  need	  to	  engage	  fairly,	  in	  a	  cooperative	  and	  supportive	  
way	  with	  the	  regulatees.	  Sometimes	  this	  is	  also	  stated	  in	  business	  plans	  and	  other	  documents	  from	  
the	   regulators.	   Stakeholders’	   involvement	   is	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   better	   regulation.	   Finally,	   statutory	  
practitioners	  and	  consumers	  panels	  have	  advisory	  powers.	   	  The	  above	  is	  also	  supported	  at	  political	  
level	  as	  acknowledged	  once	  by	   the	  Chair	  of	   the	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee	  “I	   just	  want	   to	   remind	  
anybody	  watching	   this	  hearing	   that	   the	  predecessor	  Committee,	  and	   I	  expect	   this	  Committee	   too,	  
strongly	   supported	   the	   appointment	   of	   people	   from	   the	   industry	  with	  wider	   experience	   than	   just	  
being	  academic	  economists,	  not	  that	  there	  is	  anything	  necessarily	  wrong	  with	  them,	  or	  people	  from	  
a	  relatively	  closed	  circle	  who	  have	  worked	  in	  central	  banking.	  It	  is	  extremely	  important	  in	  discussing	  
codes	  of	  conduct,	  which	  we	  will	  turn	  to	  in	  a	  moment	  that	  these	  are	  framed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  can	  create	  
the	  flexibility	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  expertise	  that	  you	  may	  have	  picked	  up.”11	  
                                                
10	  See	   for	   instance	   the	   remarks	   from	   the	   FCA	  Board	  Review	  which	  noted	   that	   “Directors	   acknowledge	   that	  
recent	   interventions	   (Davis,	   TSC,	   HM	   Treasury),	   and	   levels	   of	   public	   scrutiny	   and	   criticism	   have	   impacted	  
negatively	  on	  culture	  and	  morale,	  influencing	  executives	  cautiousness,	  levels	  of	  defensiveness,	  and	  the	  willing	  
to	  escalate	   issues	  and	   learn	   from	  mistakes,	  as	  well	   as,	  potentially,	   attracting	  and	   retaining	   talent”.	   See	  FCA,	  
FCA	  board	  effectiveness:	  an	  independent	  evaluation	  by	  Boardroom	  Review	  limited,	  October	  2015,	  p	  8.	  
	  
11	   See	   House	   of	   Commons	   Treasury	   Committee,	   Oral	   evidence	   Appointment	   of	   Gertjan	   Vlieghe	   to	   the	  
Monetary	  Policy	  Committee	  hearing,	  HC	  497,	  Tuesday	  13	  October	  2015,	  p	  1.	  	  
	  
 Proximity	  however	  may	  expose	  regulators	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  “captured”	  by	  the	  regulatees	  and	  to	  
lose	   their	   independence.	   Threats	   to	   independence	   arise	   also	   from	   revolving	   doors	   phenomena,	  
namely	  the	  ability	  to	  join	  the	  regulators	  from	  and	  to	  leave	  the	  regulators	  for	  the	  industry.	  	  
Finally	  some	  of	  the	  authorities	  are	  funded	  by	  the	  same	  industry	  they	  regulate	  which	  may	  ingenerate	  
a	  perception	  of	  lack	  of	  independence.	  
Statutes	  and	  internal	  codes	  of	  conduct	  provide	  safeguards	  for	  these	  problems,	  but	  they	  may	  not	  be	  
sufficient	  in	  the	  current	  form.	  	  
B&F	   authorities	   may	   also	   be	   subject	   to	   political	   interference.	   In	   fact,	   some	   of	   their	   most	   senior	  
members	  are	  appointed	  by	   the	  Treasury.	  Whereas	   the	   latter	  has	   to	   take	  decisions	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  
personal	   independence	   and	   professional	   requirements	   and	   can	   only	   dismiss	   them	   for	   a	   limited	  
number	  of	   reasons	   specifically	   listed	  by	   the	   law,	   the	   temptation	   to	   appoint	   favourable	   candidates	  
may	  be	  difficult	  to	  resist.	  	  
Overall	   the	   government	   is	   interested	   in	  preserving	   the	   competitiveness	  of	   the	  UK	  as	   an	  attractive	  
financial	  centre;	  in	  preserving	  financial	  stability	  because	  of	  the	  negative	  effects	  its	  impairment	  may	  
have	   on	   the	   public	   purse	   and	   the	   economy	   as	   a	   whole;	   and	   in	   having	   sound	   and	   sustainable	  
monetary	  policies	  as	  well	  as	  well-­‐functioning	  financial	  markets.	  	  
As	  before,	  statutes,	  decision	  making	  mechanisms,	  and	  internal	  codes	  and	  procedures	  should	  limit	  to	  
the	  minimum	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  influenced	  by	  political	  ends.	  	  
	  
d. Issues	  related	  to	  potential	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  
Another	  matter	   that	  may	   create	   a	   perception	   of	   lack	   of	   independence	   is	   the	   composition	   of	   the	  
boards.	   All	   the	   governing	   bodies	   of	   the	   authorities	   include	   independent	   directors	   chosen	   from	  
external	  candidates.	  Whereas	  this	  may	  create	  potential	  conflicts	  of	  interests,	  its	  actual	  purpose	  is	  to	  
bring	  diversity	  of	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  to	  the	  board,	  and	  to	  hold	  executives	  to	  account.	  	  
Rules	  on	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  help	  mitigating	  possible	  undue	  influence.	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
 Part	  II	  
Selflessness	  
Selflessness:	  holders	  of	  public	  office	  should	  act	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  public	  interest.	  	  
Acting	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  imposes	  upon	  holders	  of	  public	  offices	  very	  stringent	  conduct	  
obligations.	   For	   instance,	   this	   implies	   acting	   with	   selflessness,	   but	   also	   with	   probity;	   impartiality;	  
away	  from	  political	  patronage12	  ;	  conscientiously;	  and	  with	  equity.	  	  
Even	  though	  it	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  semantic	  and	  content	  analysis	  of	  the	  
principle,	  nevertheless	  it	  seems	  appropriate	  to	  briefly	  discuss	  its	  wording.	  From	  a	  legal	  point	  of	  view,	  
if	   one	   has	   to	   be	   judged	   against	   a	   standard,	   that	   standard	   needs	   to	   be	   very	   clear,	   otherwise	   in	  
presence	  of	  uncertainty	  a	  finding	  of	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  standard	  may	  not	  be	  appropriate.	  	  In	  essence,	  
this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  pillars	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  And	  it	  is	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  selflessness	  that	  one	  
may	  struggle	  in	  practice	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  exact	  content	  of	  the	  duty.	  For	  instance,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
given	  description	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  duty	  to	  act	  with	  selflessness,	  and	  the	  prohibition	  to	  act	  
in	  conflicts	  of	  interest,	  as	  prescribed	  by	  the	  integrity	  principle,	  seems	  blurred13.	  	  
Also,	  whereas	  selflessness	  may	  appear	  as	  a	  positive	  attribute	  that	  should	  be	  nurtured	  and	  required	  
(and	  it	  is	  often	  confused	  with	  altruism),	  it	  may	  instead	  connote	  a	  relatively	  weak	  trait	  of	  character	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  one’s	  own	  sense	  of	  self	   is	  absent14.	  Yet	   it	   is	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  self	  to	  be	  among	  the	  
drivers	  for	  speaking	  up	  (or	  whistleblowing,	  as	  commonly	  known).	  Having	  a	  sense	  of	  self	   implies	  for	  
instance,	   self	   awareness;	   it	   is	   comparable	   to	   the	   gnoti	   te	   auton	   of	   the	   ancient	   Greek	   tradition,	  
knowing	  who	  you	  are	  and	  what	  do	  you	  stand	  up	  for.	  	  
It	  may	  be	  questioned	  whether	  selflessness	  in	  practice	  may	  also	  impinge	  upon	  holders	  of	  public	  office	  
an	  enhanced	  duty	  of	  care.	  	  	  
Finally,	   one	   may	   interpret	   selflessness	   as	   not	   being	   selfish.	   However,	   this	   needs	   to	   be	   clearly	  
contextualised	   as	   being	   selfish	   in	   private	   life	   does	   not	   necessarily	   equate	   being	   selfish	   in	   the	  
                                                
12	  Despite	  various	  scandals	  and	  failings,	  the	  UK	  holds	  a	  long	  standing	  tradition	  of	  public	  sector	  integrity	  which	  
is	  generally	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  Northcote-­‐Trevelyan	  Report	  and	  which	  is	  often	  praised	  in	  political	  speeches	  as	  a	  
national	  asset.	  Evidence	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Public	  Administration	  Select	  Committee,	  The	  Public	  service	  
ethos.	   Seventh	   report	   of	   session	   2001-­‐2,	   Vol	   I,	   available	   at	  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmpubadm/263/263.pdf.	   The	   same	   words	  
“civil	  servants”	  echo	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  strong	  public	  service	  ideal.	  	  
	  
13	  In	  the	  original	  report	  Selflessness	  was	  described	  as:	  “holders	  of	  public	  office	  should	  take	  decisions	  solely	  in	  
terms	  of	   the	   public	   interest.	   They	   should	   not	   do	   so	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   financial	   or	   other	  material	   benefits	   for	  
themselves,	  their	  family	  or	  their	  friends”.	  Integrity	  was	  originally	  described	  as:	  	  “holders	  of	  public	  office	  should	  
not	  place	  themselves	  under	  any	  financial	  or	  other	  obligation	  to	  outside	  individuals	  or	  organisations	  that	  may	  
influence	  them	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  official	  duties”.	  Honesty	  instead	  read	  as	  follows:	  “holders	  of	  public	  
office	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  declare	  any	  private	   interests	  relating	  to	  their	  public	  duties	  and	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  resolve	  
any	  conflicts	  arising	  in	  a	  way	  that	  protects	  the	  public	  interest”.	  See	  1995	  Nolan	  Report,	  p	  14	  
	  
14	  This	  would	  stem	  for	  a	  pure	  semantic	  analysis.	  
	  
 professional	  one.	  Having	  regard	  to	   the	  CSPL	  definition	  of	   integrity,	   the	   following	  analysis	  has	  been	  
conducted	  based	  on	  an	  interpretation	  of	  selflessness	  as	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  be	  selfish15	  in	  the	  pursuing	  of	  
the	  public	  interest.	  	  
With	  specific	   reference	   to	  banking	  and	   finance,	   the	  public	   interests	   involved	   in	   the	   regulatory	  and	  
supervisory	  activities	  of	  B&F	  authorities	  can	  be	  found	  in	  their	  combined	  remits:	  preserving	  financial	  
stability;	  maintaining	   trust	   in	   the	   financial	   system	   and	   ensuring	   the	   fair	   and	   correct	   behaviour	   of	  
financial	  players	  as	  a	  way	  to	  protect	  investors.	  	  
More	   specifically,	   the	   PRA	   mandate,	   or	   general	   objective,	   is	   the	   promotion	   of	   the	   safety	   and	  
soundness	   of	   PRA-­‐authorised	   persons.	   The	   objective	   is	   advanced	   primarily	   by	   “seeking	   to	   ensure	  
that	  the	  business	  of	  PRA	  –authorised	  persons	  is	  carried	  on	  in	  a	  way	  which	  avoids	  any	  adverse	  effect	  
on	   the	   stability	  of	   the	  UK	   financial	   system	  and	  by	   seeking	   to	  minimise	   the	  adverse	  effect	   that	   the	  
failure	  of	  a	  PRA-­‐authorised	  person	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  on	  the	  UK	  financial	  system”	  16.	  
The	   FCA	   strategic	   objective17	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   relevant	   markets	   function	   well.	   The	   FCA	  
operational	  objectives	  are:	  the	  consumer	  protection	  objective,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  need	  to	  secure	  an	  
appropriate	   degree	   of	   protection	   for	   consumers;	   the	   integrity	   objective,	   which	   refers	   to	   the	  
protection	  and	  the	  enhancement	  of	   the	   integrity18	  of	   the	  UK	   financial	   system	  and	  the	  competition	  
objective,	  which	  relates	  to	  the	  need	  to	  promote	  effective	  competition	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  consumers19	  
in	  the	  markets.	  	  	  	  
The	   Bank	   of	   England	   is	   the	   Central	   Bank	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   with	   the	   primary	   mission	   of	  
promoting	   the	   good	   of	   the	   people	   of	   the	  United	   Kingdom	  by	  maintaining	  monetary	   and	   financial	  
stability.	   In	  a	  nutshell,	   the	  Bank	   seeks	   to	  maintain	  public	   confidence	   in	   the	  monetary	   system;	   sets	  
inflation	  targets;	   regulates	  and	  oversees	  the	  payment	  and	  settlement	  system;	  acts	  as	  a	   lender	  and	  
                                                
15	  As	  selflessness	  is	  often	  discussed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  conflicts	  of	  interests,	  the	  word	  “disinterested”	  could	  
have	  been	  employed.	  However	  it	  is	  still	  seen	  as	  inappropriate	  because	  holders	  of	  public	  officers	  should	  pursue	  
a	  public	   interest,	  or	  they	  should	  be	  interested	  in	  the	  most	  objective	  outcome	  in	  case	  of	  decision	  making	  and	  
enforcement	  or	  resolution	  powers.	  	  
	  
16	  Included	  in	  Sec	  2B	  FSMA	  2000.	  Please	  note,	  the	  version	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  Financial	  Services	  Bill	  
currently	  under	  discussion,	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  amend	  the	  PRA	  statutory	  objectives.	  	  
	  
17	  FCA	  objectives	  are	  included	  in	  Sec	  1B	  FSMA	  
	  
18	  Integrity	  in	  this	  sense	  relates	  to:	  the	  soundness,	  stability	  and	  resilience	  of	  the	  system;	  its	  not	  being	  used	  for	  
purposes	  connected	  to	  financial	  crime	  and	  affected	  by	  behaviour	  which	  constitute	  market	  abuse;	  the	  orderly	  
operation	  of	   financial	  markets	  and	  the	  transparency	  of	   the	  price	   formation	  process.	  See	  Sec	  1D	  FSMA	  2000.	  
The	   Financial	   Services	   (Banking	   Reform)	   Act	   	   2013amends	   FSMA	   2000	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   including	   an	   FCA	  
continuity	  objective	  for	  those	  non	  PRA	  regulated	  activities	  (ie,	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  provision	  
of	  core	  financial	  services	  in	  the	  UK).	  	  
	  
19	  Sec	  1G	  FSMA	  2000	  gives	  the	  widest	  possible	  definition	  of	  consumers,	   including	  both	  actual	  and	  potential	  	  
users	  of	  financial	  services	  as	  well	  as	  all	  those	  who	  have	  rights	  or	  interests	  in	  financial	  instruments.	  	  	  	  
	  
 market	   maker	   of	   last	   resort	   in	   case	   of	   crisis	   and	   has	   primary	   operational	   responsibility	   for	   the	  
management	  of	  financial	  crisis20.	  
The	  Monetary	  Policy	  Committee	  sets	  interest	  rate	  at	  a	  level	  judged	  appropriate	  to	  meet	  the	  inflation	  
target.	   This	   in	   turn	   enables	   the	   achievement	   of	   low	   and	   stable	   prices	  with	   benefits	   to	   the	   overall	  
economy.	  More	  recently,	  the	  MPC	  has	  also	  been	  entrusted	  with	  quantitative	  easing	  powers21.	  
It	  could	  then	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  selflessness	  required	  to	  maintain	  financial	  stability	  and	  trust	  in	  the	  
markets,	   as	   public	   goods,	   imposes	   upon	   members	   of	   B&F	   authorities	   a	   duty	   to	   understand	   the	  
negative	   implications	   that	   a	   selfish	   professional	   conduct	  may	   have	   on	   the	   consumers	   of	   financial	  
services	  and	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  authority.	  
Under	   this	   light,	   the	   issue	   at	   stake	   seems	   to	   be	   how	   to	   embed	   the	   spirit	   of	   public	   purpose	   in	  
employees’	   behaviour	   and	   attitude.	   	   Part	   of	   the	   answer	  may	   be	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   organisational	  
culture	  which	  not	  only	  trains,	  rewards,	  nourishes	  good	  behaviour	  as	  well	  as	  sanctions	  misbehaviour	  
but	  that	  inculcate	  also	  a	  sense	  of	  loyalty	  and	  belonging	  on	  their	  employees.	  This	  however	  needs	  to	  
be	  balanced	  against	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  staff	  private	  life22.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  address	  this,	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  how	  B&F	  authorities	  ensure	  that	  1)	  members	  of	  staff	  
are	  aware	  of	  the	  specialty	  of	  their	  role;	  and	  2)	  how	  their	  behaviour	  is	  monitored	  and	  assessed.	  	  
To	   this	   end	   we	   will	   verify	   the	   existence	   of	   “values	   statement”;	   and	   wherever	   possible,	   ad	   hoc	  




The	  FCA	  narrative	  on	  who	  they	  are	  and	  what	  they	  do	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  convey	  immediately	  a	  strong	  
sense	   of	   public	   interest	   or	   their	   commitment	   to	   highest	   standards	   of	   behaviour.	   In	   their	  website,	  
which	  presumably	   is	   the	   first	  point	  of	   reference	   for	  perspective	  applicants	   (and	  for	   the	  public	  as	  a	  
                                                
20	  With	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  Financial	  Services	  Bill,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  will	  become	  a	  
prudential	  regulatory	  authority	  and	  will	  exercise	  its	  functions	  through	  the	  PRC.	  
	  
21	  To	  put	  it	  simply,	  with	  quantitative	  easing	  measures	  the	  Bank	  issues	  electronic	  money	  to	  buy	  financial	  asset,	  
usually	   government	   bonds,	   from	   the	   private	   sector	   so	   that	   the	   latter	   has	  more	   spending	   power.	   This	   new	  
power	  can	  be	  used	  to	  buy	  corporate	  bonds	  and	  shares,	  which	   in	  turns	  allows	  for	   lower	  borrowing	  costs	  and	  
increased	   wealth.	   See	   Joyce	   et	   al,	   The	   United	   Kingdom’s	   quantitative	   easing	   policy:	   design,	   operation	   and	  
impact,	  at	  BoE	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  2011,	  Q3,	  p	  200.	  The	  MPC	  has	  stopped	  QE	  purchases	  in	  February	  2012	  but	  
“any	  funds	  associated	  with	  purchased	  bonds	  maturing	  have	  been	  reinvested”	  so	  that	  the	  overall	  stock	  of	  QE	  
remains	  the	  same.	  See	  Quantitative	  Easing	  FAQ	  available	  on	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  website.	  	  
	  
22	  The	  CSPL	   (2013)	   report	   considered	   the	   issue	  of	  private	   life	  and	  concluded	   that	   “public	  office-­‐holders	  are	  
entitled	  to	  privacy	   in	  their	  personal	   lives.	  But	   it	   is	   important	  to	  recognise	  that	  there	  can	  be	  circumstances	   in	  
which	  private	  behaviour	  can	  affect	  the	  reputation	  and	  integrity	  of	  a	  public	   institutions,	  and	  which	  require	  an	  
appropriate	  response.	  Such	  intrusion	  should	  only	  happen	  where	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  public	  interest	  to	  justify	  it,	  and	  
should	  always	  be	  proportionate”	  (p	  26).	  	  
	  
 whole),	  reference	  if	  often	  made	  to	  the	  need	  for	  “consumers	  to	  get	  a	  fair	  deal”,	  “the	  industry	  is	  run	  
with	  integrity”,	  “we	  must	  consider	  the	  principles	  of	  good	  regulation	  when	  carrying	  our	  work23”;	  and	  
on	  their	  regulatory	  perimeter.	  This	  notwithstanding,	   it	   is	   likely	  to	  think	  that	  an	  informed	  candidate	  
and	  employee	  would	  delve	  more	  into	  FCA	  documents	  to	  find	  out	  about	  their	  culture.	  	  
More	  specific	  documents,	  such	  as	  their	  business	  plan,	  their	  annual	  report,	  their	  staff	  handbook,	  their	  
code	  of	  conduct,	  and	  their	  corporate	  governance,	   lack	  a	  section	  on	  missions	  and	  values	  and	  there	  
are	  no	  clearer	  indications	  of	  the	  requirement	  on	  FCA	  employees	  to	  put	  the	  public	  interest	  ahead	  of	  
theirs.	  However	  the	  sense	  of	  belonging	  is	  recognised	  in	  their	  corporate	  responsibility	  section	  focused	  
on	   “diversity	  and	   inclusion”,	   “community	  engagement”	  and	   “sustainability”.	  At	   the	  onset,	   the	  FCA	  
specifies	   that	   “our	   role	  within	   the	   community	   is	   key	  and	   this	   approach	  helps	  our	  people	   to	   feel	   a	  
sense	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  FCA	  and	  to	  wider	  society”.	  
Reference	   is	  also	  often	  made	  to	   the	  specialty	  of	   their	   role	   in	  speeches	  and	  other	  documents	   from	  
senior	  FCA	  representatives.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  Chairman	  foreword	  to	  the	  2015/16	  business	  plan	  it	  is	  
stated	  that	  “As	  an	  organisation	  we	  are	  continuously	  looking	  at	  the	  way	  we	  work	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  
we	  are	  meeting	  challenges	  head	  on	  and	  achieving	  the	  high	  standards	  expected	  of	  us”.	  
In	   a	   recent	   speech	   Tracy	   Dermott,	   FCA	   acting	   chief	   executive,	   said:	   “My	   team	   at	   the	   FCA	   make	  
difficult	  and	  important	  decisions	  every	  day	  and	  we	  are	  acutely	  aware	  that	  all	  of	  these	  decisions	  have	  
real	   life	   costs	   and	   implications	   not	   only	   on	   those	   we	   regulate	   but,	   more	   importantly,	   on	   the	  
consumers	  and	  end	  users	  of	  their	  services”	  24.	  	  
Finally,	  when	  asked	  by	   the	  CSPL	  Survey	  whether	   they	  had	  any	   further	  comment	   to	  make,	   the	  FCA	  
noted	   that:	   “as	   a	   regulator	   we	   are	   conscious	   that	   we	   need	   to	   behave	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   beyond	  
reproach,	  given	  the	  censure	  and	  enforcement	  roles	  we	  have	  over	  the	  community	  we	  regulate”.	  
	  
Recruitment	  process	  
The	   FCA	   handbook	   includes	   the	   following	   statement	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Recruitment	   Policy:	   “we	  
believe	   the	   FCA’s	   success	   depends	   on	   having	   the	   right	   people	   in	   the	   right	   jobs	   within	   the	  
organisation.	  The	  purpose	  of	   the	  FCA’s	   recruitment	  policy	   is	   to	  provide	  a	   framework	  to	  ensure	  we	  
recruit,	  retain	  and	  develop	  the	  best	  person	  for	  each	   job”	  25.	  The	  recruitment	  process	   is	  based	  on	  a	  
set	  of	  principles	  which	  foster	  fair	  treatment	  of	  applicants;	  the	  commitment	  to	  recruit	  those	  “who	  not	  
only	  have	  the	  right	  skills	  and	  behaviours	  for	  the	  job,	  but	  who	  also	  have	  a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  the	  
                                                
23	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  good	  regulation	  do	  not	  consider	  acting	  with	  integrity,	  contrary	  
to	  what	  the	  principles	  for	  business	  require	  to	  both	  FCA	  and	  PRA	  authorised	  firms.	  	  
	  
24	  Speech	  by	  Tracy	  McDermott,	  Independence,	  Confidence	  and	  Fairness,	  at	  Bloomberg,	  4	  Feb	  2016,	  available	  
at	  www.fca.org.uk	  
	  
25	  FCA	  Employee	  Handbook,	  August	  2015,	  Ch.	  7.	  
	  
 FCA	  and	  our	  aims”.	  However,	  in	  describing	  what	  is	  expected	  by	  the	  applicant	  there	  is	  no	  reference	  to	  
their	   understanding	   or	   at	   least	   familiarity	   on	   the	   special	   nature	   of	   FCA’s	   objectives26.	   In	   the	   Job	  
Descriptions	  of	  the	  positions	  advertised	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  there	   is	  no	  reference,	  neither	   in	  the	  
minimum	  nor	  the	  essential	   requirements,	   to	  any	  prior	  knowledge	  or	  understanding	  of	  the	  need	  to	  
act	  solely	  in	  the	  public	  interest27.	  	  	  
It	   shall	   be	   noted	   however	   that	   the	   FCA	   has	   a	   similar	   requirement	   for	   candidates	   to	   the	   Board	  
whereby	  “they	  will	  be	  expected	   to	  conduct	   themselves	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  Seven	  Principles	  of	  
Public	  Life	  and	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  principles	   is	  annexed	  to	  their	   letter	  of	  appointment.	  Appointments	  of	  
the	  Chair	  and	  Non-­‐Executive	  Directors	  are	  conducted	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Code	  of	  Practice	  of	  the	  
Office	   of	   the	   Commissioner	   for	   Public	   Appointments”	   28.	   Also,	   this	   is	   how	   the	   FCA	   describes	   their	  
employees	  characteristics:	   	   	  “While	  we	  do	  not	  specifically	  promote	  the	  seven	  principles	  to	  all	  staff,	  
the	   FCA	   has	   identified	   a	   number	   of	   Cultural	   Characteristics	   (Strength	   as	   a	   Team,	   Professional	  	  
Excellence,	  Curiosity,	  Already	  on	  the	  Case,	  Backbone)	  that	  all	  staff	  are	  expected	  to	  demonstrate	  as	  
they	   go	   about	   their	   work.	   	   The	   importance	   given	   to	   the	   cultural	   characteristics	   and	   personal	  
strengths	  of	  Judgment,	  Drive	  and	  Influence	  is	  represented	  by	  their	  inclusion	  as	  a	  core	  part	  of	  the	  FCA	  
capability	   framework.	   In	   this	   way,	   they	   are	   embedded	   through	   the	   employee	   lifecycle,	   from	  
recruitment	  and	   induction	  through	  to	  ongoing	  performance	  management	  and	  appraisal	  –	  how	  our	  
people	  deliver	   is	  weighted	  equally	  with	  what	   they	  deliver.	   The	   cultural	   characteristics	   thus	  have	  a	  
significant	   influence	   on	   how	   the	   FCA	   operates	   and	   help	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   principles,	   particularly	  
objectivity,	  selflessness,	  integrity	  and	  honesty,	  define	  our	  approach”29.	  	  
Finally	  FCA	  employees	  are	  expected	  to	  follow	  “reasonable	   instructions,	  comply[ing]	  with	  the	  terms	  
of	  their	  contract	  of	  employment	  and	  adher[ing]	  to	  the	  FCA’s	  conduct	  policy,	  security	  and	  compliance	  
standards”30.	  
                                                
26	  On	  the	  general	  FCA	  career	  webpage	  mention	  is	  made	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  making	  “a	  real	  difference	  to	  the	  
two	   million	   people	   who	   work	   in	   the	   UK	   financial	   services	   industry,	   the	   40	   million	   consumers	   of	   financial	  
products	  and	  the	  stability	  of	  our	  economy	  as	  a	  whole”	  and	  also	  to	  the	  integral	  part	  played	  by	  their	  people	  to	  
“our	  success	  as	  an	  organisation,	  working	  alongside	  industry,	  visiting	  firms	  and	  speaking	  to	  consumers	  everyday	  
as	   we	   strive	   to	   ensure	   we	   are	   setting	   the	   standard	   for	   other	   regulatory	   bodies	   across	   the	   world”.	   See	  
www.fcacareers.org.uk	  
	  
27	   The	  Minimum	   requirements	   usually	   relates	   to	   prior	   experience,	   whereas	   the	   essential	   to	   personal	   skills	  
such	   as	   “communication;	   collaboration	   and	   flexibility;	   ability	   to	   make	   good	   judgement;	   organisational	   and	  
analytical	  skills”	  and	  so	  on.	  Also	  whereas	  the	  assessment	  process	  varies,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  it	   is	  mostly	  
competence	  based.	  However,	  the	  FCA	  response	  to	  the	  CSPL	  survey	  stated	  that	  the	  competency	  assessment	  is	  
based	  on	  “alignment	  with	  our	  cultural	  characteristics	  and	  personal	  strengths	  as	  well	  as	   technical	  capability”.	  
The	  Website	  section	  on	  Employees	  profile	  features	  only	  a	  series	  of	  videos	  from	  current	  employees	  describing	  
their	  roles	  within	  the	  overall	  FCA	  functions.	  	  
	  




30	  See	  FCA	  Employees	  Handbook,	  p	  155.	  
 	  
Training	  	  
FCA	  seems	  to	  place	  great	  emphasis	  in	  training	  and	  personal	  development.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  regular	  
training	  programmes,	  “all	  permanent	  and	  fixed-­‐term	  contract	  employees,	  as	  well	  as	  contractors,	  and	  
their	  line	  managers	  receive	  a	  new	  joiner	  check	  list	  on	  which	  the	  code	  of	  conduct	  is	  a	  key	  item.	  New	  
joiners	  are	  all	  required	  complete	  a	  full	  day’s	  FCA	  induction	  programme	  which	  brings	  attention	  to	  our	  
responsibilities	   as	   a	   regulator,	   and	   our	   code	   of	   conduct”31.	   There	   are	   also	   a	   number	   of	   training	  
modules	  which	  all	  must	  complete	  upon	  joining	  which	  include	  a	  module	  on	  FCA’s	  Duties	  &	  Powers.	  
	  
Monitoring	  and	  Sanctioning	  
The	   FCA	   monitors	   employees’	   performance	   against	   the	   “behaviours	   each	   employee	   exhibits	   in	  
delivering	   on	   their	   objectives/working	   commitments.	   In	   attributing	   a	   relative	   performance	   rating,	  
this	   behavioural	   aspect	   (how	   they	   deliver	   their	   work)	   is	   weighed	   equally	   with	   what	   they	   deliver.	  
Ratings	   are	   moderated	   at	   a	   local,	   divisional	   and	   then	   FCA	   level	   to	   ensure	   robust	   and	   fair	  
judgements”32	  
It	  seems	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  any	  monitoring	  and	  sanctioning	  procedures	  for	  failure	  to	  act	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  
the	  public	   interest	  would	   fall	  under	   the	   regular	  disciplinary	  procedures	   for	  misconduct,	  where,	   for	  
instance,	  “fraud,	  theft,	  dishonesty	  or	  obtaining	  or	  attempting	  to	  obtain	  an	  advantage	  at	  the	  expense	  
of	  the	  FCA	  or	  any	  person,	  firm	  or	  organisation	  that	  is	  regulated	  by	  the	  FCA”	  can	  initiate	  a	  disciplinary	  
procedure	  for	  gross	  misconduct33.	  
The	  FCA	  handbook	  includes	  a	  section	  on	  Personal	  Conduct	  which	  essentially	  warns	  employees	  of	  the	  
compulsory	  nature	  of	   their	   code	  of	   conduct.	   The	  need	   to	   comply	  with	   the	  Code34,	  which	   includes	  
policies	   on	   conflicts	   of	   interest,	   personal	   dealing	   in	   securities	   and	   rules	   on	   gifts	   and	  hospitality,	   is	  
explained	   in	  the	  following	  terms:	  “We	  are	  responsible	  for	  promoting	  and	  setting	  high	  standards	  of	  
conduct,	  so	  our	  conduct	  both	  as	  an	  organisation	  and	  as	  individual	  employees	  is	  likely	  to	  come	  under	  
close	  scrutiny.	   It	   is	   therefore	  essential	   that,	   in	  common	  with	  many	  other	  organisations,	  we	  have	  a	  
Code	  of	  Conduct.	  This	  provides	  a	  framework	  for	  managing	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  and	  related	  matters.	  
It	  also	  protects	  employees	  against	  any	  suggestion	  that	  regulatory	  decisions	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
31	  From	  FCA’s	  reply	  to	  CSPL	  Ethics	  for	  regulators	  review:	  Regulators	  survey	  
	  
32	  From	  FCA’s	  reply	  to	  CSPL	  Ethics	  for	  regulators	  review:	  Regulators	  survey.	  
	  
33	  A	  non	  exhaustive	  list	  of	  behaviour	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  disciplinary	  procedures	  and	  possibly	  dismissal	  is	  included	  
in	  the	  FCA	  Employees	  Handbook,	  at	  p	  156-­‐157.	  
	  
34	  See	  the	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  Code	  of	  Conduct,	  April	  2013,	  available	  at	  www.fca.org.uk	  
	  
 personal	   interests	   or	   that	   their	   investment	   decisions	   have	   been	   influenced	   by	   information	   made	  
available	  in	  confidence	  to	  the	  FCA.”35	  
	  	  
Bank	  of	  England	  	  
Value/Mission	  statements	  
The	  public	  mission	  of	  the	  Bank	  is	  clearly	  stated	  on	  their	  webpage	  as	  the	  promotion	  “of	  the	  good	  of	  
the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  by	  maintaining	  monetary	  and	  financial	  stability”36.	  
The	  idea	  that	  the	  Bank	  works	  to	  promote	  the	  good	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  is	  reiterated	  
in	  all	  the	  relevant	  web	  pages.	  The	  Bank	  employees’	  handbook	  contains	  a	  foreword	  by	  the	  Governor37	  
which	   reaffirms	   the	   Bank’s	  mission	   and	  which	  makes	   reference	   to	   “the	   values	   to	  which	   the	   Bank	  
aspires,	  our	  role	  as	  public	  servants,	  how	  we	   interact	  with	  the	  public,	  and	  the	  standards	  that	  guide	  
our	  own	  behavior	  and	  our	   relations	  with	  our	   colleagues”38.	  As	  part	  of	   the	  obligations	   towards	   the	  
Bank,	   employees	   are	   expected	   to	   “follow	   the	   highest	   standards,	   both	   in	  work	   undertaken	   and	   in	  
general	  behaviour”39.	  	  
Reference	   to	   the	  core	  purposes,	   responsibility,	  philosophy,	  and	  core	  values,	   including	  a	  section	  on	  
“ensuring	   the	   loyalty	   and	   commitment	   of	   our	   staff”,	   are	   clearly	   stated	   in	   the	   Handbook	   and	   are	  
phrased	  to	  convey	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  public	  duty.	  The	  Handbook	  also	   includes	  a	  specific	  section	  on	  
“ethics	  policicies	  (sic):	  our	  code	  and	  related	  policies”.	  In	  the	  Bank	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  mentions	  is	  made	  
to	  “public	  service”	  and	  “public	  servant”.	  
Finally	  the	  Bank’s	  code	  is	  organised	  into	  5	  core	  values	  with	  three	  of	  the	  Nolan	  principles	  represented	  
in	  section	  headings	  (Integrity,	  openness	  and	  accountability)40.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  “Acting	  with	  integrity”	  
and	  the	  first	  sentences	  of	  the	  chapter	  read	  as	  follows:	  “Selflessness	  is	  one	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  public	  
                                                
35	  See	  FCA	  Handbook,	  p	  175	  
	  
36	   www.bankofengland.co.uk.	   This	   mission	   remains	   almost	   unaltered	   since	   the	   Bank’s	   founding	   Charter	   of	  
1694.	  
	  
37	   The	   CSR	   literature	   usually	   evaluates	   positively	   the	   existence	   of	   accompanying	  
letters/introductions/forewords	  by	  executive	  directors	  to	  codes	  and	  other	  self	  regulatory	  documents	  as	  a	  way	  
to	  communicate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  document	  and/or	  to	  set	  the	  tone	  from	  the	  top.	  	  	  
	  
38	  	  See	  BoE	  Staff	  Handbook,2015,	  p	  2	  
	  
39	  Ibidem,	  p	  6.	  
	  
40	  Namely,	  acting	  with	  integrity;	  creating	  an	  inclusive	  working	  environment;	  demonstrating	  impartiality;	  being	  
open	   and	   accountable;	   feeling	   empowered.	   Bank	   of	   England,	  Our	   code,	   our	   commitment	   to	   how	  we	  work.,	  
version	  1.0,	   June	  2015.	  Discussion	  over	  code	   introduction	  and	  reference	  to	  the	  Nolan	  Principles,	  compliance	  
and	  enforcement	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Directors	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  
of	  Wednesday	  20	  May	  2015,	  p	  3.	  
	  
 life.	  Our	  personal	  interests	  should	  never	  influence	  our	  decisions	  at	  work,	  and	  we	  must	  be	  free	  of	  any	  
suggestion	  of	  inappropriate	  influence.”41	  
	  
Recruitment	  process	  
Unlike	   the	   FCA	   Handbook,	   there	   is	   no	   specific	   section	   on	   the	   recruitment	   process	   on	   their	   Staff	  
Handbook.	  On	  their	  website	  career	  section	  there	  is	  a	  specific	  page	  dedicated	  to	  “What	  is	  like	  to	  work	  
at	  the	  Bank	  of	  England?”,	  with	  sub-­‐headings	  related	  to	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  working	  environment	  
and	  how	  skills	  and	  intellectual	  ability	  of	  employees	  are	  rewarded.	  	  
As	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   Bank	   is	   very	   clear	   throughout	   the	   website,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   their	   code	   and	  
handbook,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   argue	   that	   prospective	   applicants	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   specialty	   of	   their	  
future	  role.	  
Training	  	  
Unlike	   the	   FCA	  Handbook,	   there	   is	   no	   specific	   section	   on	   training	   opportunities	   in	   the	   Bank	   Staff	  
Handbook.	  General	  reference	  to	  training	  is	  made	  throughout	  the	  handbook.	  
The	  Bank	  response	  to	  CSPL	  survey	  includes	  a	  section	  on	  training	  which	  reads	  as	  follows:	  “Currently	  
training	  and	  awareness-­‐raising	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  business	  ethics	  policies	  is	  covered	  as	  part	  of	  
the	   induction	   process	   for	   employees.	   The	   new	   compliance	   function	   will	   oversee	   an	   on-­‐going	  
programme	  of	  training,	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  Bank	  policies	  for	  all	  employees.	  This	  will	  be	  
kept	  under	  regular	  review	  to	  ensure	  it	  remains	  current”.	  
	  
Monitoring/Sanctioning	  
By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  Bank	  has	  a	  specific	  performance	  management	  approach	  which	  monitors	  staff	  
behaviour	   and	   understanding	   of	   their	   public	   role	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   putting	   “as	   much	   emphasis	   on	  
values,	   and	   how	  we	  do	   our	  work	   as	  what	  we	  do.	   All	  managers	   go	   through	   an	   annual	   360	   degree	  
feedback	  process	   based	  on	   the	   values	  we	  expect	   and	  everyone	  who	  works	   at	   the	  Bank	   is	   given	   a	  
rating	  for	  their	  behaviours	  as	  well	  as	  for	  their	  delivery	  against	  their	  objectives	  as	  part	  of	  the	  annual	  
performance	  review	  process.	  	  Both	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  deciding	  on	  the	  overall	  rating	  for	  an	  
individual	  and	  this	  is	  moderated	  through	  discussion	  with	  peers”42.	  
Finally	  the	  Bank	  is	  currently	  setting	  up	  a	  central	  compliance	  function	  to	  assist	  senior	  management	  in	  
managing	  compliance	  with	  the	  Bank	  Code	  of	  Conduct.	  
The	   Bank	   disciplinary	   procedures	   punish	   misconduct	   as	   instances	   of	   loss	   of	   trust	   in	   employee’s	  
judgement	   or	   behaviour,	   dishonesty	   and	   other	   examples	   of	   gross	  misconduct	   as	   well	   as	   “Serious	  
                                                
41	  See	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Our	  code,	  our	  commitment	  to	  how	  we	  work,	  p	  5.	  	  
	  
42	  Bank	  of	  England	  response	  to	  CSPL	  Ethics	  for	  Regulators	  survey.	  	  
	  
 breach	  of	  any	  of	   the	  policies	  and	  rules	  published	  to	  you	  by	  the	  Bank	   from	  time	  to	  time,	   including,	  
without	  limitation	  Our	  Code”43	  
	  
Prudential	  Regulation	  Authority	  
Value/mission	  statements	  
As	  an	  (independent)	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  the	  PRA	  website	  is	  included	  in	  the	  Bank	  one.	  
In	  the	  dedicated	  section	  there	  is	  reference	  to	  the	  statutory	  nature	  of	  the	  PRA	  as	  well	  as	  its	  objectives	  
and	   its	  approach	  to	  regulation	  and	  supervision.	  The	  PRA	   is	  described	  as	  a	   regulatory	  body	   in	  what	  
seems	   to	   be	   a	   disclaimer	   to	   differentiate	   it	   from	  Prudential	   plc.	   There	   is	   a	   specific	   section	  on	   the	  
“PRA	  and	   the	  general	  public”	  which	  mentions	  PRA	  particular	   concerns	  “about	   the	  harm	  that	   firms	  
can	  cause	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  financial	  system”.	  	  
The	  PRA	  has	  a	  specific	  policy	  on	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  of	  the	  appointment	  member	  of	  the	  PRA	  Board	  
which	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  greater	  details	  under	  “Integrity”.	  	  
It	  seems	  plausible	  to	  argue	  that	  potential	  candidates	  as	  well	  as	  employees	  will	  be	  alert	  to	  the	  public	  
interest	  underpinning	  PRA’s	  work.	  	  
	  
Recruitment	  process	  
The	   PRA	   has	   a	   specific	   career	   section,	   which	   starts	   with	   a	   high	   level	   statement:	   “picture	   a	   safer	  
economy	   for	   all,	   then	  help	  make	   it	  happen”,	   it	   continues	   re-­‐stating	   the	  PRA	  objectives,	   explaining	  
the	   meaning	   of	   supervision	   and	   what	   the	   role	   entails,	   and	   concludes	   stating	   that	   “after	   all,	   by	  
promoting	  a	  safer	  and	  more	  robust	  financial	  sector,	  you	  are	  working	  to	  benefit	  every	  single	  person	  in	  
the	   UK”44.	   The	   minimum	   skills	   required	   to	   each	   applicant	   are	   being:	   “an	   analytical	   thinker”,	   “a	  
tenacious	  problem	  solver”,	  “a	  confident	  communicator”,	  “professionally	  credible”.	  	  
	  
Training	  	  
PRA	   staff	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   handbook	   and	   code	   of	   conduct	   of	   the	   Bank	   staff.	   So	   the	   same	  
policies	  apply.	  	  
Monitoring	  and	  Sanctioning	  
Same	  as	  above.	  	  
	  
	  
                                                




 Monetary	  Policy	  Committee	  
	  
Value/mission	  statements;	  Recruitment;	  Training;	  Monitoring/Sanctions	  
Like	   the	   PRA,	   the	   MPC	   website	   is	   hosted	   within	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   Bank	   policies	   apply	   to	   MPC	  
member,	  unless	  otherwise	  specified.	  	  
MPC	  members	  have	  a	  specific	  code	  of	  conduct	  which	  stresses	  the	  “special	  responsibility	  to	  promote	  
the	  reputation	  and	   integrity	  of	   the	  Bank	  and	   its	  decision	  making	  processes.	  They	  must	  at	  all	   times	  
avoid	  statements	  and	  conduct	  that	  could	  in	  any	  way	  undermine	  public	  trust	  in	  the	  Bank.”45	  The	  code	  
then	  disciplines	  conflict	  of	  interests,	  secrecy	  and	  other	  matters	  concerned	  with	  the	  need	  to	  prevent	  
public	  speculation	  over	  monetary	  policies	  decisions.	  	  	  
The	  unique	  nature	  of	  the	  Committee’s	  objectives,	  coupled	  with	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  appointment46	  
makes	  redundant	  any	  analysis	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  involved.	  	  




Against	  definition	  problems,	  the	  analysis	  conducted	  aimed	  at	  verifying	  whether,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  
the	   principle	   of	   selflessness	   is	   part	   of	   the	   regulators’	   internal	   culture	   and	   is	   clearly	   conveyed	   to	  
employees,	  both	  potential	  and	  existing.	  To	  this	  end	  a	  few	  indicators	  have	  been	  identified	  and	  each	  
authority	  has	  been	  assessed	  against	  those.	  	  	  	  
The	   authorities	   considered	   are	   inherently	   diverse.	   The	   FCA	   is	   in	   charge	   of	   conduct	   of	   business	  
regulation	  and	  supervision	  and	  at	  first	  glance	  seems	  to	  be	  very	  market	  –oriented,	  hence	  unable	  to	  
convey	  immediately	  the	  underpinning	  public	  purpose	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  its	  activities.	  The	  Bank	  
of	   England	   is	   the	   central	  bank	  of	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	  whose	   twin	  mandate	   (monetary	  policy	  and	  
financial	  stability)	   is	  able	  per	  se,	  at	   least	   in	  principle,	  to	  convey	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  public	   interest	  to	  
the	  outside	  world	  and	  internally.	  The	  PRA	  and	  the	  MPC	  are	  the	  Bank’s	  operative	  arm	  and	  yet	  they	  
have	  their	  own	  identity.	  
The	  authorities	  differed	  also	   in	  how	   they	   communicated	   the	  public	   interest	   and	  how	   they	   require	  
their	  staff	  to	  live	  up	  to	  it.	  	  
	  
	  
                                                
45	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  MPC	  Members,	  21	  May	  2015.	  
	  
46	  The	  MPC	  is	  made	  up	  of	  9	  members.	  Five	  belong	  to	  the	  Bank	  (the	  Governor,	  the	  three	  Deputy	  Governors	  and	  
and	  the	  Bank	  Chief	  Executive)	  and	  four	  are	  independent	  members	  appointed	  by	  the	  Chancellor.	  	  
	  
 Integrity	  
Integrity:	  holders	  of	  public	   office	  must	  avoid	  placing	   themselves	  under	  any	  obligation	   to	  people	  or	  
organisations	  that	  might	  try	  inappropriately	  to	  influence	  them	  in	  their	  work.	  They	  should	  not	  act	  or	  
take	  decisions	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  financial	  or	  other	  material	  benefits	  for	  themselves,	  their	  family	  or	  their	  
friends.	  They	  must	  declare	  and	  resolve	  any	  interests	  and	  relationships.	  
	  
Some	  recent	  events	  have	  questioned	  the	   integrity	  of	  B&F	  authorities,	  undermining	  their	  credibility	  
and	  trustworthiness.	  	  
For	  example,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  LIBOR	  and	  FOREX	  scandals	  there	  were	  allegations	  that	  the	  Bank	  of	  
England	  knew	  the	  benchmark	  was	  being	  rigged	  and	  yet	  did	  not	  intervene	  to	  bring	  the	  manipulation	  
to	  a	  halt47.	  As	  a	  consequence	  to	  this,	  the	  Bank	  commissioned	  an	  independent	  review	  over	  “whether,	  
between	  2005	  and	  2013,	   any	  Bank	  official	  was	   involved	   in,	   or	   aware	  of,	   the	   conduct	  which	   is	   the	  
subject	  of	   the	  FCA’s	   investigation	   into	   the	  FX	  market”48.	  The	   review	   found	  no	  evidence	   to	   suggest	  
that	  any	  Bank	  official	  was	  involved	  in	  any	  unlawful	  or	  improper	  behaviour	  in	  the	  FX	  market.49	  	  
Also,	  on	  5	  March	  2015	  the	  SFO	  (Serious	   fraud	  office)	   issued	  a	  press	  release	  confirming	  an	  ongoing	  
investigation	  into	  “material	  referred	  to	  it	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  concerning	  liquidity	  auctions	  during	  
the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2007	  and	  2008”	  and	  that	  “The	  material	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  independent	  inquiry	  
that	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  commissioned	  into	  this	  matter.”50	  
                                                
47	  The	  different	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  Bank	  was	  allegedly	  involved	  are	  summarised	  in	  this	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  
article	   by	  David	   Enrich,	  Bank	   of	   England	  Official	   received	   emails	   relating	   to	   LIBOR	  manipulation,	   Prosecutor	  
says	   	   available	   here	   http://www.wsj.com/articles/boe-­‐official-­‐received-­‐emails-­‐relating-­‐to-­‐libor-­‐manipulation-­‐
prosecutor-­‐says-­‐1432729106.	  
	  
48	  See	  Bank	  of	  England	  Foreign	  Exchange	  Market	   investigation.	  A	  report	  by	  Lord	  Grabiner	  QC	  available	  here	  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2014/grabiner.pdf.	   The	   specific	   terms	   of	  
reference	  were	  “whether	  any	  Bank	  official,	  during	  the	  period	  July	  2005	  to	  December	  2013:	  	  (a)	  was	  either	  (i)	  
involved	   in	   attempted	   or	   actual	   manipulation	   of	   the	   foreign	   exchange	   market	   (including	   the	   WMR	   FX	  
benchmark),	  or	  (ii)	  aware	  of	  attempted	  or	  actual	  manipulation	  of	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  market,	  or	  (iii)	  aware	  of	  
the	   potential	   for	   such	   manipulation,	   or	   (iv)	   colluded	   with	   market	   participants	   in	   relation	   to	   any	   such	  
manipulation	  or	  aware	  of	  any	  such	  collusion	  between	  participants;	  	  (b)	  was	  either	  (i)	  involved	  in	  the	  sharing	  of	  
confidential	   client	   information	  or	   (ii)	   aware	  of	   the	   sharing	  of	   such	   information	  between	  participants	   for	   the	  
purposes	  of	  transacting	  business	  in	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  market;	  or	  	  (c)	  was	  involved	  in,	  or	  aware	  of,	  any	  other	  
unlawful	  or	  improper	  behaviour	  or	  practices	  in	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  market”	  p	  42.	  
	  
49	  However,	  the	  reviewer	  “found	  that,	  from	  May	  2008,	  the	  Bank’s	  Chief	  FX	  Dealer,	  Mr	  Mallett,	  was	  aware	  of	  
the	   fact	   that	   banks	   were	   having	   open	   discussions	   about	   their	   fix	   positions	   in	   chat	   rooms	   with	   a	   view	   to	  
matching	  them	  off.	  He	  was	  worried	  about	  the	  practice	  and	  thought	  that	  regulators	  may	  take	  an	  interest	  in	  it.	  
(…).Notwithstanding	  his	  concerns,	  Mr	  Mallett	  did	  not	  raise	  them	  with	  an	  appropriate	  person	  at	  the	  Bank,	  with	  
the	  FXJSC	  (on	  which	  the	  FSA	  sat)	  or	  with	  the	  FSA”.	  Ibidem,	  p	  37.	  Mr	  Mallet	  has	  since	  then	  been	  dismissed	  for	  
serious	  misconduct,	  however	  the	  Bank	  did	  not	  directly	  linked	  his	  dismissal	  to	  the	  case	  in	  question.	  
	  
50	  SFO	  	  Press	  Release,	  SFO	  is	   investigating	  Bank	  of	  England	  liquidity	  auctions,	   	  05	  March	  2015	  available	  here	  
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-­‐room/latest-­‐press-­‐releases/press-­‐releases-­‐2015/sfo-­‐is-­‐investigating-­‐bank-­‐of-­‐
england-­‐liquidity-­‐auctions.aspx.	  The	  correspondent	  Bank	  of	  England	  one	  was	  issued	  the	  day	  before,	  see	  Bank	  
of	   England	   Statement	   on	   SFO	   investigation,	   available	   here	  
 The	   FCA	   has	   been	   under	   severe	   pressures	   from	   the	   media	   for	   being	   allegedly	   influenced	   by	   the	  
Government	   in	   their	   regulatory	   and	   supervisory	   actions.	   Among	   the	   findings	   of	   an	   independent	  
review	   over	   FCA	   board	   effectiveness,	   the	   assessors	   noted	   that	   “stakeholders	   management”	  
constitutes	   a	   challenge51	   and	   recommended	   that	   “the	   Chairman	   and	   the	   board	   need	   a	   clear	   and	  
aligned	  view	  on	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	   role	  and	   independence	  of	   the	  Board,	  which	  can	   then	  be	  
translated	   for	   stakeholders	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   understanding”52.	   More	   recently,	   an	   internal	  
document	   originally	   prepared	   for	   an	   EXCo	   (Executive	   Committee)	   meeting	   was	   leaked	   to	   the	  
Financial	  Times,	  a	  newspaper,	  only	  to	  find	  out	  that	  the	  FCA	  had	  decided	  to	  abandon	  its	  review	  into	  
                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2015/037.aspx.	  On	  this	  and	  other	  issues	  related	  to	  
the	  report	  and	  its	  costs,	  see	  the	  letter	  written	  by	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  to	  Andrew	  
Tyrie	  in	  response	  to	  Tyrie’s	  request	  for	  more	  information	  on	  the	  liquidity	  auctions.	  Anthony	  Habgood,	  Letter	  to	  
Andrew	  Tyrie	  in	  response	  to	  his	  letter	  of	  12	  March	  2015,	  of	  17	  March	  2015.	  
	  
51	  More	   specifically	   the	   review	   stated	   that	   “Like	   most	   regulators,	   the	   FCA	   has	   a	   complex	   and	   demanding	  
stakeholders	   landscape,	  which	   requires	   careful	   interpretation	   and	  management;	   the	   landscape	   is	   populated	  
with	  powerful	  personalities	  and	  strong	  opinions,	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  conflicting	  and	  changing	  agendas	  (noted	  by	  
all	  directors).	  It	  is	  also	  the	  subject	  of	  intense	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  media	  comment.	  Although	  constituted	  as	  an	  
independent	   regulator,	  and	   following	   the	  UK’s	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	   in	  many	   respects,	  Board	  powers	  
are	  limited,	  and	  its	  remit	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  Government;	  this	  has	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  role	  and	  influence	  
of	  the	  Board.	  External	  interventions,	  which	  can	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  chairman,	  and/or	  bypass	  the	  Chairman	  and	  
the	   Board	   entirely,	   can	   have	   dramatic	   effects	   on	   the	   organisation.	   All	   directors	   are	   aware	   that	   the	   political	  
landscape	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  manage.	  Recent	  intervention	  by	  HM	  Treasury	  and	  other	  bodies	  have	  raised	  
questions	  from	  directors	  regarding	  the	  Board’s	  independence.”	  FCA,	  FCA	  board	  effectiveness:	  an	  independent	  
evaluation	   	   by	   Boardroom	   Review	   limited,	   October	   2015,	   p	   3,	   available	   here	   https://www.fca.org.uk/your-­‐
fca/documents/reports/fca-­‐board-­‐effectiveness-­‐review-­‐2015.	   In	  the	  past,	  a	  similar	  criticism	  was	  raised	  to	  the	  
Financial	  Services	  Authority	   (the	  FCA	  replaces	   the	  FSA):	   in	   the	  report	  on	  the	  HBOS	  failure,	   the	  FSA	  has	  been	  
considered	   as	   subject	   to	   external	   influence.	   See	   The	   Failure	   of	   HBOS	   plc	   (HBOS).	   A	   report	   by	   the	   Financial	  
Conduct	   Authority	   (FCA)	   and	   the	   Prudential	   Regulation	   Authority	   (PRA),	   November	   2015,	   available	   here	  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/reports/hbos.pdf	  
	  
52	  FCA,	  FCA	  board	  effectiveness,	  2015,	  (fn	  51),	  p	  4.	  The	  review	  has	  been	  commissioned	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  
Treasury	  Committee	  13th	  report	  inquiring	  on	  the	  communication	  incident	  related	  to	  the	  life	  insurance	  review.	  
The	  committee	  was	  “surprised”	  to	  discover	  that	  results	  of	  the	  FCA	  internal	  review	  were	  deemed	  “satisfactory”,	  
and	   urged	   the	   Board	   to	   “commission	   an	   external	   organisation	   to	   conduct	   a	   review	   of	   its	   practices	   and	  
effectiveness”,	  and	  asked	   for	   the	  results	  of	   the	  review	  to	  be	  made	  public,	  p	  66.	  The	   facts	  of	   the	  case	  are	  as	  
follows:	  “On	  the	  evening	  of	  27	  March	  2014,	  the	  Daily	  Telegraph	  published	  an	  article	  on	  its	  website	  describing	  a	  
forthcoming	   thematic	   review	   by	   the	   Financial	   Conduct	   Authority	   (FCA)	   into	   the	   life	   insurance	   market.	   The	  
same	  story	  appeared	  in	  the	  print	  edition	  of	  the	  Telegraph	  the	  following	  day.	  The	  story,	  based	  on	  an	  advance	  
briefing	  given	  by	  the	  FCA	  to	  the	  Telegraph	  earlier	  that	  week,	  gave	  a	  misleading	  impression	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
life	   insurance	   review,	   and	   was	   published	   before	   the	   FCA	   had	  made	   any	   official	   announcement	   of	   its	   own.	  
When	  the	  markets	  opened	  on	  28	  March,	  the	  share	  prices	  of	  several	  leading	  life	  insurers	  began	  to	  fall	  heavily.	  
Only	  when	  the	  FCA	  published	  a	  clarifying	  statement	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  review—several	  hours	   later	  that	  
day—did	   share	   prices	   begin	   to	   recover.”	   See	  House	   of	   Commons	   Treasury	   Committee,	  Press	   briefing	   of	   the	  
FCA’s	   Business	   Plan	   for	   2014/15.	   Thirteenth	   Report	   of	   Session	   2014-­‐15,	   March	   2015,	   p	   3,	   available	   at	  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmtreasy/881/881.pdf.	   An	   independent	  
review	   of	   the	   incident	   was	   previously	   being	   commissioned	   to	   Simon	   Davis,	   partner	   at	   Clifford	   Chance,	   a	  
consultancy	   firm.	  The	   final	   review	  Report	  of	   the	   Inquiry	   into	   the	  events	  of	  27/28	  March	  2014	  relating	   to	   the	  
press	  briefing	  of	  information	  in	  the	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority’s	  2014/15	  Business	  Plan	  	  was	  made	  public	  on	  
20	   November	   2014,	   and	   is	   available	   at	   http://www.fca.org.uk/your-­‐fca/documents/reports/davis-­‐inquiry-­‐
report.	  
	  
 banking	   culture.	   The	   incident	   prompted	   speculation	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   decision	   came	   as	   a	  
consequence	  to	  political	  pressures53.	  	  	  
The	   appointment	   to	   the	   board	   of	   the	   MPC	   of	   Dr	   Gertjan	   Vlieghe54	   provoked	   public	   disdain	   and	  
forced	  the	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee	  to	  intervene	  and	  to	  require	  amendments	  to	  the	  MPC	  code	  of	  
conduct55.	  
The	  risk	  of	  the	  PRA	  losing	  its	  independence	  following	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  bill	  was	  
another	   matter	   of	   concern	   for	   the	   Treasury	   Committee	   who	   questioned	   the	   then	   PRA	   Chief	  
Executive56.	  
Integrity	  per	  se	  has	  the	  broadest	  possible	  meaning	  and	  it	  refers	  to	  our	  moral	  code	  and	  its	  rigour.	  In	  
fact	   in	  principle	   integrity	  would	   include	  few	  of	  the	  Nolan	  principles	  that	  are	  enunciated	  alone,	  and	  
yet	   it	   goes	   beyond	   selflessness	   and	   honesty57.	   As	   such,	   guidance	   on	   its	   actual	   content	   may	   be	  
                                                
53	  In	  response	  to	  a	  Freedom	  of	  Information	  request,	  the	  FCA	  insisted	  they	  had	  not	  sought	  any	  comments	  nor	  
held	  any	  discussion	  with	  the	  Bank,	  the	  PRA,	  HM	  Treasury	  or	  any	  other	  body	  not	  to	  continue	  the	  culture	  review.	  
They	  did	  inform	  the	  “PRA	  by	  email	  on	  17	  December	  2015	  of	  our	  decision	  to	  discontinue	  the	  project.	  The	  PRA	  
acknowledged	   our	   email	   and	   did	   not	   comment	   on	   our	   decision.	  We	   have	   not	   received	   written	   comments,	  
feedback	  or	   observations	   from	   the	  Bank	  of	   England,	  HM	  Treasury	   or	   any	  other	   outside	  body”.	   See	   FCA	   FOI	  
4350,	  available	  at	  www.fca.org.uk.	  Whereas	  the	  FCA	  shared	  a	  version	  of	  the	  proposed	  culture	  review	  with	  the	  
PRA,	  this	  is	  certainly	  not	  enough	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  drop	  the	  review	  came	  amid	  external	  pressures.	  
See	  Email	  from	  the	  FCA	  to	  the	  Clerk	  of	  the	  Committee	  14	  January	  2016,	  available	  at	  www.fca.org.uk.	  See	  also	  
the	  Treasury	  Committee	  Hearing	  of	  Tracey	  McDermott	  and	  John-­‐Griffith	  Jones	  on	  January	  20,	  2016	  where	  the	  
question	  of	  independence	  from	  political	  pressure	  resonated	  widely:	  House	  of	  Commons	  Treasury	  Committee,	  
Oral	   Evidence	   of	   Tracy	  McDermott	   and	   John	   Griffith-­‐Jones,	   Financial	   Conduct	   Authority	   HC	   515,	   20	   January	  
2016;	  PRA	  response	  to	  the	  FOI	  request	  on	  “When	  did	  the	  Prudential	  Regulation	  Authority	  ('PRA')	  first	  learn	  that	  
the	   Financial	   Conduct	   Authority	   ('FCA')	   was	   considering	   discontinuing	   their	   thematic	   review	   of	   'culture'.?”	  
Released	  on	  19	  January	  2016	  
	  
54	  Dr	  Vlieghe	  was	  a	  partner	  at	  Brevan	  Howan,	  an	  asset	  management	  company,	  upon	  his	  appointment.	  
	  
55	  Proposal	  rejected	  by	  the	  Bank’s	  Governor.	  Please	  see	  correspondence	  between	  Andrew	  Tyrie,	  Chairman	  of	  
the	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee,	  and	  Mark	  Carney,	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England.	  	  
	  
56	  See	  Treasury	  Committee,	  Oral	  evidence:	  Bank	  of	  England	  Bill,	  HC	  445,	  Tuesday	  20	  October	  2015,	  available	  at	  
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-­‐a-­‐z/commons-­‐select/treasury-­‐
committee/inquiries1/parliament-­‐2015/bank-­‐of-­‐england-­‐bill-­‐15-­‐16/.	  Andrew	  Bayley,	  then	  PRA	  Chief	  Executive,	  
affirms	  his	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  Bill	  provisions	  related	  to	  the	  PRA	  independence	  and	  separation	  requirements.	  
In	  fact	  he	  confirms	  their	   importance	  saying	  that	  “there	   is	  all	  sorts	  of	  potential	   for	  conflict	  and	  muddle	   if	  you	  
don’t	  get	  that	  right”,	  p	  1.	  
	  
57	  The	  ever	  present	   instances	  of	  misconduct	   in	   the	  banking	   sector	  have	   forced	   judges	   to	  define	   integrity,	   a	  
task	   usually	   assigned	   to	   philosophers	   or	   social	   scientists.	   See	   for	   instance	   Batra	   v	   The	   Financial	   Conduct	  
Authority	   [2014]	  UKUT	  0214	   (TCC);	  Hoodless	   and	  Blackwell	   v	   FSA	   (2003),	  where	   the	   Tribunal	   observed	   that	  
“integrity	   connotes	   	   moral	   soundness,	   rectitude	   and	   steady	   adherence	   to	   an	   ethical	   code.	   A	   person	   lacks	  
integrity	  if	  unable	  to	  appreciate	  the	  distinction	  between	  what	  is	  honest	  or	  dishonest	  by	  ordinary	  standards”,	  as	  
long	   as	   these	   standards	   are	   clear.	   In	   Vukelic	   v	   FSA	   (2009)	   UKFSM	   FSM067	   at	   [23]	   the	   Tribunal	   somehow	  
expanded	  the	  definition	  of	  integrity	  as	  a	  concept	  “elusive	  to	  define	  in	  a	  vacuum	  but	  still	  readily	  recognisable	  by	  
those	   with	   specialist	   knowledge	   and/or	   experience	   in	   a	   particular	   market	   [23].	   Following	   up	   on	   this,	   the	  
Tribunal	   in	   First	   Financial	   Advisors	   Limited	   v	   FSA	   [2012]	  UKUT	  B16	   (TCC)	   also	   referencing	  Hoodless	   draws	   a	  
distinction	   between	   integrity	   and	   honesty:	   “even	   though	   a	   person	   might	   not	   have	   been	   dishonest,	   if	   they	  
either	   lack	   an	   ethical	   compass,	   or	   their	   ethical	   compass	   to	   a	   material	   extent	   points	   them	   in	   the	   wrong	  
 needed.	   As	  with	   selflessness,	   one	  may	   question	   the	   description	   given	   but	   in	   this	   case	   its	   content	  
seems	  to	  be	  clearer.	  The	  CSPL	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  three	  pronged	  duty58	  which	  requires:	  	  1)	  independence;	  2)	  
avoidance	  of	  conflicts	  of	  interests;	  3)	  disclosure	  and	  resolution.	  	  	  
We	  shall	  examine	  independence	  first.	  	  
It	  is	  not	  possible	  here	  to	  give	  a	  full	  account	  of	  the	  established	  body	  of	  academic	  literature	  related	  to	  
the	  independence	  of	  regulatory	  agencies59.	  Also,	  both	  the	  content	  of	  independence	  and	  its	  definition	  
vary	   according	   to	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   subject	   who	   is	   independent	   from	   another	   subject,	   and	   the	  
instruments	   aimed	   at	   guaranteeing	   it.	   Thereby,	   it	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   adopt	   a	   single	   concept	   of	  
independence	   that	   would	   be	   suitable	   for	   any	   type	   of	   B&F	   authority.	   Against	   this	   background,	  
independence	   is	   usually	   characterised	   as	   having	   four	   dimensions:	   institutional,	   functional,	  
organizational	  and	  financial60.	  As	  unelected	  bodies,	  B&F	  authorities	  are	   institutionally	   independent	  
and	  as	  such	  they	  have	  very	  stringent	  accountability	  duties	  (analysed	  below	  under	  the	  relevant	  Nolan	  
principle).	  Independence	  is	  functional	  because	  it	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  valid	  tool	  to	  serve	  specific	  public	  
policy	   goals.	   Organisational	   independence	  may	   be	   limited	   by	   statutory	   prescriptions;	   some	   of	   the	  
B&F	   authorities	   are	   funded	   by	   the	   industry	   they	   regulate	   which	   may,	   in	   principle,	   raise	   some	  
concerns.	  	  
More	  broadly	  the	  independence	  of	  B&F	  authorities	  can	  been	  defined	  as	  “the	  ability	  of	  the	  agency	  to	  
carry	   out	   its	   operations	   without	   undue	   political	   or	   commercial	   interference”61.	   This	   definition	   is	  
                                                                                                                                                  
direction,	   that	   person	   lacks	   integrity”	   [119].	   In	   Arch	   Financial	   Products	   v	   FCA	   [2015]	   there	   is	   a	   further	  
explanation	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  integrity	  and	  honesty	  “a	  lack	  of	  integrity	  does	  not	  necessarily	  equate	  to	  
dishonesty.	  While	  a	  person	  who	  acts	  dishonestly	  is	  obviously	  also	  acting	  without	  integrity,	  a	  person	  may	  lack	  
integrity	  without	  being	  dishonest.	  One	  example	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  integrity	  not	  involving	  dishonesty	  is	  recklessness	  as	  
to	   the	   truth	  of	   statements	  made	   to	  others	  who	  will	   or	  may	   rely	  on	   them	  or	  wilful	   disregard	  of	   information	  
contradicting	  the	  truth	  of	  such	  statements”	  [200].	  To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  and	  in	  a	  less	  legalistic	  jargon,	  the	  latter	  
distinction	  had	  been	  made	  also	  by	  one	  participant	   to	   the	   	  CSPL	   focus	  group	  during	   the	  course	  of	   their	  2013	  
review,	  see	  CSPL	  (2013)	  at	  par	  3.8,	  p	  23.	  
	  
58	   Please	   note,	   integrity	  was	   originally	   described	   as:	   	   “holders	   of	   public	   office	   should	   not	   place	   themselves	  
under	  any	  financial	  or	  other	  obligation	  to	  outside	  individuals	  or	  organisations	  that	  may	  influence	  them	  in	  the	  
performance	   of	   their	   official	   duties”.	   The	   description	   of	   some	   principles	   was	   amended	   in	   2013	   to	   reflect	  
changes	  in	  understanding	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  certain	  words.	  See	  CSPL	  (2013),	  p	  22	  
	  
59	  For	  central	  banks,	  a	  seminal	  work	  is	  Lastra	  R,	  Central	  Banking	  and	  Banking	  Regulation,	  FMG,	  London,	  1996	  	  
	  
60	   Amtenbrink	   F.,	   The	   Democratic	   Accountability	   of	   Central	   Banks	   -­‐	   A	   comparative	   study	   of	   the	   European	  
Central	  Bank,	  Hart	  Publishing,	  Oxford,	  1999,	  p.	  17	  	  
	  
61	   Seelig	   S.,	   Novoa	   A.,	  Governance	   practices	   at	   financial	   regulatory	   and	   supervisory	   agencies,	   IMF	  Working	  
Paper	  01.07.2009.	  Central	  Bank	  independence	  is	  also	  enshrined	  into	  the	  EU	  Treaty,	  art.	  130:	  “When	  exercising	  
the	  powers	  and	  carrying	  out	  the	  tasks	  and	  duties	  conferred	  upon	  them	  by	  the	  Treaties	  and	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  
ESCB	  and	  of	  the	  ECB,	  neither	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  nor	  a	  national	  central	  bank,	  nor	  any	  member	  of	  their	  
decision-­‐making	  bodies	  shall	  seek	  or	  take	  instructions	  from	  Union	  institutions,	  bodies,	  offices	  or	  agencies,	  from	  
any	  government	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  or	  from	  any	  other	  body.	  The	  Union	  institutions,	  bodies,	  offices	  or	  agencies	  
and	  the	  governments	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  undertake	  to	  respect	  this	  principle	  and	  not	  to	  seek	  to	   influence	  
the	  members	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  bodies	  of	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  or	  of	  the	  national	  central	  banks	  in	  
the	  performance	  of	  their	  tasks”	  
 particularly	  relevant	  for	  our	  purposes	  since	  B&F	  authorities	  are	  always	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  captured	  by	  
their	  regulatees	  and	  being	  the	  subject	  of	  political	  pressures.	  
Given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  activities	  they	  regulate	  and	  oversee,	  and	  given	  the	  financial	  importance	  that	  
these	  have	  on	   the	  economy62,	   especially	   in	   the	  UK,	  B&F	  authorities	   are	   always	  under	   the	  political	  
radar.	   In	   some	   cases	   they	   must	   coordinate	   their	   actions	   with,	   or	   receive	   instructions	   by,	   the	  
Treasury.	  Besides,	  their	   institutional	   independence	  is	  a	  creature	  of	   law,	  and	  laws	  are	   influenced	  by	  
the	  political	  climate	  and	  will63	  64.Their	  independence	  is	  also	  functional	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  goals	  
and	  tools	  set	  out	  in	  the	  law.	  	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
62	  According	  to	  parliamentary	  research,	  “in	  2014,	  financial	  and	  insurance	  services	  contributed	  £126.9	  billion	  in	  
gross	  value	  added	  (GVA)	  to	  the	  UK	  economy,	  8.0%	  of	  the	  UK’s	  total	  GVA.	  London	  accounted	  for	  50.5%	  of	  the	  
total	  financial	  and	  insurance	  sector	  GVA	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  2012.	  The	  sector’s	  contribution	  to	  UK	  jobs	  is	  around	  3.4%.	  
Trade	  in	  financial	  services	  makes	  up	  a	  substantial	  proportion	  of	  the	  UK’s	  trade	  surplus	  in	  services.	  In	  2013/14,	  
the	  banking	  sector	  alone	  contributed	  £21.4	  billion	  to	  UK	  tax	  receipts	  in	  corporation	  tax,	   income	  tax,	  national	  
insurance	   and	   through	   the	   bank	   levy”.	   See	   House	   of	   Commons,	   Financial	   Services:	   contribution	   to	   the	   UK	  
economy,	   SN/EP/06193,	   26	   February	   2015,	   available	   here	  
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06193/SN06193.pdf.	   GVA	   is	   a	   specific	   measure	   of	  
the	  value	  of	  a	   sector	   to	   the	  economy.	  GVA	   is	  used	   to	  estimate	   the	  GDP,	  which	   is	   an	   indicator	  of	   the	  whole	  
economy.	   The	  GDP	  measures	  may	  use	   production,	   income	  and	   expenditure	   approaches.	  GVA	  measures	   are	  
used	  to	  calculate	  GDP	  when	  the	  production	  or	  income	  approaches	  are	  used.	  See	  www.ons.gov.uk	  for	  further	  
reference.	  	  	  	  
	  
63	  During	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  discussions	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Bill,	  Lord	  Sharkey	  (LD)	  overtly	  discusses	  both	  
political	  influences	  and	  those	  of	  the	  Bank	  over	  the	  FCA.	  “The	  requirement	  that	  the	  PRA	  board	  has	  a	  majority	  of	  
external	   members	   is	   an	   important	   provision.	   Its	   purpose	   is	   clear:	   it	   is	   to	   protect	   against	   and	   counter	  
overwhelming	  influence	  by	  the	  Bank.	  Unfortunately,	  whether	  there	  is	  really	  a	  majority	  of	  independent	  board	  
members	  is	  open	  to	  significant	  doubt.	  It	  depends	  on	  whether	  or	  not,	  as	  the	  Bank	  asserts,	  the	  CEO	  of	  the	  FCA	  
can	  properly	  be	  described	  as	  either	  external	  or	  independent.	  As	  I	  said	  on	  Monday	  when	  discussing	  the	  status	  
of	  her	  membership	  of	  the	  FPC,	  the	  CEO	  of	  the	  FCA	  has,	  at	  best,	  a	  qualified	  independence,	  not	  to	  be	  compared	  
with	  the	  true	  independence	  of	  the	  truly	  external	  members.	  She	  depends	  for	  her	  job	  on	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  
Chancellor	  and	  of	   the	  governor.	  Her	  organisation	   is,	   in	  many	   respects,	   controlled—or	  can	  be	   controlled—or	  
constrained	   by	   the	   Bank	   or	   its	   organs.	   The	   summary	   sacking	   of	   her	   predecessor,	  Martin	  Wheatley,	   by	   the	  
Chancellor,	  with,	  no	  doubt,	  at	  least	  the	  agreement	  of	  the	  governor,	  is	  a	  clear	  and	  dramatic	  illustration	  of	  just	  
how	  much	  independence	  the	  CEO	  of	  the	  FCA	  has	  when	  it	  comes	  down	  to	  it.	  When	  I	  raised	  the	  same	  point	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  FPC,	  the	  Minister	  disagreed.	  He	  asserted	  simply	  that	  the	  FCA	  was	  a	  completely	  independent	  
body.	  The	  evidence	  for	  this	  is	  pretty	  thin,	  as	  others	  have	  noticed.	  As	  recently	  as	  August,	  the	  Adviser	  Lounge	  ran	  
an	  article	  headlined:	  «Financial	  advice	  review	  shows	  FCA	  is	  not	  independent».	  It	  concluded	  that	  the	  regulator	  
can	  be	  pushed,	  both	  formally	  and	  informally,	  into	  enacting	  the	  Minister’s	  will.	  It	  quoted	  an	  historical	  example.	  
It	   noted	   that	   the	   former	  Housing	  Minister,	  Grant	   Shapps,	   intervened	  directly	   in	   the	   FCA’s	  mortgage	  market	  
review	  consultation	  in	  December	  2010—and	  Grant	  Shapps	  was	  not	  even	  a	  Treasury	  Minister”.	  Lord	  Sharkey’s	  
opinion	  had	  been	   seconded	  by	  both	   Lord	  Tunnicliffe	   (Lab)	   and	   the	  Parliamentary	   Secretary,	   Lord	  Bridges	  of	  
Headley	   (Con).	   	   See	   Official	   Report	   Bank	   of	   England	   and	   Financial	   Services	   Bill	   [HL],	   Committee	   2nd	   day	  
discussion	  of	  Amendment	  19,	  11	  November	  2015:	  col	  1998-­‐2001.	  	  
	  
64	  However,	  the	  reverse	  is	  also	  true.	  For	  instance	  the	  provisions	  included	  in	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  Financial	  
services	  Bill	  related	  to	  the	  Bank	  organisation	  and	  the	  PRA	  desubsidiarisation	  currently	  under	  discussion	  came	  
as	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   the	   internal	   reorganisation	   of	   the	   Bank	   as	   a	   “One	   Bank”.	   This	   is	   clearly	   stated,	  
among	  the	  others,	   in	   the	  Treasury	  briefing	  paper	  to	  the	  HL	   for	   the	  Bill	  where,	  as	  noted	  by	  Lord	  Bridges,	   the	  
PRA	  suggested	  governance	  would	  “conform	  with	  the	  governor’s	  “One	  Bank”	  strategy	  aimed	  at	  breaking	  down	  
barriers	  within	  the	  Bank,	  «that	  could	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  unified	  culture	  and	  impede	  flexible	  and	  coordinated	  
working	  across	  the	  Bank»”.	  Ibidem,	  col	  2001-­‐02.	  
 Regulatory	   capture	   is	   a	   common	   phenomenon,	   but	   in	   banking	   and	   finance	   assumes	   an	   almost	  
unique	  edge65.	  The	  banking	  sector	  has,	  wrongly,	  a	  strong	  embedded	  culture	  of	  profit	  maximisation	  
only	  	  which	  derives	  from	  its	  inability	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  public	  nature	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  credit	  
provision.	   The	   financial	   crisis	   has	   revealed	   that	   the	   industry’s	   main	   purpose	   was	   serving	  
shareholders’	  interests,	  not	  the	  public	  good.	  The	  banking	  business	  is	  based	  on	  running	  other	  people	  
money	   (and	  “to	  make	  money”)	   in	   fact,	  not	  on	  having	  a	   social	   license	   to	  operate.	  On	   the	  contrary,	  
B&F	   authorities	   have	   no	   interest	   in	   the	   profit	  maximisation	   purpose	   of	   their	   regulatees66	   but	   are	  
concerned	   about	   financial	   stability,	   trust	   and	   fair	   treatment	   of	   customers.	   These	   contrasting	  
objectives	   (unlike	   for	   instance	   in	   the	   health	   sector	   where	   both	   the	   regulators	   and	   the	   regulated	  
entities	   have	   a	   clear	   public	   purpose	   in	  mind)	   can	   create	   a	   greater	   tension	   among	   the	   parties	   and	  
make	   the	   regulated	   firms	   particularly	   keen	   on	   gaining	   regulators’	   sympathy.	   However,	   regulators’	  
need	   to	   understand	   their	   business	   implies	   proximity	   to	   them67	   and	   requires	   the	   appointment	   of	  
experienced	   professional	   from	   the	   industry	   itself68.	   	   Regulators	   may	   also	   want	   to	   move	   to	   the	  
regulated	   sector	   lured	   by	   higher	   pay	   and	   different	   challenges	   (phenomenon	   known	   as	   “revolving	  
doors”)69.	  	  
An	  OECD	  report	  from	  2009,	  found	  that	  since	  its	  inception	  in	  2000	  the	  FSA	  had	  36	  different	  members	  
of	  the	  Board.	  Of	  these	  36,	  26	  had	  connections	  at	  board	  or	  senior	  level	  with	  the	  banking	  and	  finance	  
industry	   either	   before	   or	   after	   their	   term	  of	   office	  whilst	   nine	   continued	   to	   hold	   appointments	   in	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
65	  OECD,	  Revolving	  doors,	  Accountability	  and	  transparency-­‐	  emerging	  regulatory	  concerns	  and	  policy	  solutions	  
in	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  May	  2009,	  p	  16.	  
	  
66	   They	   are	   interested	   in	   their	   financial	   soundness	   as	   a	   condition	   for	   financial	   stability,	   however	   financial	  
soundness	  is	  different	  from	  profit	  maximisation.	  
	  
67	  By	  way	  of	  example,	   in	  the	  foreword	  to	  the	  2015/16	  FCA	  Business	  Plan,	  the	  Chairman	  states	  that	  “we	  are	  
also	  committed	  to	  working	  as	  efficiently	  as	  possible	  with	  firms	  to	  deliver	  value	  for	  money	  as	  well	  as	  the	  right	  
outcome	  for	  consumers	  and	  financial	  markets”.	  
	  
68	  It	  shall	  be	  noted	  though	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  shared	  practice	  among	  B&F	  authorities	  overseas.	  	  	  
	  
69	  In	  2013	  the	  Financial	  Times	  published	  an	  article	  by	  Patrick	  Jenkins	  titled	  Reform	  call	  over	  “pitiful”	  pay	  rate	  
at	  BoE’s	  court,	  which	  reported	  on	  the	  need	  to	  pay	  more	  	  non	  executive	  directors	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  reflect	  their	  
increased	  workload	  and	  to	  boost	  their	  prestige.	  The	  article	  reports	  that	  the	  “eight	  external	  non-­‐executives	  in	  
the	   12-­‐seat	   “court”	   –	   as	   the	   BoE’s	   governing	   body	   is	   named	   –	   are	   paid	   just	   £15,000	   a	   year	   for	   a	   time	  
commitment	  of	  three	  days	  a	  month.	  The	  chairman	  of	  the	  court,	  Sir	  David	  Lees,	  who	  works	  three	  to	  four	  days	  a	  
week	  in	  his	  role,	  is	  paid	  £30,000”,	  and	  that	  “Equivalent	  private	  sector	  roles	  are	  far	  better	  paid.	  The	  chairmen	  of	  
the	  UK’s	   big	   banks	   typically	   receive	   £750,000,	  while	   non-­‐executives	   earn	   £50,000	   to	   £100,000”.	   The	   report	  
produced	   by	   the	   Public	   Administration	   Select	   Committee	   (2002)	   stated	   very	   clearly	   that	   serving	   the	   public	  
interest	  should	  not	  necessarily	  entail	   low	  wages.	  The	  Review	  of	  HM	  Treasury’s	  management	  response	  to	  the	  
financial	   crisis	  mentions	   the	  difficulty	   for	   the	  Treasury	   to	   retain	  high	   calibre	   staff	   due	  also	   to	   comparatively	  
lower	   level	   of	   payments,	   but	   suggests	   that	   retention	   could	   be	   improved	   through	   non	   financial	   levers,	  
particularly	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  career	  development.	  See	  Review	  of	  HM	  treasury’s	  management	  response	  to	  




 financial	  corporations	  while	  they	  were	  at	  the	  FSA.	  A	  further	  3	  members	  had	  connections	  with	  other	  
non	  banking	  corporate	  boards,	  and	  the	  remaining	  seven	  had	  no	  such	  connections70.	  
Revolving	   doors	   policies	   are	   those	   which	   impose	   limitations	   upon	   appointments	   and	   limitations	  
upon	  leaving	  the	  office.	  For	  instance,	  the	  former	  (s.c.	  revolving	  in),	  would	  prescribe	  who	  cannot	  be	  
appointed	   to	   a	   specific	   role	   because	   of	   their	  most	   recent	   professional	   background	   and/or	   for	   the	  
existence	   of	   financial	   or	   other	   interests,	   and	   the	   latter	   (s.c.	   revolving	   out)	   would	   impose	  
gardening/cooling	  off	  periods	  or	  approval	  requirements	  before	  moving	  to	  a	  private	  sector	  employer.	  
They	   could	   go	   as	   far	   as	   requiring	   the	   existence	   of	   appropriate	   organisational	   requirements	   or	  
limitations	   on	   roles’	   responsibilities	   to	   the	   private	   employer.	   Revolving	   doors	   policies	   would	  
normally	  be	  applicable	  to	  the	  authorities’	  governing	  body	  and	  possibly	  to	  their	  senior	  staff.	  	  
As	  said,	  these	  policies	  would	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  avoiding	  inappropriate	  levels	  of	  proximity	  to	  the	  
regulatees:	  migrations	  from	  the	  private	  to	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  viceversa	  are	  particularly	  dangerous	  
not	  only	  because	  of	   the	  possible	  capture,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  can	  undermine	  public	   trust	   in	   the	  
authority	  and	  can	  create	  “grey	  areas”71	  where	  a	  perception	  of	  lack	  of	  independence	  is	  ingenerated.	  
The	   law	   already	   establishes	   the	   minimum	   requirements	   for	   appointments,	   including	   provisions	  
related	   to	   independent	   members,	   but	   in	   principle	   authorities	   could	   increase	   that	   level	   by	   self	  
regulatory	  instruments.	  	  
Moving	   on	   to	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   instead,	   it	   shall	   be	   noted	   that	   they	   may	   arise	   not	   only	   as	   a	  
consequence	  to	  the	  revolving	  doors	  phenomenon,	  or	  to	  political	   influence,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  
existence	  of	  any	  other	  sort	  of	   ties,	  direct	  or	   indirect,	  with	   regulated	   firms	  and/or	  with	  their	  senior	  
managers.	  They	  can	  also	  arise	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  privileged	  position	  members	  of	  staff	  hold	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  regulated	  entities.	  One	  striking	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  access	  to	  information	  on	  
listed	   firms	   and	   how	   this	   can	   impact	   investment	   decisions,	   previous	   or	   future,	   of	   B&F	   authorities	  
employees.	  	  	  
Conflicts	  of	  interests	  become	  particularly	  acute	  at	  the	  top	  level.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  FCA/PRA	  report	  
on	  HBOS’s	  failure	  recommends	  that:	  “UK	  financial	  services	  regulators	  should	  also	  guard	  against	  the	  
risks	   of	   actual	   or	   perceived	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   arising	   from	   the	   composition	   of	   their	   Boards.	   The	  
                                                
70	   See	   OECD,	   Revolving	   doors,	   Accountability	   and	   transparency-­‐	   emerging	   regulatory	   concerns	   and	   policy	  
solutions	   in	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  May	  2009,	  p.	  30.	  Revolving	  doors	  have	  of	  course	  attracted	  a	  wealth	  of	  media	  
attention.	  See	  for	  instance,	  Brooke	  Masters,	  Enter	  the	  revolving	  regulators,	  Financial	  Times,	  April	  23	  2012;	  and	  
FSA	  Managing	   director	   to	   join	   PWC,	   	   Financial	   Times,	   20	  March	   2012;	   RBS’s	   Sir	   Howard	   appointment	   stirs	  
revolving	   doors	   concerns,	   	   Financial	   Times	   24	   February	   2015,	  More	   recently	   with	   former	   regulators	   openly	  
discussing	  and	  defending	  their	  move.	  See	  for	  instance,	  Howard	  Davies,	  What’s	  wrong	  with	  taking	  a	  little	  spin	  in	  
the	  revolving	  door?,	  in	  Financial	  Times,	  May	  31	  2013;	  	  and	  Wheatley	  defends	  FCA’s	  revolving	  door	  into	  private	  
sector,	   in	   Money	   Marketing,	   3	   June	   2015,	   available	   here	   http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/wheatley-­‐
defends-­‐fcas-­‐revolving-­‐door-­‐into-­‐private-­‐sector/.	  See	  also	  the	  High	  Pay	  Centre	  Report,	  The	  revolving	  door	  and	  
the	  corporate	  colonisation	  of	  UK	  politics,	  2015	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  OECD	  (2009),	  p	  9.	  
	  
 Review	  found	  no	  evidence	  that	  Mr	  Crosby	  exercised	  undue	  influence	  over	  the	  supervision	  of	  HBOS	  
from	  his	  position	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  FSA’s	  Board.	  However,	  relevant	  regulatory	  authorities	  should	  
review	   their	   conflicts	  of	   interest	  policies	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	   risks	   associated	  with	   including	   serving	  
industry	   practitioners	   as	   non-­‐executive	   directors	   on	   their	   Boards	   are	   adequately	  managed”.	   They	  
should	  also	  have	  the	  “will	  to	  act”	  “free	  from	  undue	  influence,	  in	  particular	  when	  markets	  are	  benign	  
and	  in	  the	  face	  of	  changing	  public	  policy	  priorities”.	  
Finally,	  the	  US	  is	  currently	  legislating	  over	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  and	  revolving	  doors	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  
imposing	   restrictions,	   among	   the	   others,	   on	   regulators	   moving	   to	   the	   private	   sector	   or	   to	   limit	  
remuneration	  to	  those	  who	  want	  to	  move	  to	  the	  public	  sector72.	  
Among	   the	   possible	   integrity	   indicators,	   the	   following	   have	   been	   chosen73:	   	   policies	   on	   “revolving	  
doors”;	  rules	  on	  gifts	  and	  hospitality;	  existence	  of	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  policies	  including	  retention	  of	  
financial	  interest	  before	  taking	  up	  job;	  policies	  on	  self	  dealing.	  
	  
FCA	  
“Revolving	  doors	  policy”	  and	  applicability	  
Appointment	  to	  the	  FCA	  board	  is	  regulated	  by	  Schedule	  1ZA	  sec	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  of	  FSMA	  2000,	  whereas	  
other	   rules	   related	   to	   appointment	   and	   recruitment	   are	   included	   in	   the	   Employee	   handbook.	  
Provisions	  included	  in	  that	  handbook	  are	  applicable	  to	  all	  employees	  with	  no	  distinctions	  based	  on	  
specific	  roles	  and	  seniority.	  
There	   seem	   to	   be	   no	   specific	   provisions	   in	   place	   that	   go	   beyond	   the	   legal	   requirements,	   such	   as	  
prohibition	   based	   on	   previous	   employment	   in	   the	   financial	   services	   industry	   or	   organisational	  
requirements	  on	  the	  subsequent	  private	  sector	  employer.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  Schedule	  1ZA	  Sec	  3	  (3)	  
of	  FSMA	  requires	  the	  Treasury	  to	  take	  into	  account	  whether	  the	  person	  they	  intend	  to	  appoint	  as	  a	  
                                                
72	  See	  Financial	  Services	  Conflict	  of	   Interest	  Act	  S.	  1779,	  presented	  by	  Sen	  Baldwin,	  Tammy	  [D-­‐WI]:	  A	  Bill	   to	  
prevent	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   that	   stem	   from	   executive	   Government	   employees	   receiving	   bonuses	   or	   other	  
compensation	  arrangements	  from	  nongovernment	  sources,	  from	  the	  revolving	  door	  that	  raise	  concerns	  about	  
the	   independence	  of	   financial	  services	  regulators,	  and	  from	  the	  revolving	  door	  that	  casts	  aspersions	  over	  the	  
awarding	  of	  government	  contracts	  and	  other	  financial	  benefits,	  available	  at	  www.congress.gov	  
	  
73	  Existence	  of	  policies	  on	  corruption	  and	  bribes	  could	  have	  been	  included	  too.	  However	  given	  their	  statutory	  
nature	  they	  are	  largely	  present	  in	  all	  the	  institutions	  and	  reflect	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  relevant	  Act	  (UK	  Bribery	  Act	  
2010).	   Gifts	   and	   hospitality	   are	   more	   nuanced	   instead	   since	   they	  may	   be	   bribing	   vehicles	   and	   yet	   the	   Act	  
focuses	  only	  on	  cases	  where	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  establish	  a	  connecting	  factor	  between	  the	  gift/hospitality	  and	  the	  
advantage	  that	  may	  be	  received	  by	  the	  offeror.	  In	  this,	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  authority	  is	  key.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  
shown	  all	  authorities	  have	  specific	  policies	  in	  this	  regards	  that	  go	  beyond	  the	  legal	  requirements.	  For	  a	  more	  
detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  Act,	  see	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  The	  Bribery	  Act	  2010,	  Guidance	  about	  procedure	  which	  
relevant	   commercial	  organisations	   can	  put	   into	  place	   to	  prevent	  persons	  associated	  with	   them	   from	  bribing,	  
March	  2011.	  Rules	   on	   appointment	   and	  dismissal	   of	   the	   relevant	   governing	  bodies	   and	   authorities’	   funding	  
could	   have	   been	   considered	   too.	  However	   these	   too	   are	   already	   set	   out	   in	   the	   law	   and	   have	   been	  broadly	  
discussed	   in	   the	   introductory	   paragraph.	   The	   reason	  why	   lobbying	   has	   not	   been	   included	   here	   is	   explained	  
under	  “scope	  of	  application”.	  
	  
 board	  member	  has	  any	  financial	  or	  other	  interests	  that	  could	  have	  a	  material	  effect	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  
the	   functions	  as	  member	   that	   it	  would	  be	  proper	   for	   the	  person	   to	  discharge.	  Treasury	  appointed	  
members	   are	   also	   prohibited	   from	   acquiring	   any	   financial	   or	   other	   interests	   that	   have	   a	  material	  
effect	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  functions	  as	  member;	  to	  receive	  directions	  by	  the	  Treasury,	  the	  Secretary	  
of	  State	  or	  any	  other	  person.	  	  The	  FCA	  confirmed	  in	  its	  response	  to	  the	  CSPL	  survey	  to	  have	  a	  specific	  
policy	  on	   recruitment	  of	   staff	   from	  the	   regulated	  sector	  and	  movement	  of	   former	  employment	   to	  
the	  regulated	  sector,	  but	  those	  could	  not	  be	  found	  on	  their	  website.	  	  
Rather	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  need	  to	  declare	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  which	  may	  arise	  from	  the	  holding	  of	  
financial	  or	  other	  interests.	  These	  are	  included	  in	  the	  FCA	  Code	  of	  Conduct.	  
There	   is	   a	   specific	   policy	   on	   «Leaving	   the	   FCA»74,	   which	   entitles	   the	   FCA	   to	   impose	   working	  
limitations	   during	   the	   notice	   period,	   and	   which	   seems	   to	   be	   aimed	   at	   preserving	   insurgence	   of	  
possible	  influences.	  This	  notwithstanding,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  out	  that	  it	  is	  a	  general	  policy	  and	  is	  
only	  applicable	  to	  the	  notice	  period,	  during	  which	  the	  FCA	  can:	  	  	  
«exclude	  you	  from	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  FCA,	  and	  any	  regulated	  firm	  or	  other	  third	  party	  at	  which	  you	  
may	  be	  working	  at	  the	  relevant	  time	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  FCA;	  and/or:	  	  
-­‐ require	  you	  to	  carry	  out	  specified	  duties	  for	  the	  FCA	  other	  than	  your	  normal	  duties;	  and/or	  –	  
-­‐ require	   you	   not	   to	   communicate	   in	   your	   capacity	   as	   an	   FCA	   employee	   with	   firms	   or	  
organisations	  regulated	  by	  the	  FCA,	  other	  third	  parties	  or	  FCA	  employees	  or	  officers.	  	  
-­‐ require	   you	   to	   refrain	   from	  attending	   internal	   and	   external	  meetings,	   or	   forums	   that	  may	  
present	  a	  conflict	  or	  are	  commercially	  sensitive	  in	  nature.	  	  
In	  addition	  the	  FCA	  is	  entitled	  during	  the	  notice	  period	  to	  require	  that	  you:	  	  
-­‐ do	  not	  have	  contact	  with	  employees	  or	  third	  parties	  except	  as	  authorised	  by	  us	  	  
-­‐ do	  not	  to	  carry	  out	  all	  or	  part	  of	  your	  duties	  	  
-­‐ return	  to	  us	  all	  documents,	  computer	  disks	  and	  other	  property	  belonging	  to	  us»75.	  
	  	  
Rules	  on	  Gifts	  and	  Hospitality	  
Both	  versions	  of	  the	  FCA	  Code	  of	  Conduct76	  include	  a	  specific	  section	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  Gifts	  and	  
Hospitality.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	  note	   that	   in	   the	  2013	  version	   the	   relevant	  chapter	   starts	  by	  making	  
reference	  to	  the	  UK	  Bribery	  Act	  and	  by	  embedding	  the	  policy	  into	  that	  framework.	  The	  2016	  version	  
instead,	  frames	  the	  policy	  into	  the	  need	  for	  the	  FCA	  to	  “operate	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  public	  defensible,	  so	  
                                                
74	  	  See	  FCA	  Employment	  Handbook,	  2015,	  Ch	  8,	  p	  119	  
	  
75	  Ibidem,	  p	  122	  
	  
76	  	  See	  FCA	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  April	  2013	  and	  January	  2016	  	  
	  
 [the	   employee]	  must	   be	   cautious	   about	   accepting	   and	   giving	   gifts	   and	   hospitality	   that	   could	   give	  
grounds	  for	  suggestions	  of	  undue	  influence”.	  This	  is	  set	  against	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Authority	  to	  “know	  
the	   industries	   and	   stakeholders	   with	   which	   the	   FCA	   interacts	   so	   the	   FCA	   encourages	   networking	  
which	  contributes	  to	  improving	  our	  stakeholders	  relations”.	  
The	   policy	   requires	   disclosure,	   recording	   and	   then	   surrendering	   to	   the	   Ethics	   Officer	   of	   any	   gifts	  
received	  above	  a	  RRP	  value	  of	  30£.	  The	  Ethics	  officer	  will	  then	  take	  action	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  donation	  
to	   charity,	   use	  within	   the	   FCA	  or	   disposal.	  Gifts	   below	  30£	   can	   be	   retained	   by	   the	   employee,	   but	  
must	   be	   disclosed	   and	   recorded.	   “Monetary	   gifts	   (including	   redeemable	   vouchers)	  MUST	  NOT	   be	  
accepted.	   If	   a	  monetary	  gift	   is	   received,	   the	   recipient	  may	  ask	   for	   it	   to	  be	  donated	   to	  a	   charity	  of	  
their	  choice”77.	  
The	   code	   places	   responsibility	   on	   both	   the	   receiver	   and	   the	   relevant	   director	   for	   ensuring	  
compliance	  with	  the	  policies.	  There	   is	  also	  a	  specific	  policy	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  prizes	  and	  on	  the	  
giving	  of	  gifts	  and	  hospitality	  which	  should	  be	  exercised	  with	  caution.	  	  
Rules	  on	  hospitality	  are	  based	  on	  the	  same	  principles,	   ie	  acceptance	  and	  disclosure,	  so	   long	  as	  the	  
hospitality	  is	  not	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  the	  press	  or	  others	  may	  interpreted	  to	  be	  “exclusive	  or	  expensive”.	  
In	   that	   case,	   “It	   is	   therefore	  not	   usually	   appropriate	   to	   accept	   such	   an	   invitation	   except,	   perhaps,	  
where	  it	  would	  increase	  your	  effectiveness	  in	  discharging	  your	  role	  or	  otherwise	  significantly	  further	  
the	  FCA’s	  interests.	  There	  is	  no	  comprehensive	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  exclusive	  or	  expensive	  
hospitality,	  but	  it	  would	  include	  invitations	  to	  major	  sporting	  or	  cultural	  events,	  particularly	  if	  only	  a	  
small	   number	   of	   people	   have	   been	   invited	   to	   attend.	   Directors	   may	   authorise	   acceptance	   of	  
hospitality	  not	  covered	  in	  Table	  4.2	  and	  which	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  exclusive	  or	  expensive	  if,	  in	  their	  
judgement	  and	  having	  considered	  all	  the	  relevant	  factors,	  they	  consider	  it	  appropriate.(For	  directors,	  
authority	  should	  be	  given	  by	  their	   line	  manager)”78.	  Finally	  an	  employee	  must	  not	  seek	  nor	  accept	  
preferential	  rates	  or	  benefits	  in	  kind	  for	  private	  transactions	  carried	  out	  with	  companies	  with	  which	  
they	  have,	  or	  may	  have,	  official	  dealings	  as	  a	  result	  of	  employment	  with	  the	  FCA.	  
Overall,	  the	  rules	  are	  not	  exclusive	  and	  common	  sense	  should	  be	  used	  in	  assessing	  any	  situation	  not	  
covered	  by	  the	  policy.	  As	  said,	  the	  policies	  apply	  to	  all	  members	  of	  staff.	  	  
Gifts	   and	   hospitality	   received	   by	   the	   Chairman	   and	   by	   executive	  members	   of	   the	   Board	   are	   also	  
published	  on	  FCA	  website.	  Data	  are	  available	  starting	  from	  April	  201379.	  
	  
Conflicts	  of	  interest	  including	  retention	  of	  financial	  interest	  before	  taking	  up	  the	  job	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  FCA	  Code	  2016,	  p	  10.	  
	  
78	  Ibidem,	  p	  12.	  
	  
79	  Here	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  The	  FCA	  Code	  of	  Conduct,	  to	  which	  the	  Employees	  handbook	  refers	  to,	  includes	  a	  specific	  policy	  on	  
conflicts	   of	   interests,	   applicable	   to	   all	   members	   of	   staff.	   In	   its	   essence,	   the	   policy	   is	   based	   upon	  
disclosure	  and	  non	  exploitation,	  and	  considers	  both	  actual	  and	  apparent	  conflicts.	  The	  main	  aim	  is	  
the	  protection	  of	  FCA	  reputation	  and	  the	  need	  for	  the	  FCA	  to	  publicly	  defend	  its	  actions.	  A	  register	  of	  
interests	   of	   FCA	   Chairman	   and	   board	   members	   is	   publicly	   available80.	   However	   a	   policy	   which	  
requires	   the	  most	   senior	  managers,	   including	  Chairman	  and	  Board	  members,	   to	   sell	   participations	  
they	  may	  have	  on	  regulated	  companies	  seems	  to	  be	  absent.	  	  
Whereas	  the	  policy	  is	  broadly	  left	  unchanged	  by	  the	  new	  code,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  latter	  
places	  more	  emphasis	  on	  individual	  responsibility81	  and	  that	  it	  now	  includes	  conflicts	  that	  may	  arise	  
from	  “personal	  association	  or	  personal	  interest	  or	  association	  of	  their	  immediate	  family”.	  	  	  
Conflicts	   of	   interest	   are	   indeed	   defined	   as	   the	   possibility	   that	   staff	   work	  may	   be:	   “affected	   by	   a	  
personal	  interest,	  personal	  association	  or	  personal	  interest	  or	  association	  of	  your	  immediate	  family.	  
It	  becomes	  significant	   if	  an	   independent	  third	  party	  might	  reasonably	  take	  the	  view	  that	  there	   is	  a	  
risk	  of	  your	  resultant	  actions	  (or	  those	  of	  a	  personal	  associate)	  being	  affected,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  
are	  actually	  affected.	  Conflicts	  of	  interest	  may	  arise	  in	  various	  ways.	  For	  example,	  as	  the	  result	  of:	  
a.	  a	  direct	  or	  indirect	  financial	  interest	  
b.	   a	   direct	   or	   indirect	   financial	   interest	   held	   by	   a	   commercial	   undertaking	   with	   which	   you	   have	  
connections	  
c.	   a	   personal	   association	   or	   relationship	   with	   those	   affected,	   or	   likely	   to	   be	   affected,	   by	   the	  
information	  or	  issue	  in	  question	  
d.	  an	  expectation	  of	  a	  future	  interest	  (for	  example,	  future	  employment)	  
e.	  in	  some	  cases,	  a	  previous	  association	  with	  the	  information	  or	  issue	  in	  question	  
f.	  a	  relevant	  interest	  of	  an	  immediate	  family	  member,	  in	  the	  types	  of	  circumstances	  set	  out	  above	  at	  
a-­‐e	  
g.	  an	  interest	  arising	  from	  a	  common	  interest	  grouping,	  such	  as	  a	  trade	  association	  or	  other	  public	  or	  
private	   society.	   This	   list	   is	   not	   exhaustive,	   nor	   will	   all	   of	   the	   examples	   necessarily	   give	   rise	   to	  
                                                
80	  	  See	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  of	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81	  For	  instance	  the	  incipit	  of	  the	  current	  definition	  of	  conflicts	  is	  “conflict	  of	  interest	  arises	  when	  your	  work	  for	  
the	  FCA	  could	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  personal	  interest	  or	  personal	  association”,	  whereas	  it	  used	  to	  be	  “A	  conflict	  of	  
interest	  arises	  when	  our	  work	  for	  the	  FCA	  could	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  personal	  interest	  or	  personal	  association”;	  or	  
“you	   must	   not	   exploit,	   or	   reasonably	   appear	   to	   exploit	   any	   personal	   or	   professional	   relationship”	   (2016	  
version)	   against	   “None	   of	   us	  must	   exploit,	   or	   reasonably	   appear	   to	   exploit,	   to	   our	   personal	   advantage	   any	  
personal	   or	   professional	   relationships	  with	   a	   Relevant	  Organisation”	   (2013	   version)”.	   Also	   the	   2013	   version	  
made	   reference	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   “Those	   providing	   information	   must	   be	   confident	   that	   it	   will	   be	   properly	  
handled,	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  must	  be	  identified	  immediately	  when	  they	  arise	  and	  be	  properly	  managed”	  
(p	  6),	  whereas	  no	  such	  a	  reference	  is	  made	  in	  the	  2016	  version.	  	  
 significant	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  If	  you	  are	  in	  doubt	  about	  whether	  a	  conflict	  has	  arisen,	  please	  consult	  
the	  ethics	  officer	  (whose	  details	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  Hub)”82.	  
The	  disclosure	  obligation	  arises	  also	  when	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  particular	  product	  or	  service	  provider	  
(for	   instance	   holding	   of	   assets;	   liabilities	   or	   share	   dealing)	   could	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   conflict	   of	   interest	  
according	  to	  employee’s	  opinion.	  	  
The	  interests	  that	  must	  be	  disclosed	  include,	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to83:	  
“•	  any	  post,	  other	  employment,	  or	   fiduciary	  positions	   that	   you	  hold,	  or	  have	  held	   in	   the	  past	   five	  
years	   in	   connection	   with	   a	   relevant	   organisation	   or	   an	   organisation	   that	   presently,	   to	   your	  	  
knowledge,	  has	  a	  contractual	  relationship	  with	  the	  FCA	  
•	   any	   other	   significant	   relationships	   that	   you	   have,	   including	   a	   professional,	   personal,	   financial	   or	  
family	   relationship,	   held	   in	   connection	   with	   or	   capable	   of	   affecting	   a	   relevant	   organisation.	   This	  
includes	  the	  names	  of	  organisations	  with	  which	  you	  hold:	  
––	  securities	  and/or	  related	  investments	  
––	  pension	  products	  
––	  investments	  with	  life	  assurance	  content	  
––	  mortgages	  
––	  endowment	  policies	  
––	  collective	  investment	  schemes	  
––	   holdings	   in	   investment	   portfolios	   (including	   where	   full	   or	   partial	   discretion	   is	   given	   to	   the	  
investment	  manager)	  
––	  interests	  in	  hedge	  funds	  and	  private	  equity	  funds	  
For	   the	   purposes	   of	   disclosure	   under	   the	   code,	   your	   relationship	   is	   with	   the	   firm	  managing	   your	  
investment	  rather	  than	  with	  a	  particular	  fund.	  	  
•	   the	   names	   of	   organisations	   with	   which	   you	   have	   entered	   into	   any	   ongoing	   formal	   loan	  
arrangements	   under	   which	   you	   have	   borrowed	   a	   capital	   sum	   of	   £5,000	   or	   more	   and	   which	   you	  
expect	  to	  continue	  to	  exist	  for	  at	  least	  six	  months	  
•	  any	  individuals	  with	  whom	  you	  have	  a	  significant	  relationship	  who	  hold	  positions	  or	  are	  employed	  
by	  the	  FCA,	  a	  relevant	  organisation	  or	  a	  firm	  connected	  with	  the	  FCA’s	  business,	  such	  as	  a	  supplier	  or	  
professional	  adviser.	  
	  •	   any	   of	   the	   above	   conflicts	   of	   your	   immediate	   family,	   to	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   you	   are	   aware	   of	  
them”.	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  FCA	  Code	  of	  conduct	  2006,	  p	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83	  For	  a	  full	  list,	  see	  the	  FCA	  Code	  of	  conduct,	  p	  3-­‐6	  
	  
 Upon	  disclosure	  to	  the	  Ethics	  officer,	  the	  latter	  has	  to	  record	  it,	  and	  based	  on	  the	  conflict,	  the	  line	  
manager	  can	  move	  the	  member	  of	  staff	  to	  another	  role	  or	  project84.	  
Contrary	  to	  what	  suggested	  by	  the	  CSPL	   integrity	  principle,	   there	   is	  no	  requirement	  to	  resolve	  any	  
interests	  and	  relationship.	  
Many	  of	  the	  conflicting	  situations	  are	  more	  specifically	  addressed	  by	  the	  policies	  on	  self	  dealing.	  	  
	  
Policies	  on	  self	  dealing	  
The	   FCA	   code	   of	   conduct	   includes	   a	   specific	   section	   titled:	   “personal	   dealings	   in	   securities	   and	  
related	  investments”	  which	  finds	  its	  raison	  d’etre	   in	  the	  prohibition	  of	  insider	  trading,	   ie	  dealing	  on	  
the	  basis	   of	  material	   non	  public	   information,	   as	   regulated	  by	   the	   EU	  Market	  Abuse	  Directive.	   The	  
policy	  however	  goes	  beyond	  the	  law	  to	  impose	  higher	  standards	  of	  conduct	  upon	  FCA	  members.	  The	  
general	  rule	  is	  that	  a	  member	  of	  staff	  cannot	  deal	  in	  securities	  unless	  has	  received	  specific	  clearance	  
and	   in	   case	   of	   authorisation	   shall	   do	   so	   within	   a	   limited	   time	   frame	   (2	   days).	   Clearance	   is	   not	  
permitted	  whenever	  the	  financial	  instrument	  has	  been	  held	  for	  less	  than	  6	  months,	  or	  if	  relates	  to	  an	  
FCA	  regulated	  firm.	  Further	  rules	  relate	  to	  specific	  types	  of	  instruments	  and	  bets	  and	  to	  persons	  who	  
are	  significantly	  related	  to	  the	  member	  of	  staff.	  	  
In	  their	  response	  to	  the	  CSPL	  survey	  the	  FCA	  stated	  that	  “A	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  Code	  applies	  to	  
non-­‐executive	  directors,	  primarily	  to	  provide	  slightly	  different	  practical	  arrangements	  for	  monitoring	  
their	   dealing	   in	   shares,	   reflecting	   the	   fact	   that	   such	  directors	   are	  not	   employees	   and	  do	  not	  have	  
access	  to	  all	  the	  organisation’s	  systems”.	  
	  
Bank	  of	  England	  
“Revolving	  doors	  policy”	  and	  applicability	  
Similarly	   to	   the	   FCA,	   rules	   on	   appointment	   and	   dismissal	   of	   the	   Bank	   governing	   body	   are	   strictly	  
regulated	   by	   the	   law.	  Members	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Directors	   are	   appointed	   by	   Her	  Majesty	   (Bank	   of	  
England	  Act	   1998,	   part	   1	   (1))	   and	   there	   seems	   to	   be	  no	   “revolving	   in”	   restrictions	   upon	  Directors	  
other	  than	  a	  general	  disqualification	  for	  appointment	  “if	  he	   is	  a	  Minister	  of	  the	  Crown	  or	  a	  person	  
serving	  in	  a	  government	  department	  in	  employment	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  remuneration	  is	  payable	  out	  
of	   money	   provided	   by	   Parliament”	   (Schedule	   1	   of	   BoE	   act	   1998	   par	   5	   (1)).	   If	   the	   person	   is	  
subsequently	  appointed	  to	  a	  political	  role,	  he	  shall	  vacate	  office,	  which	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  there	  are	  
no	  restrictions	  on	  the	  taking	  up	  of	  Parliamentary	  posts.	  	  
The	   BoE	   Staff	   Handbook,	   which	   applies	   to	   all	   employees	   including	   those	   with	   more	   senior	   and	  
executive	  roles,	  regulates	  the	  case	  in	  which	  a	  member	  of	  staff	  is	  leaving	  the	  office,	  but	  there	  are	  no	  
                                                
84	  Project	  has	  been	  included	  in	  the	  2016	  version	  of	  the	  code.	  
	  
 limitations	  or	  prohibitions	  as	  to	  the	  new	  role.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  specific	  policy	  related	  to	  the	  taking	  up	  
of	   company	   directorships	   or	   other	   positions	   while	   working	   at	   the	   Bank,	   which	   is	   generally	  
discouraged	   or	   forbidden	   depending	   on	   the	   nature	   and	   role85.	   Rules	   on	   disclosure	   and	   recording	  
apply	  in	  this	  case.	  
Should	  notice	  being	  served	  by	  either	  party,	  the	  Bank	  may	  require	  the	  employee:	  
“3.1	   to	   do	   other	   work	   within	   the	   Bank	   which	   in	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	   Bank	   is	   less	   sensitive	   in	   the	  
circumstances;	  and/	  or	  	  
3.2	  not	  to	  attend	  for	  work	  for	  all	  or	  part	  of	  your	  notice	  period.	  	  
During	  any	  such	  period	  you	  will	  remain	  obliged	  to	  provide	  any	  assistance	  that	  may	  be	  requested	  by	  
the	  Bank,	  but	  unless	  required	  or	  authorised	  to	  do	  so	  by	  the	  Bank	  you	  should	  not:	  	  
(a)	  attend	  the	  Bank’s	  premises;	  	  
(b)	  contact	  any	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  employees	  except	  where	  such	  employees	  are	  your	  personal	  friends	  and	  
you	  are	  contacting	  them	  in	  a	  personal	  capacity;	  	  
(c)	  contact	  any	  customers	  or	  counter-­‐parties	  of	   the	  Bank	  except	  where	  such	  customer	  or	  counter-­‐
party	  is	  your	  personal	  friend	  and	  you	  are	  contacting	  them	  in	  a	  personal	  capacity;	  	  
(d)	  make	  any	  public	  statements	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Bank	  or	  any	  of	  its	  officers	  or	  employees;	  or	  	  
(e)	  engage	   in	  any	  other	  occupation	  (whether	  as	  employee	  or	  otherwise)	  outside	  your	  employment	  
with	  the	  Bank.”86	  	  
Further	  duties	  are	  imposed	  on	  staff	  leaving	  the	  Bank	  that	  aim	  at	  protecting	  the	  Bank’s	  interest.	  For	  
instance	  during	  the	  following	  six	  months	  from	  the	  termination	  date,	  those	  who	  were	  entrusted	  with	  
operational,	  management	  and	  analytical	   roles	  are	   forbidden	   from	  soliciting	  away	  or	  engaging	  with	  
Key	  personnel	  of	  the	  Bank.87	  
	  
Rules	  on	  Gifts	  and	  Hospitality	  
The	  Bank	  “entertainment	  and	  gifts	  policy”	  is	  mentioned	  in	  their	  code	  of	  conduct88	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  
need	   to	   apply,	   and	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   applying,	   “high	   standards	   of	   ethical	   behaviour	   to	   maintain	  
objectivity	  and	  commercial	  impartiality	  and	  to	  protect	  against	  any	  suggestion	  of	  impropriety”89.	  	  
                                                
85	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Directorship	  policy,	  available	  at	  www.bankofengland.co.uk	  	  
	  
86	  See	  BoE	  Staff	  handbook,	  2015,	  p	  24	  
	  
87	  Ibidem,	  p	  23	  
	  
88	  Section	  C2	  of	  the	  Staff	  Handbook	  states	  that	  "you	  must	  not	  accept	  or	  offer	  in	  your	  official	  capacity,	  any	  fee,	  
gratuity,	  gift,	  hospitality,	  entertainment	  or	  consideration	  of	  any	  kind,	  from	  or	  to	  a	  Bank	  customer,	  supplier	  or	  
any	   other	   person,	   without	   authority	   from	   your	   Manager/Head	   of	   Division.	   If	   you	   are	   in	   any	   doubt	   about	  
 Members	   of	   staff	   are	   also	   required	   to	   apply	   common	   sense	   and	   Executive	   Directors,	   Directors	  
and/or	  Heads	  of	  Division	  may,	  where	  necessary,	  propose	  adaptation	  of	   the	   rules	   to	   suit	  particular	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  work	  of	  their	  area.	  Stricter	  rules	  and	  standards	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  required	  when	  
staff	  have	  a	  “direct	  commercial	   involvement	  with	  an	  organisation	  or	   individual	  through	  their	  work;	  
for	   example,	   purchasing,	   tenders	   and	   contracts,	   financial	   market	   operations.”90.	   Entertainment	  
offers	   should	  be	  disclosed	  and	  authorised,	  even	   if	   the	  member	  of	   staff	   is	   invited	  as	  accompanying	  
spouse	  or	  partner.	  	  Offer	  of	  entertainment	  deemed	  “excessive”	  should	  be	  refused.	  Here	  “excessive”	  
is	  defined	  as	  “offers	  of	  entertainment	  that	  are	  time-­‐consuming,	  over-­‐frequent,	  part	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  
invitations	  to	  one	  area	  from	  a	  particular	  organisation	  that,	  taken	  together,	  appears	  inappropriate;	  or	  
disproportionately	  lavish.	  Invitations	  to	  expensive	  or	  exclusive	  sporting	  or	  cultural	  events	  should	  not	  
be	  accepted”91.	  Gifts	  acceptance	   is	  discouraged,	  but	   if	  necessary	  gifts	  up	  to	  a	  value	  of	  30£	  may	  be	  
retained.	  Again,	  disclosure,	  disposal	  and	  recording	  rules	  apply.	  There	  are	  also	  specific	  provisions	  on	  
speaking	  engagements.	  	  
In	   relation	   to	   senior	   managers	   and	   board	   members,	   “The	   Bank	   releases	   information	   about	  
appointments,	   expenses,	   receipt	   of	   entertainment	   and	   gifts	   over	   £100	   from	   external	   parties,	  
excluding	  any	   information	  which	   the	  Bank	   considers	   confidential	   at	   the	   time.	  The	  data	   is	   released	  
with	  a	  lag	  of	  around	  3	  months,	  currently	  available	  until	  end-­‐	  August	  2015”	  on	  the	  Bank	  website.	  
	  
Conflicts	  of	  interest	  including	  retention	  of	  financial	  interest	  before	  taking	  up	  the	  job	  
The	  Bank	  of	  England	  has	  wide	  ranging	  policies	  on	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  which	  are	  also	  tailor	  made	  to	  
role	  seniority92.	  There	  are	  specific	  policies	  on:	  directorship;	  financial	  relationships;	  political	  activities;	  
community	  and	  charity	  roles;	  and	  personal	   financial	   transaction	  policies.	  These	  are	  all	  available	  on	  
the	  Bank’s	  website93	  and	  overall	  require	  disclosure,	  recording	  and	  approval	  requirements.	  	  
                                                                                                                                                  
accepting	  or	  offering	  a	  gift	  or	  entertainment,	   then	  you	  should	  discuss	   this	  with	  your	  Manager	  prior	   to	  doing	  
so".	  	  
	  
89	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Entertainment	  and	  gifts	  policy,	  p	  1	  
	  
90	  Ibidem,	  p	  2	  
	  
91	  Ibidem	  p	  2	  
	  
92	   So	   for	   instance,	   in	   its	   response	   to	   the	   CSPL	   survey	   the	   Bank	   specifies	   that	   «The	   Bank’s	   Non-­‐Executive	  
Directors	   and	   those	   in	   the	   Senior	   Policy	  Group	   (covering	   the	  MPC,	   FPC,	   and	  PRA	  Board),	   are	   subject	   to	   the	  
same	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  and	  underlying	  policies.	  The	  rules	   for	   this	   senior	  group	  of	   staff	  are	  more	  stringent	   in	  
relation	   to	   some	   of	   the	   policies,	   for	   example	   the	   personal	   financial	   transactions	   and	   financial	   relationships	  
policies,	  with	  the	  senior	  policy	  group	  required,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  to	  disclose	  annually	  their	  stock	  of	  assets.	  
There	   are	   additional	   ‘conflicts	   of	   interest’	   Policies	   for	  MPC,	   FPC	   and	  PRA	  Board	  members.	   The	   FPC	  Code	  of	  
Conduct	  includes	  the	  provision	  that	  members	  are	  prohibited	  from	  donating	  to	  political	  parties.	  The	  interests	  of	  
all	  members	  of	  the	  senior	  policy	  committees	  and	  of	  the	  Non-­‐Executive	  Directors	  have	  to	  be	  declared	  and	  are	  
listed	  on	  the	  Bank’s	  website».	  
	  
93	  Here	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/humanresources/default.aspx	  
 With	   specific	   reference	   to	   “relationships	   with	   financial	   institutions	   that	   might	   be	   perceived	   to	  
influence	   your	   judgement	   or	   affect	   your	   decisions”94,	   disclosure	   duties	   arise	   with	   respect	   of	   the	  
following:	   “a.	   holdings	   of	   securities	   or	   related	   investments	   in	   institutions	   regulated	   by	   the	   Bank,	  
including	   stock	   options,	   share	   related	   reward	   schemes.	   b.	   holding	   a	   balance	   or	   deposit	   in	   a	   PRA-­‐
regulated	  bank	  of	  a	  value	  greater	  than	  the	  FSCS	   limit	   (currently	  £85k).	  c.	  holding	  an	   investment	  or	  
pension	  product	  with	  a	  PRA-­‐regulated	  insurer	  whose	  return	  depends	  on	  the	  profits	  of	  the	  insurance	  
company	  –	  for	  example	  a	  ‘with	  profits’	  policy.	  d.	  having	  any	  other	  financial	  relationship	  which	  could	  
reasonably	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   potential	   conflict	   of	   interest.	   This	   would	   include	   deferred	  
remuneration	  arrangements”.	  
There	   is	  no	   specific	  definition	  of	   conflicts	  of	   interest,	   as	   the	  code	   is	  more	   focused	  on	   the	  possible	  
source	  rather	  than	  their	  description.	  The	  Bank	  encourages	  members	  to	  consult	  with	  their	  manager	  
or	  deputy	  secretaries	  whenever	  in	  doubt.	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  specific	  “personal	  relationship”95	  policy	  which	  aims	  at	  making	  the	  Bank	  aware	  of	  any	  
outside	  interest	  that	  might	  influence	  staff	  judgement.	  The	  Bank	  can	  then	  make	  adjustment	  to	  avoid	  
conflicts,	   as	   well	   as	   “any	   suspicion	   of	   collusion,	   founded	   or	   unfounded”.	   The	   close	   personal	  
relationships	   that	  need	   to	  be	  disclosed	  are:	  1)	   the	  existence	  of	  a	   family	  member	  or	   someone	  else	  
connected	  to	  the	  member	  of	  staff,	  working	  in	  the	  Bank;	  2)	  Personal	  relationships	  with	  a	  person	  or	  an	  
organisation	  outside	  the	  Bank	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  “financial,	  economic	  or	  political	  journalism;	  
Bank-­‐regulated	   financial	   institutions	   (including	   PRA-­‐regulated	   firms);	   significant	   dealing	  
counterparties;	  a	  firm	  that	  is	  holding	  or	  tendering	  for	  a	  contract	  with	  the	  Bank”96.	  
Depending	  on	  the	  circumstances	  the	  Bank	  may	  decide	  to	  move	  the	  member	  of	  staff	   to	  a	  different	  
role.	  	  
Policies	  on	  self	  dealing	  
The	   policy	   on	   “personal	   financial	   transactions”	   is	   extremely	   thorough	   and	   goes	   well	   beyond	   the	  
Market	  Abuse	  requirements.	  In	  a	  nutshell	  the	  policy	  allows	  staff	  to	  keep	  previously	  acquired	  holding	  
of	   instruments	   but	   these	   cannot	   be	   actively	  managed	  nor	   increased.	   They	   can	  be	   sold,	   but	   under	  
Banks’	  permission97.	  There	  is	  a	  general	  prohibition	  over	  the	  purchase	  of	  financial	  instruments	  in	  any	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
94	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Financial	  relationships	  policy,	  p1,	  available	  at	  www.bankofengland.co.uk	  
	  
95	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Personal	  relationships	  policy,	  p1,	  available	  at	  www.bankofengland.co.uk	  
	  
96	  Ibidem,	  p1	  
	  
97	  “If	  you	  have	  joined	  the	  Bank	  with	  holdings	  of	  such	  securities	  (or	  held	  them	  prior	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  
this	  policy)	  you	  will	  be	  able	   to	   retain	   them,	  exercise	   rights	  arising	   from	  them	  or	  sell	   them,	  but	  you	  may	  not	  
acquire	   more	   or	   actively	   manage	   them.	   You	   must	   declare	   your	   holdings	   under	   the	   Bank’s	   financial	  
relationships	   section	   of	   HRConnect	   (see	   the	   Financial	   Relationships	   Policy).	   If	   you	   exercise	   your	   rights	   in	  
relation	  to	  your	  prior	  holding	  or	  sell	  these	  securities,	  you	  should	  report	  it	  via	  the	  transaction	  reporting	  system	  
in	  HRConnect.	  	  
 entity	  regulated	  by	  the	  Bank.	  There	  are	  provisions	  related	  to	  discretionary	  management,	  speculative	  
/	  short	  term	  transactions98,	  advice,	  prohibitions99.	  Rules	  apply	  also	  to	  those	  transaction	  undertaken	  
for	  or	  by	  connected	  person,	  where	  connected	  person	  refer	  to	  “spouse;	  civil	  partner;	  children	  or	  step	  
children	  under	  18	  years,	  and	  any	  other	  person	  with	  whom	  you	  live	  in	  an	  enduring	  family	  relationship	  
if	  you	  take	  or	  advise	  on	  financial	  decisions	  with	  that	  person”100.	  Specific	  rules	  apply	  also	   in	  case	  of	  
trusteeships	  of	  charitable	  organisations.	  
It	  shall	  be	  highlighted	  that	  a	  stricter	  policy	  applies	  to	  Members	  of	  the	  Court,	  MPC,	  PRA,	  EXCo,	  and	  
FPC.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   requirements	   set	   out	   for	   all	   members	   of	   staff,	   the	   former	   have:	   Annual	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	   1.8	  It	  is	  acceptable	  for	  a	  balanced	  discretionary	  portfolio	  to	  contain	  some	  financial	  securities	  provided	  
you	  have	  no	  control	  over	  day	  to	  day	  investment	  decisions	  and	  provided	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  such	  arrangement	  
are	  approved	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Bank	  in	  advance.”	  
	  
98	  “You	  should	  not	  undertake	  transactions	  whose	  main	  purpose	  is	  speculative	  (e.g.	  to	  make	  a	  capital	  gain	  or	  
avoid	  a	  loss	  in	  the	  short	  term),	  or	  in	  betting	  on	  financial	  variables	  or	  indices.	  	  
	   1.5	   Taking	   out	   a	   Contract	   for	   Differences	   (CfD),	   which	   includes	   ‘spread	   betting’	   in	   relation	   to	  
securities,	   UK	   indices	   /	   sectors	   or	   economic	   variables	   of	   direct	   interest	   to	   the	   Bank	   and	   its	   forecasting	  
processes	  (e.g.	  commodity,	  currency	  markets)	  or	  the	  UK	  equity	  market	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  prohibited.”	  
	  
99	  “Reporting	  Officers	  will	  not	  approve	  transactions	  where	  you	  have	  -­‐	  or	  might	  be	  perceived	  to	  have	  -­‐	  relevant	  
information	  that	  is	  not	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  for	  example,	  ahead	  of	  decisions,	  publications	  or	  announcements	  
made	  by	  any	  of	   the	  Bank’s	  senior	  policy	  committees	   (including	   the	  FPC,	  MPC	  and	  PRA	  Board).	  2.3	  Generally	  
your	   Reporting	   Officer	   will	   not	   approve	   dealings	   which	   appear	   to	   be	   short-­‐term	   and	   speculative	   and	   will	  
question	  and	  may	  not	  approve	  a	  transaction	  that	  is	  subsequently	  reversed	  within	  three	  months	  -­‐	  depending	  on	  
the	  circumstances	  this	  may	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  Code.	  This	  is	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  both	  you	  and	  the	  
Bank,	  as	  such	  transactions	  could	  result	  in	  a	  perception	  of	  an	  abuse	  of	  information	  much	  more	  easily	  than	  for	  
other	  investments	  You	  are	  required	  to	  obtain	  prior	  permission	  for	  the	  transactions	  listed	  below.	  At	  least	  one	  
working	  day’s	  notice	  must	  be	  given,	  via	  the	  transaction	  reporting	  system	  in	  HRConnect.	  	  
	   3.2	  Transactions	  which	  must	  be	  pre-­‐reported	  and	  cleared	  include:	  	  
	   I.	   Transferring	   funds	   into,	   out	   of,	   or	   between	   savings,	   deposit	   or	   investment	   accounts,	   National	  
Savings	   instruments	   or	   Collective	   Investment	   Schemes	   and	   investments	   made	   via	   a	   peer	   to	   peer	   lending	  
services,	  where	  the	  value	  of	  the	  transaction	  is	  more	  than	  £15,240.	  	  
	   II.	  Arranging	  a	  mortgage	   (including	  mortgage	  transfers,	   re-­‐mortgaging,	  mortgage	  equity	  withdrawal,	  
or	   switching	   from	   a	   fixed	   to	   floating	   arrangement,	   or	   vice-­‐versa	   or	   extending	   an	   existing	   mortgage).	  
“Arranging”	  in	  this	  context	  means	  entering	  into	  an	  agreement	  to	  borrow,	  or	  acquiring	  an	  option	  to	  borrow	  on	  
stated	  terms	  and	  conditions.	  	  
	   III.	  Setting	  up	  a	  personal	  pension	  plan	  with	  a	  choice	  of	  funds	  or	  exercising	  an	  option	  under	  such	  a	  plan	  
to	   switch	   funds.	   Switching	   between	   funds	   within	   the	   Bank’s	   Supplementary	   Pension	   Plan	   need	   not	   be	  
reported.	  
	   IV.	   Dealings	   in	   securities	   and	   related	   investments,	   including	   those	   made	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   personal	  
pension	  plan	  and	  investments	  in	  commodities,	  such	  as	  precious	  metals.	  	  
	   V.	  Purchases	  or	  sales	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  where	  the	  value	  of	  a	  transaction	  (or	  series	  of	  transactions)	  is	  
greater	  than	  the	  equivalent	  of	  £15,240.	  Where	  regular	  FX	  purchases/sales	  are	  planned	  (e.g.	  to	  service	  running	  
costs	   of	   a	   foreign	   property),	   or	   income	   from	   such	   property),	   a	   one-­‐off	   permission	   can	   be	   sought	   for	  
transactions.	  	  
	   VI.	   Any	   financial	   transaction	  not	   specified	   above	  but	  which,	   in	   the	  nature	   and	   spirit	   of	   these	   rules,	  
could	  reasonably	  be	  seen	  as	  sensitive.	  	  
	   3.3	  You	  should	  not	  split	  up	  financial	  transactions	  in	  order	  to	  circumvent	  these	  requirements.	  	  
	   3.4	  Once	  approved,	  a	  transaction	  should	  be	  executed	  promptly”.	  
	  
100	  Ibidem,	  p	  6	  
	  
 reporting	   duties;	   to	   place	   under	   full	   discretionary	   management	   their	   large	   portfolios	   and	   “a	  
responsibility	  to	  make	  themselves	  aware	  of	  any	  transaction	  of	  the	  nature	  covered	  by	  these	  rules	  by	  a	  
spouse	   or	   other	   connected	   person	   that	   could	   cause	   damage	   to	   the	   reputation	   of	   the	   Bank.	   The	  
failure	  to	  seek	  approval	  for	  any	  such	  transaction	  may	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  Code.	  They	  must	  
keep	  records	  of	  all	  their	  financial	  transactions,	  and	  of	  any	  connected	  persons,	  for	  at	  least	  5	  years	  and	  
on	  request	  make	  them	  available	  to	  the	  Bank.”	  
	  
PRA	  	  
Revolving	  doors	  policy	  and	  applicability	  
The	  appointment	  to	  the	  PRA	  board	  is	  strictly	  regulated	  by	  the	  law	  and	  the	  general	  rules	  applicable	  to	  
Bank	  of	  England	  staff.	  In	  addition,	  Schedule	  1ZB	  (10)	  of	  FSMA	  imposes	  upon	  the	  Court	  a	  duty	  to	  have	  
regard	   to	   generally	   accepted	   principles	   of	   good	   practice	   related	   to	   the	   making	   of	   public	  
appointments	  in	  appointing	  PRA	  board	  members.	  The	  Code	  of	  Practice	  for	  Ministerial	  appointment	  
requires	   that	   the	  appointment	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  merit,	   fairness	  and	  openness	  and	  that	   the	  
candidates	  meet	   the	  criteria	  set	   forth	   in	   the	  CSPL	  Seven	  Principles	  of	  Public	  Life	  “and	  will	  have	  no	  
conflicts	  of	  interest	  that	  would	  call	  into	  question	  their	  ability	  to	  perform	  the	  role”101.	  
It	  is	  further	  stated	  in	  FSMA	  that	  “Before	  appointing	  a	  person	  as	  an	  appointed	  member,	  the	  court	  of	  
directors	  must	   consider	  whether	   the	  person	  has	  any	   financial	  or	  other	   interests	   that	   could	  have	  a	  
material	  effect	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  functions	  as	  member	  that	  it	  would	  be	  proper	  for	  the	  person	  to	  
discharge.”	  Sec	  11	  (2),	  includes	  a	  similar	  requirements	  to	  the	  FCA	  board,	  namely	  that	  “The	  terms	  on	  
which	  an	  appointed	  member	  (“M”)	  is	  appointed	  must	  be	  such	  as	  –	  
(a)	  to	  secure	  that	  M	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  direction	  by	  the	  Bank,	  
(b)	  to	  require	  M	  not	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  directions	  of	  any	  other	  person,	  and	  
(c)	   to	  prohibit	  M	  from	  acquiring	  any	   financial	  or	  other	   interests	   that	  have	  a	  material	  effect	  on	  the	  
extent	  of	  the	  functions	  as	  member	  that	  it	  would	  be	  proper	  for	  M	  to	  discharge.”	  
	  
Rules	  on	  gifts	  and	  hospitality	  
Same	  as	  the	  Bank.	  
	  
Conflicts	  of	  interest	  including	  retention	  of	  financial	  interest	  before	  taking	  up	  the	  job	  
                                                
101	   See	   the	   Commissioner	   for	   public	   appointment,	   Code	   of	   Practice	   for	  ministerial	   appointments	   to	   public	  
bodies,	  1	  April	  2012,	  par	  4.	  
	  
 PRA	  members	  of	   staff	  are	  subject	   to	   the	  same	  policies	  as	  Bank	  of	  England	  employees.	  However,	  a	  
specific	  conflicts	  of	   interest	  policy	  applies	  to	  the	  appointed	  members	  to	  the	  PRA	  Board102.	  The	  PRA	  
policy	   on	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   of	   the	   “appointed	   members”	   of	   the	   Board	   insists	   on	   the	   need	   to	  
appoint	  candidates	  with	  the	  necessary	  expertise	  and	  qualifications	  but	  recognises	  that	  this	  enhances	  
the	  possibility	  of	  conflicts.	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  policy	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  PRA	  reputation	  from	  the	  risk	  
that	  the	  appointed	  person	  is	  as	  such	  as	  to	  ingenerate	  the	  suspicion	  of	  not	  being	  fully	  independent,	  
disinterested	  and	  impartial;	  or	  that	  the	  firm	  to	  which	  the	  person	  is	  connected	  to	  “may	  have	  an	  unfair	  
competitive	  advantage	  by	  reason	  of	  assumed	  access	  to	  information	  or	  policy	  thinking”.	  	  	  
To	   this	  end,	   further	  obligations	  are	   imposed	   in	  addition	   to	   the	   statutory	   requirements	   included	   in	  
FSMA	   and	   those	   of	   the	   Company	   Act.	   For	   instance,	   a)	   “The	   acceptability	   of	   a	   conflict	   should	   be	  
judged	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  potential	   reputational	  risk	  to	  the	  PRA.	  This	  risk	  may	  be	  reduced	  by	  the	  
conflicted	  board	  member	   recusing	  himself/herself	   from	  Board	  decisions	   and	  discussions,	   although	  
not	  necessarily	  so.	  A	  reputational	  risk	  can	  materialise	  even	  where	  an	  individual	  has	  not	  had	  to	  recuse	  
himself	   from	  decisions	  and	  discussions	   in	   the	  past;	  b)	  A	  conflict	  of	   interest	  as	  a	  result	  of	  holding	  a	  
financial	  interest	  in	  a	  PRA	  authorised	  person	  would	  normally	  disqualify	  an	  individual	  from	  becoming	  
a	   member	   of	   the	   PRA	   board,	   subject	   to	   a	   “de	   minimis”	   test;	   c)	   The	   policies	   are	   expected	   to	   be	  
applied	   more	   rigorously	   in	   relation	   to	   executive	   directors	   and	   to	   non-­‐executive	   chairmen.	  
Unacceptable	  conflicts	  will,	  however,	  generally	  also	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  Board	  members	  who	  are	  non-­‐
executive	   directors.	   Whether	   a	   conflict	   disqualifies	   an	   individual	   will	   depend	   on	   the	   nature	   and	  
importance	  of	  the	  firm”	  and	  “a	  judgement	  should	  be	  made	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis	  whether	  the	  size,	  
significance	   and	   nature	   of	   the	   firm’s	   business	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   PRA’s	   objectives	   is	   such	   as	   to	  
require	   disqualification”.	   Full	   time	   consultancy	   arrangements	  with	   firms	  would	  normally	   disqualify	  
the	  candidate,	  whereas	  part	  time	  ones	  will	  be	  assessed	  on	  a	  case	  by	  case	  basis.	  	  
Finally,	   the	   PRA	   articles	   of	   association	   include	   a	   specific	   section	   on	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   of	  
directors.103	  	  
	  
Policies	  on	  self	  dealing	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  Namely	  those	  members	  that	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	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103	   See	   «Conflicts	   of	   interest»	   par	   44ff	   of	   the	   Articles	   of	   Association	   of	   Prudential	   Regulation	   Authority	  
Company	  number	  07854923,	  available	  at	  www.bankofengland.co.uk	  
	  
 The	  	  four	  external	  members	  of	  the	  MPC	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  Chancellor	  (FSMA	  par	  13	  (2)	  (c)	  who	  
has	  to	  be	  satisfied	  that	  the	  person	  has	  knowledge	  or	  experience	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  
Committee’s	  functions.	  FSMA	  Schedule	  3	  par	  (5)	  (A)	  disqualifies	  a	  person	  for	  appointment	  if–(a)	  he	  is	  
a	  Minister	  of	  the	  Crown,	  or	  a	  person	  serving	  in	  a	  government	  department	  in	  employment	  in	  respect	  
of	  which	  remuneration	  is	  payable	  out	  of	  money	  provided	  by	  Parliament,	  or	  (b)	  he	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
court	  of	  directors	  of	  the	  Bank.	  A	  person	  appointed	  under	  section	  13(2)(b)	  or	  (c)	  shall	  vacate	  office	  if	  
he	  is	  elected.	  A	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  who	  is	  appointed	  to	  the	  MPC	  board	  must	  leave	  the	  office	  too,	  
which	  implies	  that	  there	  are	  no	  ex	  ante	  restrictions	  to	  the	  taking	  up	  of	  the	  post.	  
	  
Rules	  on	  gifts	  and	  hospitality	  
Same	  as	  the	  Bank.	  
	  
Conflicts	  of	  interest	  including	  retention	  of	  financial	  interest	  before	  taking	  up	  the	  job	  
As	   with	   the	   PRA,	   the	   rules	   and	   policies	   applicable	   to	   Bank’s	   staff	   do	   apply	   to	   the	   MPC	   too.	   	   In	  
addition,	  the	  MPC	  has	  a	  specific	  code	  of	  conduct,	  which	  entrusts	  them	  with	  a	  “special	  responsibility	  
to	  promote	  the	  reputation	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  its	  decision	  making	  processes.	  They	  must	  at	  
all	  times	  avoid	  statements	  and	  conduct	  that	  could	  in	  any	  way	  undermine	  public	  trust	  in	  the	  Bank”104.	  
The	   Code	   includes	   provisions	   on:	   conflicts	   of	   interest;	   communication;	   purdah;	   statements;	  
comments;	   secrecy;	   financial	   stability;	   speeches	   and	   other	   media	   plans;	   political	   involvement;	  
lectures	  and	  academic	  journals;	  information	  services	  for	  MPS	  members;	  and	  other	  issues.	  	  	  
The	   policy	   on	   conflicts	   is	   as	   follows:	   “Members	   of	   the	   MPC	   may	   not	   retain	   any	   directorship,	  
trusteeship,	  advisory	  post	  or	  other	  interest,	  whether	  or	  not	  remunerated,	  which	  is,	  or	  could	  be	  seen	  
to	  be,	   in	  conflict	  with	  membership	  of	  the	  Committee.	  The	  acceptability	  of	  particular	  appointments	  
and	  interests	  will	  be	  assessed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐	  case	  basis.	  Examples	  of	  clear	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  would	  
be	  where	  MPC	  members	  provide	  their	  services	  as	  consultants	  or	  as	  non-­‐executive	  directors	  to	  banks,	  
securities	   firms,	   investment	  managers	   or	   other	   financial	   institutions	   or	   to	   any	   other	   body	   if	   their	  
relationship	   involves,	   or	   could	   be	   seen	   to	   involve,	   the	   provision,	   directly	   or	   indirectly,	   of	  
commercially	  valuable	  advice	  relating	  to	   the	  conjunctural	  position	  or	   to	  prospects	   in	   the	  UK	  or	   for	  
the	   foreign	   exchange	   market.	   On	   appointment,	   members	   will	   be	   asked	   to	   disclose	   all	   relevant	  
commitments	   and	   interests	   to	   the	   Governor	   and	   to	   the	   Chancellor.	   The	   Chancellor	   will	   decide	  
whether	   the	   continuation	  of	  any	   commitment	  or	   interest	   is	   incompatible	  with	  membership	  of	   the	  
committee;	  the	  Governor	  may	  offer	  advice	  in	  this	  regard.	  Members	  should	  also	  notify	  the	  Secretary	  
of	  the	  Bank	  –	  who	  will	  consult	  the	  Governor	  as	  appropriate	  –	  in	  advance	  if	  they	  are	  planning	  to	  take	  
on	   any	   new	   outside	   commitment	   or	   interest	   which	  might	   be	   seen	   as	   in	   any	   way	   in	   conflict	   with	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  CODE	  OF	  CONDUCT	  FOR	  MPC	  MEMBERS,	  21	  May	  2015	  
	  
 membership	  of	   the	  MPC,	  or	   if	   a	  potential	   conflict	  arises	   in	   respect	  of	  any	  existing	  commitment	  or	  
interest.	  The	  Governor	  may	  also	  choose	  to	  consult	  the	  Chancellor	  as	  appropriate.	  The	  Bank,	  through	  
its	  press	  office,	  will	  answer	  specific	   factual	  questions	  about	  other	  commitments	  and	   interests	  held	  
by	  MPC	  members	   and	   will	   disclose	   details	   of	   these	   in	   its	   Annual	   Report.	   It	   will	   also	   disclose	   the	  
remuneration	  of	  MPC	  members.”105.	  
Finally,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Bill	  under	  discussion	  includes	  a	  specific	  provision	  on	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  
of	  MPC	  members	   which	   imposes	   disclosure	   requirements	   of	   actual	   or	   potential	   conflicts	   and	   the	  
possibility	  to	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  discussion	  if	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Committee	  sees	  the	  participation	  
as	  inappropriate.	  This	  will	  bring	  the	  MPC	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  arrangements	  in	  line	  with	  the	  relevant	  
provisions	  of	  the	  UK	  Company	  Act	  2006.106	  	  
	  
Policies	  on	  self	  dealing	  




Against	  the	  CSPL	  definition	  of	   Integrity,	   the	  existence	  of	  Authorities	  practices	  that	  go	  beyond	  their	  
legal	  requirements	  has	  been	  researched,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  dissecting	  whether	  they	  were	  detailed	  and	  
robust	  enough	  to	  ensure	  the	  relevant	  authority	  does	  act	  within	  the	  integrity	  boundaries.	  	  
Policies	  vary	   in	   the	  breath	  of	  details	   included,	  with	  some	  setting	   the	  bar	  particularly	  high,	  and	  yet	  
they	  tend	  to	  converge	  towards	  the	  bottom.	  Other	  than	  what	  set	  out	  in	  the	  law,	  there	  are	  no	  specific	  
prohibitions	  on	  revolving	  doors	  neither	  in	  nor	  out,	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  
candidate	  is	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  appointee	  and	  to	  the	  efficient	  functioning	  of	  the	  subsequent	  
accountability	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  the	  vetting	  from	  the	  Treasury	  Committee.	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106	  The	  provision	  included	  in	  Part	  1	  (8)	  (6),	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  “13B(1)	  If	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Committee	  (“M”)	  has	  any	  
direct	  or	  indirect	  interest	  (including	  any	  reasonably	  likely	  future	  interest)	  in	  any	  dealing	  or	  business	  which	  falls	  
to	  be	  considered	  by	  the	  Committee—	  (a)	  M	  must	  disclose	  that	  interest	  to	  the	  Committee	  when	  it	  considers	  the	  
dealing	  or	  business,	  and	   (b)	   the	  Committee	  must	  decide	  whether	  M	   is	   to	  be	  permitted	   to	  participate	   in	  any	  
proceedings	   of	   the	   Committee	   relating	   to	   any	   question	   arising	   from	   its	   consideration	   of	   the	   dealing	   or	  
business,	  and	  if	  so	  to	  what	  extent	  and	  subject	  to	  what	  conditions	  (if	  any).	  (2)	  The	  Bank	  must	  issue	  and	  maintain	  
a	   code	  of	   practice	  describing	  how	  members	   of	   the	  Committee	   and	   the	  Committee	   are	   to	   comply	  with	   sub-­‐
paragraph	  (1).	  (3)	  The	  Bank	  may	  at	  any	  time	  revise	  or	  replace	  the	  code.	  (4)	  Before	  issuing,	  revising	  or	  replacing	  
the	  code,	   the	  Bank	  must	  consult	   the	  Treasury.	   (5)	  The	  Bank	  must	  publish	   the	  current	  version	  of	   the	  code	   in	  




 By	  the	  same	  token,	  there	  are	  no	  duties	  to	  dispose	  of	  the	  instruments	  that	  may	  ingenerate	  actual	  or	  
potential	  conflicts	  upon	  candidates	  to	  executive	  positions.	  The	  relevant	  policies	  aim	  at	  managing	  not	  
resolving	  the	  conflicts	  in	  fact,	  contrary	  to	  what	  envisaged	  by	  the	  CSPL.	  	  
Even	  though	  one	  may	  wonder	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  fair	  and	  indeed	  effective	  to	  impose	  the	  resolution	  
of	  conflicts	  or	  prohibitions	  over	  	  individuals	  from	  a	  specific	  professional	  background,	  probably	  more	  
can	   be	   done,	   especially	   in	   presence	   of	   deferred	   remuneration	   and	   pension	   packages	   awarded	   to	  
senior	  executives	  who	  join	  the	  B&F	  Authority.	   In	  these	  cases	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  plans	  are	   likely	  to	  
accrue	  once	  the	  Authority’s	  member	  has	  left	  and	  will	  indeed	  potentially	  be	  impacted	  by	  the	  activities	  
carried	  out	  when	  he	  or	  she	  was	  holding	  the	  public	  post.	  The	  law,	  which	  is	  indeed	  quite	  strict	  already,	  
does	   not	   provide	   a	   solution	   for	   this	   risk	   either.	   Similarly,	   the	   revolving	   out	   phenomenon	  may	   be	  
considered	  more	  carefully	  should	  the	  member	  of	  the	  Authority	  decide	  to	  move	  to	  an	  executive	  role	  




Accountability:	  Holders	  of	  public	  office	  are	  accountable	  to	  the	  public	  for	  their	  decisions	  and	  actions	  
and	  must	  submit	  themselves	  to	  the	  scrutiny	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  this.	  
	  
Accountability	   and	   independence	   are	   strictly	   complementary.	   B&F	   authorities	   enjoy	   the	   highest	  
possible	  degree	  of	  independence	  and	  as	  such	  are	  also	  subject	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  public	  scrutiny.	  It	  is	  
no	   surprise	   then	   that	   the	   accountability	   mechanisms	   to	   which	   the	   Authorities	   are	   subject	   to	   are	  
disciplined	  by	  the	  law	  and	  are	  quite	  rigorous.	  Accountability	  aims	  at	  ensuring	  an	  indirect	  democratic	  
control	  over	  the	  decisions	  taken	  by	  independent	  authorities,	  which	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  the	  B&F	  
context	   in	   consideration	   of	   both	   their	   regulatory	   and	   enforcement	   powers.	   Whereas	   these	   are	  
delegated	  and	  framed	  by	  the	  law,	  they	  happen	  somewhat	  outside	  the	  “democratic	  circuit”,	  hence	  a	  
primary	  goal	  of	  accountability	   is	   to	  make	  authorities	   responsible	   for	   their	   (technical)	  activities	  and	  
results.	   This	   sort	   of	   public	   scrutiny	   however,	  may	   create	   some	   tension	   and	   needs	   to	   be	   carefully	  
balanced	  against	  the	  risk	  of	  political	  interference	  into	  the	  merit	  of	  B&F	  decision	  making	  activities107.	  
Like	   a	   Janus	  mask,	   accountability	   can	   be	   the	   face	   of	   a	   necessary	   democratic	   tool	   or	   could	   be	   the	  
façade	   for	   subjecting	  authorities	   to	  political	  will.	   This	   is	  why	   it	  needs	   to	  be	  carefully	  designed	  and	  
wisely	  applied.	  In	  fact,	  if	  accountability	  mechanisms	  are	  well	  designed	  and	  functioning,	  they	  serve	  as	  
a	  mean	  to	  strengthening	  independencein	  that	  they	  assure	  transparency	  and	  due	  process.	  
There	   are	   various	   indicators	   of	   accountability,	   related	   to	   internal	   and	   external	   scrutiny.	   Board	  
composition,	   independence	  and	  ability	  to	  monitor;	   internal	  reviews	  and	  assessment	  processes,	  are	  
all	   examples	   of	   the	   former.	   	   Press	   releases;	   Parliamentary	   hearings;	   cost	   benefit	   analysis;	   impact	  
assessment;	  publications	  of	  minutes	  etc,	   are	  all	   examples	  of	   the	   latter.	  External	   scrutiny	   is	  usually	  
linked	   to	   the	   public’s	   need	   to	   be	   informed,	   but	   in	   its	   more	   nuanced	   form	   it	   also	   refers	   to	   the	  
participation	  from	  the	  regulatees	  in	  the	  rule	  making	  process.	  “a	  well	  designed	  system	  should	  allow	  
those	  affected	  by	  the	  standards	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  standard	  setting	  process	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  
standards	  from	  unduly	  hindering	  business	  operations”108.	  Consultation	  papers	  issued	  by	  authorities	  
are	  an	  example	  of	  this.	  
                                                
107	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  the	  Governor	  expressed	  two	  overriding	  concerns	  related	  to	  the	  provision	  included	  in	  
the	   Bank	   of	   England	   Bill	   of	   subjecting	   Bank’s	   accounts	   to	   the	   National	   Audit	   Office,	   related	   to:	   «avoid	  
compromising	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   Bank,	   which	   would	   be	   at	   risk	   if	   the	   NAO	   could	   question	   policy	  
judgments.	   The	   other	  was	   to	   preserve	   the	   role	   of	   Court	   as	   the	   Bank’s	   governing	   body».	   To	   this	   end,	   «The	  
outcome	  was	  that	  the	  Court	  would	  continue	  to	  appoint	  a	  professional	  firm	  to	  undertake	  the	  financial	  audit	  of	  
the	  whole	  Bank,	  including	  the	  PRA	  which	  had	  thus	  far	  been	  audited	  by	  the	  NAO.	  The	  NAO	  would	  be	  consulted	  
about	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  professional	  auditor	  and	  would	  have	  access	  to	  the	  audit	  outputs.	  It	  would	  also	  
audit	  activities	  that	  the	  Bank	  undertakes	  under	  a	  Treasury	  indemnity.	  In	  relation	  to	  value	  for	  money	  the	  NAO	  
would	  have	  an	  ability,	  consulting	  Court,	  to	  commence	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  reviews	  at	  its	  own	  volition.	  
However	   there	  would	  be	  a	   strong	   carve	  out	   for	  policy,	   to	  be	  written	   into	   legislation	   specific	   to	   the	  Bank	  of	  
England».	  See	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Court,	  15	  July	  2015,	  available	  at	  www.bankofengland.co.uk	  
	  
108	   See	   Ruder,	   Canfield	   and	   Hollister,	   Creation	   of	   world	   wide	   accounting	   standards:	   convergence	   and	  
independence,	  in	  Journal	  of	  Intl	  Law	  &	  Business,	  25,	  2005,	  517	  
 The	   Parliamentary	   Commission	   on	   Banking	   Standards	   devoted	   many	   recommendations	   to	   the	  
increase	   of	   B&F	   authorities’	   accountability	   as	   the	   new	   regulatory	   framework	   was	   still	   seen	   as	  
weak109.	  	  
However,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  CSPL	  (2013a)	  Report:	  “Intelligent	  accountability	  may	  be	  easier	  to	  talk	  about	  
than	   to	  achieve,	  but	   implies:	  •	  putting	  out	  good	   information	   in	   intelligible	  and	  adaptable	   formats,	  
not	  just	  data;	  •	  creating	  a	  genuine	  dialogue	  with	  stakeholders	  (including	  the	  media);	  •	  building	  up	  a	  
degree	   of	   trust	   over	   time	   that	   creates	   a	   virtuous	   feedback	   loop	   in	   which	   stakeholders	   can	   see	  
policies	   being	   influenced	   and	   changed	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   input;	   and	  •	   being	   open,	   particularly	   in	  
relation	  to	  reporting	  problems	  to	  avoid	  a	  culture	  of	  blame”110.	  
It	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  enumerate	  the	  different	  accountability	  mechanisms	  provided	  
for	  by	  laws	  and	  regulations,	  and	  to	  comment	  on	  their	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  This	  is	  not	  intended	  
either	   to	   be	   a	   content	   analysis	   of	   the	   relevant	   accountability	   tools	   for	   B&F	   authorities	   to	  
demonstrate	   their	   efficacy	   ,	   or	   lack	   thereof.	   Rather,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   aspirational	   spirit	   of	   the	  Nolan	  
Principles,	   what	   follows	   will	   investigate	   the	   existence,	   if	   any,	   of	   best	   practices	   used	   to	   address	  
accountability	  deficits	  which	  may	  have	  arisen	  in	  the	  recent	  past.	  	  
	  
FCA	  
Since	   its	   inception	   the	   FCA	   has	   been	   heavily	   criticised	   for,	   among	   the	   others,	   an	   alleged	   lack	   of	  
accountability.	   Originally	   this	   stemmed	   mostly	   from	   criticisms	   over	   FCA’s	   predecessor	   flawed	  
approach	  to	  supervision	  and	  regulation111.	  	  
In	   their	   investigation	  on	   the	   FCA112	   the	   Treasury	  Committee	  heard	  of	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   lack	  of	  
transparency	   in	   the	  appointment	  process	  of	  FCA	  board	  members;	   lack	  of	   transparency	  around	  the	  
agendas,	  plans	  and	  minutes	  of	  board	  meetings;	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  accountability	  and	  proper	  dialogue	  with	  
consumers	   and	   regulated	   firms.	   The	   Committee	   then	   put	   forward	   recommendations	   aimed	   at	  
addressing	  those	  issues,	  some	  of	  which	  have	  then	  been	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  Parliament.	  Even	  
if	  not	   required	   to	  do	   so	  by	   the	   law,	   the	  FCA	  currently	  publishes	  detailed	  board	  minutes	  within	   six	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
109	  See	  PCBS,	  Changing	  banking	  for	  good,	  Vol	  I,	  June	  2013,	  par	  215-­‐222	  
	  
110	  See	  CSPL	  (2013a),	  p	  47.	  
	  
111	  FSA’s	   failure	  has	  been	  considered	   in	  various	   investigations,	  see	  for	   instance:	  FSA’s	   Internal	  Audit	   report,	  
The	  supervision	  of	  Northern	  Rock:	  a	  lessons	  learned	  review;	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  FSA	  board	  
report,	   and	   The	   Failure	   of	   HBOS	   plc	   (HBOS).	   A	   report	   by	   the	   Financial	   Conduct	   Authority	   (FCA)	   and	   the	  
Prudential	  Regulation	  Authority	  (PRA),	  November	  2015	  
	  
112	  House	  of	  Commons	  Treasury	  Committee,	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority,	  26th	  Report	  of	  session	  2010-­‐2012,	  
January	  2012,	  available	  at	  www.parliament.uk/trescom	  
	  
 weeks	   of	   each	  meeting113,	   publishes	   business	   plans	   and	   annual	   plans	   which,	   read	   in	   conjunction,	  
allow	  for	  greater	  accountability114.	  Other	  public	  documents	  relate	  to	  FCA	  corporate	  governance,	   its	  
approach	  to	  advancing	   its	  objectives,	   its	  risk	  outlook,	   its	  regulatory	  strategy	  115	  and	  even	  how	  they	  
calculate	  their	  FOI	  fees116.	  	  
The	   FCA	   has	   published	   a	   set	   of	   key	   initiatives	   for	   improving	   transparency	   and	   good	   consumer	  
outcomes,	  which	  will	  be	  closely	  monitored	  by	  the	  Consumer	  Panel117,	  and	  stakeholders	  can	  access	  
the	  Annual	  Report	  of	   the	  FCA	  Complaints	  Commissioner	   to	   know	  how	  complaints	   against	   the	  FCA	  
have	  been	  addressed	  and	   to	  what	  extent	   the	  FCA	  has	  adopted	   their	   recommendations	   (whenever	  
the	  Commissioner	  decides	  to	  uphold	  a	  complaint)118.	  	  	  
The	  relationship	  with	  the	  statutory	  panels	  seems	  to	  have	  improved.	  This	  emerges	  both	  from	  minutes	  
of	  the	  FCA	  Board	  meetings119	  and	  from	  evidence	  gathered	  by	  the	  Treasury	  committee120.	  The	  then	  
                                                
113	   The	   first	   published	   minutes	   are	   from	   28	   February	   2013.	   Minutes	   are	   available	   at	  
http://www.fca.org.uk/about/structure/board/board-­‐minutes	  
	  
114	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  FCA	  involves	  Practitioners	  Panel	  in	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  Business	  
Plan.	  
	  
115	  See	  for	  instance	  FCA,	  The	  FCA	  approach	  to	  advancing	  its	  objectives,	  December	  2015;	  FCA,	  Our	  Strategy,	  8	  
December	  2014.	  www.fca.org.uk/your-­‐fca/documents/reports/fca-­‐our-­‐strategy	  	  	  
	  
116	  The	  FCA	  has	  decided	  to	  exercise	  its	  statutory	  option	  to	  refuse	  FOI	  requests	  above	  a	  certain	  cost,	  and	  the	  
limit	  has	  been	  set	  to	  £450.	  From	  the	  relevant	  document	  it	   is	  not	  clear	  whether	  they	  will	  decide	  on	  a	  case	  by	  
case	  basis	  or	  whether	  they	  will	  reject	  any	  request	  above	  that	  threshold.	  See	  FCA,	  Freedom	  of	  Information	  Act	  
Fees	  Statement,	  available	  at	  www.fca.co.uk	  
	  
117	   See	   FSCP,	   Accessibility,	   advice	   and	   redress,	   available	   here	   	   https://www.fs-­‐cp.org.uk/consumer-­‐
panel/accessibility-­‐advice-­‐and-­‐redress	  
	  
118	  However,	  please	  note	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  statutory	  measure.	  
	  
119	  Even	   though	  sometimes	  minutes	  are	   still	   too	  vague,	   see	   for	   instance	   the	  Board	  account	  of	   the	  meeting	  
with	   the	   practitioner	   panels	   in	   which	   it	   is	   said	   that	   the	   Board	   discussed	   their	   comments,	   with	   no	   further	  
indications:	  “The	  Board	  reviewed	  and	  discussed	  the	  reports	  from	  the	  Chairs	  of	  the	  Panels,	  noting	  in	  particular:	  
(…)	   the	   comments	   from	   the	  Practitioner	  Panels	   in	   relation	   to	   effective	   and	   sustainable	   regulation,	   including	  
how	  the	  FCA	  was	  responding	  to	  the	  points	  made,	  and	  interactions	  with	  the	  NAO	  on	  value	  for	  money”.	  See	  FCA,	  
Board	  Minutes	   ,	   21-­‐22	  October	   2015.	   The	  minutes	   also	   show	  how	   the	   relationship	  with	   the	   panels	   has	   not	  
always	  been	   smooth,	   see	   for	   instance	   the	   records	  of	   the	  Board	  on	   Jan	  29	  on	   the	  matter:	   “Monthly	   reports	  
from	  the	  Independent	  Panels:	  The	  Board	  noted	  the	  Panel	  reports	  and	  that	  the	  key	  theme	  arising	  was	  the	  need	  
for	  clarification	  of	  the	  Panels’	  relationships	  with	  the	  FCA.	  In	  response	  to	  a	  request	  by	  the	  Consumer	  Panel,	  the	  
Board	  discussed	  the	  Panel’s	  terms	  of	  reference	  and	  its	  public	  communications	  plan.	  	  
	   The	   Board	   agreed	   that	   it	   should	   not	   restrict	   the	   Consumer	   Panel’s	   ability	   to	   comment	   publicly	   on	  
issues	  and	  Mr	  Griffith	  Jones	  would	  contact	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  Consumer	  Panel	  to	  clarify	  this.	  	  
	   The	  Board	   supported	   the	   role	  of	   the	  Panels	   to	   advise	   the	  Board	  and	   the	  Executive	  on	  matters	   and	  
agreed	  that	  it	  was	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Panels	  to	  challenge	  the	  FCA	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  To	  that	  end,	  Mr	  Griffith-­‐
Jones	   suggested	   that	   the	   Panels’	   reports	   should	   also	   be	   addressed	   to	   and	   considered	   by	   the	   Executive	  
Committee.	  	  
	   The	  Board	  noted	  that	  it	  was	  important	  to	  clarify	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  FCA	  would	  share	  information	  
with	   the	   Panels	   and	   as	   a	   result	   Mr	   Martin	   was	   preparing	   a	   note	   concerning	   the	   handling	   of	   sensitive	  
information	  to	  be	  discussed	  with	  the	  Panels”.	  FCA,	  Board	  Minutes	  ,	  29	  January	  2015.	  
	  
 Chairman	  of	  the	  FCA	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  FCA	  wanted	  to	  be	  more	  engaged	  with	  its	  stakeholders	  and	  
also	  adopted	  a	  revised	  communication	  strategy.	  	  
It	   is	   still	   unclear	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   appointment	   processes	   are	   transparent121.	   For	   instance,	  
following	  the	  earlier	  departure	  of	  Martin	  Weathley	  as	  a	  FCA	  Chief	  Executive	  the	  Government	  had	  to	  
replace	   him.	   The	   announcement	  was	   issued	   in	   July	   2015.	   The	  decision	  by	   the	  Government	   not	   to	  
renew	  his	  mandate	   caused	   great	   speculation	   and	   the	  Authority	  was	   left	  with	   uncertainty	   for	   long	  
time.	   This	   in	   turn	   created	   a	   leadership	   vacuum	   which	   was	   certainly	   not	   beneficial	   to	   the	  
organisation122	   (and	   its	   stakeholders).	  Over	   time	   it	  appeared	   that	   the	  Acting	  Head	  was	   running	   for	  
the	  position,	  but	  only	  after	  some	  time	  she	  declined.	  The	  issue	  had	  been	  considered	  by	  an	  ad	  hoc	  FCA	  
Board123.	  The	  new	  Chief	  has	  been	  appointed	  in	  February	  2016,	  but	  it	  was	  never	  really	  clear	  who	  the	  
candidates	  were	  and	  why	  some	  have	  been	  preferred	  over	  others.	  	  
The	  FCA	  reaction	  to	  the	  communication	  incident	  in	  2014,	  mentioned	  above	  under	  “integrity”,	  was	  to	  
launch	   an	   internal	   inquiry	   and	   an	   external	   one,	   led	   by	   Simon	   Davis	   upon	   request	   of	   FCA	   Non	  
                                                                                                                                                  
120	  During	  their	  hearing	  of	  the	  FCA	  practitioners	  panel,	  the	  TC	  Chair	  asked	  the	  following:	  “It	  would	  be	  helpful	  
if	  you	  could	  give	  us	  a	  preliminary	  view	  on	  the	  receptiveness	  of	  the	  board,	  particularly	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  non-­‐
execs	  on	   the	  board,	   to	   these	  exchanges	  with	  you.	  Are	   they	  receptive?	  Are	   they	  active?	  Are	   they	  doing	   their	  
jobs	  properly?”	  to	  which	  António	  Simões,	  replied:	  “It	  is	  a	  very	  interesting	  point.	  I	  took	  over	  as	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  
Practitioner	  Panel	  on	  1	  September,	  so	  I	  have	  chaired	  one	  meeting.	  One	  of	  my	  first	  decisions	  as	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  
panel	  was	  to	   invite	  the	  non-­‐executive	  directors	  to	  meet	  the	  Practitioner	  Panel	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  we	  are	  not	  
just	  writing	  a	  report	  every	  month	  that	  goes—	  Chair:	   Into	  the	  ether.	  António	  Simões:	  —but	  that	  they	  actually	  
have	  a	  relationship	  with	  us.	  Several	  of	  the	  non-­‐executive	  directors	  are	  coming	  to	  have	  dinner	  with	  the	  panel	  in	  
our	   next	  meeting,	   so	   that	  we	   have	   that	   direct	   channel	   of	   communication	   between	   the	   panel	   and	   the	   non-­‐
executive	   directors.	   That	   is	   happening.	   Many	   of	   them	   attend	   our	   panels,	   not	   just	   mine.	   The	   independent	  
directors	  all	  have	  an	  invitation,	  and	  several	  of	  them	  attend	  our	  panels”.	  John	  Trundle,	  member	  of	  the	  Market	  
Practitioners	   Panel	   somehow	  agreed:	   “What	   I	  would	   say	   is	   that	   the	   people	   they	   have	   are	   very	   skilled,	   very	  
experienced	   and	   they	   have	   been	   very	   open	   and	   transparent	   with	   us.	   We	   have	   a	   very	   good	   dialogue	   with	  
them”.	   See	   House	   of	   Commons	   Treasury	   Committee,	   Oral	   Evidence:	   Financial	   Conduct	   Authority	   Statutory	  
Panels,	  HC	  559,	  28	  October	  2015,	  available	  at	  http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-­‐a-­‐
z/commons-­‐select/treasury-­‐committee/inquiries1/parliament-­‐2015/fca-­‐practitioner-­‐panel-­‐15-­‐16/	  
	  
121	   In	   their	   response	   to	   the	   TC	   Inquiry	   the	  Government	   rejected	   the	   suggestion	   that	   the	   Head	   of	   the	   FCA	  
should	   be	   subjected	   to	   pre-­‐appointment	   hearings,	   opting	   for	   pre-­‐commencement	   hearings	   instead,	   at	   is	  
happens	  with	  the	  MPC	  and	  the	  Bank.	  See	  House	  of	  Commons	  Treasury	  Committee,	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  
report	  on	  the	  government	  response,	  28th	  Report	  of	  Sessions	  2010-­‐2012,	  p	  13.	  
	  
122	  During	  the	  relevant	  hearings	  the	  FCA	  Chairman	  commented	  on	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  renew	  
Martin	   Weathley	   may	   have	   had	   on	   the	   morale	   of	   the	   staff.	   There	   is	   also	   an	   extensive	   discussion	   on	   FCA	  
independence	  from	  political	  pressures.	  See	  House	  of	  Commons	  Treasury	  Committee,	  Oral	  Evidence	  Financial	  
Conduct	  Authority,	  HC	  515,	  20	  January	  2016.	  P.	  3	  
	  
123	  See	  FCA	  Board	  minutes,	  7	  January	  2016:	  “Mr	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  updated	  the	  Board	  on	  the	  comments	  made	  by	  
the	  Chancellor	  earlier	  that	  morning	  in	  relation	  to	  Ms	  McDermott.	  The	  Board	  noted	  that	  Mr	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  had	  
contacted	  all	  Board	  members	  to	  confirm	  that	  Ms	  McDermott	  had	  withdrawn	  from	  consideration	  for	  the	  CEO	  
post	  on	  9	  December.	  Mr	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  had	  spoken	  to	  Sir	  Brian	  Pomeroy	  as	  Senior	   Independent	  Director	  and	  
Jane	   Platt,	   fellow	   CEO	   recruitment	   Panel	   members,	   before	   Christmas,	   and	   notified	   the	   remaining	   Board	  
Members	  in	  the	  New	  Year.	  Ms	  McDermott	  explained	  the	  steps	  taken	  to	  update	  FCA	  staff	  and	  that	  an	  external	  
announcement	  had	  been	  prepared.”	  There	  was	  no	  other	  business	  to	  be	  discussed.	  	  
	  
 Executives.	   The	  Davis	   report,	  which	   costed	  3.8	  mln	   including	  VAT124,	  was	  made	  public	  by	   the	  FCA,	  
despite	   the	   criticisms	   addressed	   to	   the	   authority.	   The	   FCA	   also	   decided	   to	   action	   upon	   it.	   	   They	  
affirmed	  the	  intention	  to	  follow	  the	  recommendations	  given125	  and	  decided	  to	  complete	  additional	  
work	   on	   three	   areas	   that	   deserved	   careful	   consideration.	   They	   also	   worked	   on	   a	   review	   of	   their	  
strategy.	  Finally	  as	  a	  consequence	  to	  the	  individual	  responsibility	  the	  executive	  staff	  involved	  did	  not	  
receive	   a	   bonus,	   and	   the	   executive	   members	   of	   the	   board	   saw	   their	   bonus	   cut	   by	   25%.	   Other	  
disciplinary	  actions	  had	  been	  initiated126.	  	  
The	  FCA	  has	  also	  taken	  on	  board	  several	  of	  the	  recommendations	  from	  the	  Treasury	  Committee	  in	  
the	  matter,	  articulating	  their	  actions	  in	  a	  detailed	  response	  to	  the	  Committee127.	  	  
At	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee,	  FCA	  Internal	  Audit	  reports	  are	  submitted	  to	  them	  
one	   year	   in	   arrears.	   Upon	   request	   of	   the	   Committee,	   the	   FCA	   has	   recently	  made	   public	   its	   latest	  
internal	   audit	   reviews.	   These	   related	   to	   the	   internal	  management	   of	   the	   communication	   incident	  
and	  the	  efficacy	  of	  FCA	  communication	  strategy128,	  to	  the	  identification,	  handling	  and	  management	  
of	  sensitive	  information,	  and	  to	  the	  introduction	  and	  subsequent	  implementation	  of	  a	  three	  lines	  of	  
defence	  strategy,	  and	  on	  the	  operation	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Supervisory	  Oversight	  Function	  and	  
to	  the	  UK	  listing	  authority.	  Some	  of	  the	  internal	  audit	  reports	  include	  major	  findings	  that	  the	  FCA	  is	  
willing	  to	  address.	  	  
In	  2014	  the	  FCA	  had	  also	  commissioned	  an	  external	  firm	  to	  review	  board	  effectiveness129,	  followed	  
by	   a	   second	  one	   in	   2015130.	   Both	  had	  bene	  made	  public.	   The	   FCA	  has	   indeed	  agreed	   to	   carry	  out	  
internal	  reviews	  every	  alternate	  year	  (ie	  on	  a	  biannual	  basis).	  	  
During	  the	  Treasury	  Hearings	  over	  the	  dropping	  of	  the	  culture	  review,	  FCA	  executives	  acknowledged	  
internal	  deficiencies	  and	  considered	  the	  need	  to	  take	  further	  actions.	  	  
	  
Bank	  of	  England/	  PRA	  	  
                                                
124	  See	  FCA,	  The	  Davis	  Review	  –	  The	  FCA	  Response,	  10	  December	  2014,	  p	  3	  
	  
125	  Which	  led	  to	  63	  separate	  actions.	  
	  
126	  FCA,	  The	  Davies	  review,	  The	  FCA	  Response,	  10	  December	  2014	  
	  
127	  See	  	  FCA,	  FCA	  Response	  to	  the	  Thirteenth	  Report	  of	  the	  Treasury	  Committee,	  2014/15	  Press	  briefing	  of	  the	  
FCA’s	  Business	  Plan	  for	  2014/15,	  June	  2015	  
	  
128	  FCA	   Internal	  Audit	  Report,	  A	   review	  of	   the	  design	  and	  effectiveness	  of	   the	   FCA	  external	   communication	  
strategy,	   October	   2014;	   FCA	   internal	   Audit	   Report,	   the	   FCA’s	   incident	   response	   and	   crisis	   management	  
capability,	  24	  October	  2014.	  
	  
129	  See	  FCA,	  Review	  of	  board	  effectiveness	  by	  Independent	  Audit	  Limited,	  18	  June	  2014	  
	  
130	  FCA,	  FCA	  board	  effectiveness:	  an	  independent	  evaluation	  	  by	  Boardroom	  Review	  limited,	  October	  2010	  
	  
 The	  Bank	  of	  England	  has	  historically	  been	  criticised	   for	  a	   lack	  of	   transparency,	  and	  transparency	   is	  
the	  bedrock	  of	  accountability.	  	  From	  a	  regulatory	  perspective	  the	  Bank	  moved	  from	  a	  City	  Club	  style	  
of	  regulation131,	  where	  engagement	  with	  the	  regulatees	  was	  particularly	  intense,	  to	  a	  system	  where	  
stakeholders	   would	   guess	   the	   next	   monetary	   policy	   move	   from	   the	   raise	   of	   an	   eyebrow	   of	   the	  
Governor,	   to	   “constructive	   ambiguity”	   in	   decisions	   over	   financial	   stability,	   to	   the	   current	   policy	   of	  
being	  “open	   for	  business”	  and	  “open	  about	  our	  business”132.	  Meanwhile	   the	   legislative	   framework	  
has	  strengthened	  too	  and	  various	  accountability	  tools	  have	  been	  introduced	  and	  more	  are	  currently	  
under	  discussion133.	  Not	   least,	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Bill	  proposes	   to	   subject	   the	  Bank	   to	   “value	   for	  
money”	   examinations	   by	   the	   NAO	   and	   by	   the	   Treasury	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   prudential	   regulation	  
functions,	  which	  may	  create	  some	  controversy	  as	  reported	  above.	  
The	  PRA	  instead,	  created	  only	  in	  2013	  hasn’t	  so	  far	  experienced	  remarkable	  accountability	  criticisms.	  
Today,	   as	   with	   the	   FCA,	   both	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   PRA	   have	   stringent	   and	   well-­‐oiled	   accountability	  
requirements	  which	   include,	  among	  the	  others,	  press	  briefing,	  minutes	  publication,	  publications	  of	  
annual	  reports	  and	  accounts,	  testimonies	  to	  the	  Treasury	  Committee,	   internal	  control	  mechanisms	  
and	  so	  on.	  The	  Bank	  has	  decided	  to	  publish	  the	  minutes	  of	  the	  Court	  meetings,	  even	  if	  not	  required	  
to	  do	  so	  by	  statute134.	  	  
In	  a	  recent	  report135,	  the	  National	  Audit	  Office,	  which	  scrutinises	  PRA	  accounts,	  expressed	  the	  view	  
that	  PRA	  had	  set	  out	  its	  objectives	  and	  strategic	  approaches	  clearly.	  However,	  while	  acknowledging	  
the	  difficulties	  in	  reaching	  a	  firm	  conclusion	  over	  the	  authority	  due	  to	  its	  recent	  establishment	  and	  
to	  other	  problems,	  the	  Office	  raised	  concerns	  over	  the	  level	  of	  transparency	  of	  the	  PRA.	  The	  office	  
says	  that	  “In	  practical	  terms	  the	  PRA’s	  accountability	  must	  be	  taken	  alongside	  of	  the	  wider	  Bank	  of	  
England	  which	  we	  found	   in	  practice	  makes	  or	  approves	  resources	  decisions	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  PRA.	  
Over	   the	  course	  of	   this	   review	  the	  Bank	  has	  complied	  with	  all	  NAO	   information	  requests.	  The	   fact	  
that	  NAO	  doesn’t	  have	  statutory	  access	  to	  the	  financial	  information	  held	  by	  the	  wider	  Bank	  however	  
presents	  a	  risk	  to	  reporting	  in	  future	  on	  the	  economy,	  efficiency	  or	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  PRA”136.	  
                                                
131	   See	   Rawlings,	   Georgosuli,	   Russo,	   Regulation	   of	   Financial	   Services:	   Aims	   and	   Methods,	   Institute	   for	  
Regulation	   and	   Ethics	   working	   paper,	   April	   2014	   available	   here	  
http://www.ccls.qmul.ac.uk/docs/research/138683.pdf	  	  	  
	  
132	  See	  Minouche	  Shafik,	  Goodbye	  ambiguity,	  hello	  clarity:	   the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  relationship	  with	   financial	  
markets,	   speech	   delivered	   at	   Warwick	   University	   available	   here	  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/801.aspx	  
	  
133	  See	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  Financial	  Services	  Bill	  [HL]	  currently	  under	  discussion	  which	  intervenes	  on	  the	  
Bank’s	  and	  its	  Committees’	  	  governance,	  and	  subjects	  the	  Bank	  to	  the	  NAO	  scrutiny.	  	  
	  
134	  The	  Bill	  above	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  require	  the	  PRC	  to	  publish	  its	  minutes.	  	  
	  
135	  National	  Audit	  Office,	  Report	  by	  the	  Comptroller	  and	  Auditor	  General	  on	  The	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  
and	  the	  Prudential	  Regulation.	  Regulating	  Financial	  Services,	  24	  March	  2014	  	  
	  
136	  Ibidem,	  p	  9	  par	  14.	  
 As	  a	  response	  to	  the	  2012	  Treasury	  Committee	  inquiry	  into	  the	  accountability	  of	  the	  Bank,	  the	  Bank	  
accepted	   some,	   but	   not	   all,	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Committee137.	   For	   instance	   they	   created	   an	  
Oversight	  Committee	  with	  the	  view	  of	  challenging	  the	  Bank	  and	  conduct	  internal	  reviews	  (which	  was	  
different	   from	   what	   suggested	   by	   the	   Committee).	   The	   oversight	   committee	   is	   now	   due	   to	   be	  
abolished	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Bill.	  	  
Outside	  the	  statutory	  requirements	  perimeter,	   in	  September	  2014	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  created	  an	  
internal	  “Independent	  Evaluation	  Office”	  (IEO).	  The	  IEO	  “aims	  to	  maintain	  public	  trust	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
the	  Bank	   and	   to	   reinforce	   the	   institution’s	   culture	  of	   learning,	   by:	   Supporting,	  where	   appropriate,	  
external	   reviews	   of	   the	   Bank;	   Carrying	   out	   one	   off	   evaluations	   of	   areas	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   work	   ;	  
Facilitating	  broader	  Court	  oversight	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  policy	  areas	  and	  	  strategy.	  The	  
IEO	   reports	   directly	   to	   the	  Chair	   of	   Court	   and	  operates	   at	   arm’s	   length	   from	   local	   business	   areas.	  
Court	  sets	  the	  priorities	  and	  determines	  the	  work	  programme	  of	  the	  IEO.”138	  
So	   far	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   constructive	   dialogue	   between	   the	  Office	   and	  Bank’s	   committees.	   For	  
instance	  the	  MPC	  replied	  swiftly	  to	  an	  IEO	  report	  on	  Forecast	  Performance139	  spelling	  out	  a	  series	  of	  
initiatives	  that	  will	  be	  put	  in	  place	  as	  a	  follow	  up	  from	  their	  recommendations140	  
The	  Bank	  also	  carried	   independent	  reviews	  over	   its	  functioning	  or	  policies.	  For	   instance	  in	  October	  
2012	   they	   commissioned	   a	   review	   over	   the	   provision	   of	   emergency	   liquidity	   assistance	   in	   2008-­‐	  
2009,	  conducted	  by	  Ian	  Plenderleight141,	  a	  review	  on	  the	  Bank’s	  Framework	  for	  Providing	  Liquidity	  to	  
the	  Banking	  System,	  conducted	  by	  Bill	  Winters142	  and	  a	  review	  on	  	  the	  Monetary	  Policy	  Committee’s	  
Forecasting	  Capability	  conducted	  by	  David	  Stockton143.	  The	  Bank	  replied	  to	  the	  reviews	  outlining	  a	  
comprehensive	  plan	  to	  address	  their	  recommendations144.	  	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
137	  See	  House	  of	  Commons	  Treasury	  Committee,	  Accountability	  of	   the	  Bank	  of	  England.	  Response	   from	  the	  
Court	  of	  the	  Bank	  to	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  report	  from	  the	  Committee,	  HC	  1769,	  27th	  report	  of	  sessions	  2010-­‐2012,	  	  
23	  January	  2012	  
	  
138	  See	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/ieo/default.aspx	   	  
	  
139	  See	  Independent	  Evaluation	  Office,	  Evaluating	  Forecast	  Performance,	  November	  2015	  	  
	  
140	  See	  MPC,	  the	  Monetary	  Policy	  Committee	  Response	  to	  the	  Independent	  Evaluation	  Office	  evaluation	  of	  the	  
MPC’s	  forecasting	  performance,	  in	  Inflation	  Report	  November	  2015,	  p	  44.	  	  
	  
141	  See	  Review	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  provision	  of	  emergency	  liquidity	  assistance	  in	  2008–09.	  A	  report	  to	  the	  
Court	  by	  Ian	  Plenderleight,	  October	  2012	  
	  
142	  See	  Review	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  framework	  for	  providing	  liquidity	  to	  the	  Banking	  System.	  A	  report	  to	  
the	  Court	  by	  Bill	  Winters,	  October	  2012	  	  
	  
143	   See	  Review	   of	   the	  Monetary	   Policy	   Committee’s	   Forecasting	   Capability.	   A	   report	   to	   the	   Court	   by	   David	  
Stockton,	  October	  2012.	  
	  
144	  See	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Response	  of	   the	  bank	  of	  England	   to	   the	   three	  court-­‐commissioned	   reviews,	  March	  
2013	  
 More	  recently	  they	  commissioned	  Lord	  Grabiner	  to	  investigate	  the	  alleged	  involvement	  of	  Bank	  staff	  
into	   Forex	   manipulation145.	   	   The	   employee	   involved	   in	   the	   latter	   case	   has	   subsequently	   been	  
terminated	  by	   the	  Bank,	   although,	   it	  was	   claimed,	  not	   as	   a	   consequence	   to	   the	   investigation.	   The	  
Bank	  responded	  to	  the	  investigation	  by	  implementing	  all	  its	  recommendations146	  	  
	  
Finally,	  in	  March	  2014	  the	  Bank	  has	  issued	  a	  strategic	  plan	  based	  on	  14	  actions	  that	  aims,	  among	  the	  
others,	  at	  strengthening	  and	  improving	  accountability,	  and	  transparency	  at	  the	  Bank.	   In	  fact	  “open	  
and	   accountable”	   is	   one	   of	   the	   Pillars	   of	   their	   2014	   strategic	   plan.	   For	   instance	   to	   enhance	  
transparency	   within	   the	   Bank,	   it	   	   planned	   to	   “establish	   a	   Stakeholder	   Relations	   Group	   to	   ensure	  
external	  economists	  and	  analysts	  have	  equal	  and	  timely	  access	  to	  information	  behind	  MPC,	  FPC	  and	  
PRA	  decisions,	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  insight	  into	  the	  Bank’s	  current	  views	  and	  decisions”;	  they	  decided	  
to	   “transform	   the	   Annual	   Report	   to	  make	   it	  more	   transparent,	   accessible	   and	   informative,	   assess	  
progress	   against	   our	   policy	   objectives	   annually,	   and	   promote	   and	   respond	   to	   the	   independent	  
reports	   commissioned	   to	   evaluate	   the	   Bank’s	   performance”	   and	   to	   be	   more	   engaged	   and	  
approachable147.	   On	   11	   November	   2015	   the	   Bank	   held	   an	   “open	   forum”	   to	   which	   all	   sorts	   of	  
stakeholders’	  representatives	  participated	  to	  discuss	  the	  most	  pressing	   issues	  related	  to	  the	  future	  
of	   the	   Bank	   and	   banking	   supervision.	  With	   all	   the	   limitations	   that	   such	   a	   high	   profile	   event	  may	  
entail,	  it	  was	  a	  remarkable	  initiative	  which	  also	  allowed	  for	  an	  open	  dialogue	  between	  the	  floor	  and	  




Two	  episodes	  have	  recently	  brought	  the	  MPC	  under	  the	  spotlight.	  Both	  however	  are	  examples	  of	  the	  
well	  functioning	  of	  accountability	  tools.	  
On	   28	   July	   2015	   Dr	   Vlieghe	   was	   appointed	   to	   the	   Monetary	   Policy	   Committee.	   Prior	   joining	   the	  
Committee	  he	  was	  a	  partner	  in	  an	  asset	  management	  firm	  (Brevan	  Howan),	  from	  which	  he	  received	  
a	   fixed	  share	  of	   the	  equity	  profits	  over	   the	   firm’s	  overall	  business	  as	  part	  of	  his	   remuneration.	  He	  
could	  not	   sell	   the	   stake	  at	  his	  will	   because	   the	   firm	   is	   private	   and	  his	   stake	   could	  have	  only	  been	  
redeemed	  with	   the	   consent	  of	   the	   firm.	  The	  appointment	   created	  public	   concerns	  because	  of	   the	  
apparent	   conflict	   of	   interest:	   the	   firms’	   profit	   would	   have	   somehow	   been	   affected	   by	   monetary	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
145	  See	  above	  at	  footnote	  46.	  
	  
146	   See	   Bank	   of	   England,	   Foreign	   Exchange	   Market	   Investigation:	   Bank	   of	   England’s	   response	   to	   Lord	  
Grabiners’s	  recommendations,	  26	  February	  2015	  
	  
147	  See	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Strategic	  Plan	  Background	  Information,	  18	  March	  2014,	  p	  2	  
	  
 policy	  decisions	  because	  part	  of	  firm’s	  business	  is	  to	  trade	  on	  the	  short	  end	  of	  the	  bond	  market,	   ie	  
where	  interest	  rates	  decisions	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  high	  impact.	  	  
Upon	   appointment	   Dr	   Vlieghe	  was	   being	   questioned	   thoroughly	   by	   the	   Treasury	   committee,	   and	  
before	  the	  actual	   taking	  up	  of	   the	  office	   	  he	  asked	  his	  previous	  employer	  to	  be	  bought	  out,	  which	  
was	  agreed.	  During	   the	  hearing	  he	  discussed	   in	  great	  details	  why	   the	  public	  perception	  of	   conflict	  
was	  unfounded	  and	  how	  he	  had	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  both	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Bank	  from	  the	  onset	  that	  
his	  stake	  may	  have	  been	  a	  source	  of	  concern.	  Exercising	  the	  discretion	  that	  the	  Code	  allows	  to	  both,	  
the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Bank	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  there	  was	  no	  conflict.	  The	  lack	  of	  conflict	  was	  
justified	   on	   the	   grounds	   that:	   “Mr	   Vlieghe	   was	   not	   joining	   the	   regulatory	   side	   of	   the	   Bank	   -­‐	   and	  
Brevan	  Howard	  is	  not	  in	  any	  event	  regulated	  by	  the	  Bank.	  In	  relation	  to	  MPC	  decisions	  the	  interest	  
was	  judged	  not	  to	  be	  relevant	  -­‐it	  would	  require	  Mr	  Vlieghe	  to	  have	  a	  very	  close	  knowledge	  of	  Brevan	  
Howard's	   trading	  position	   to	  know	  how	  the	  MPC's	  decisions	  would	  affect	   its	   trading	  performance,	  
and	  as	  previously	  noted	  Mr	  Vlieghe	  had	  resigned	   from	  the	  partnership.	  The	  Secretary's	  conclusion	  
was	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  required	  that	  Mr	  Vlieghe	  renounce	  his	  interest	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  joining	  the	  
MPC.”148	   	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   Treasury	   was	   satisfied	   with	   Dr	   Vlieghe’s	   appointment.	   The	   committee	  
though	  had	  requested	  the	  Bank	  to	  change	  the	  code	  of	  conduct	  for	  MPC.	  The	  request	  was	  objected	  
by	  the	  Governor	  but	  taken	  into	  consideration	  by	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  Court149.	   In	  a	  nutshell	  this	  
shows	  how	  accountability	  mechanisms	  have	  paved	   the	  way	   for	  a	  constructive,	  open	  and	  objective	  
dialogue	  among	  the	  parties.	  
The	   second	   example	   relates	   to	   the	   review	   into	   the	   lack	   of	   transparency	   of	   the	  MPC.	  Within	   the	  
broader	  efforts	  to	  make	  the	  Bank	  more	  accountable	  and	  transparent	  and	  following	  up	  on	  a	  specific	  
request	   by	   the	   Treasury	   committee,	   the	   Bank	   commissioned	   a	   former	   member	   of	   the	   Federal	  
Reserve	   System,	   Kevin	  Warsh,	   to	   investigate	   practices	   and	   procedures	   that	   could	   improve	  MPC’s	  
transparency150.	   Specifically,	   those	   related	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   keeping	   the	   recording	   of	   the	  MPC	  
meetings	   and	   possibly	   publish	   a	   full	   transcript	   over	   time.	   The	   terms	   of	   reference	   also	   asked	   to	  
consider	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  alternative	  ways	  of	  improving	  transparency.	  	  
The	   recommendations	   that	   followed	   were	   based	   on	   4	   areas:	   making	   sound	   policy	   decisions;	  
communicating	  judgments	  effectively;	  ensuring	  accountability	  for	  its	  actions;	  and	  creating	  a	  fair	  and	  
accurate	  historical	   record.	  The	  MPC	  decided	  to	  accept	  Warsh’s	  recommendations	  and	  “announced	  
the	  following	  changes	  to	  its	  practices:	  publication	  of	  both	  the	  minutes	  of	  its	  policy	  meetings	  and	  (in	  
                                                
148	  See	  Mark	  Carney,	  Letter	  to	  Andrew	  Tyrie	  on	  the	  MPC	  Code,	  3	  September	  2015	  
	  
149	   See	   House	   of	   Commons	   Treasury	   Committee,	   Oral	   evidence	   Appointment	   of	   Gertjan	   Vlieghe	   to	   the	  
Monetary	   Policy	   Committee	   hearing,	   HC	   497,	   Tuesday	   13	   October	   2015;	   and	   House	   of	   Commons	   Treasury	  
Committee,	  	  The	  appointment	  of	  Dr	  Gertjan	  Vlieghe	  to	  the	  Monetary	  Policy	  Committee	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  
Second	  Report	  of	  Session	  2015–16,	  	  13	  October	  2015	  
	  
150	   See	   Transparency	   and	   the	   Bank	   of	   England’s	   Monetary	   Policy	   Committee,	   review	   by	   Kevin	   Warsh,	  
December	  2014	  
	  
 the	  relevant	  months)	  the	  Inflation	  Report	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  its	  policy	  decisions,	  starting	  in	  August	  
2015;	   publication	  of	  written	   transcripts	   of	   the	  meetings	   at	  which	  monetary	   policy	   is	   decided,	   and	  
related	   staff	   policy	   briefing	   material,	   with	   an	   8-­‐year	   lag,	   as	   of	   the	   March	   2015	   policy	   meeting;	  
alteration	  of	   its	  2016	  meeting	  schedule	   to	  provide	  scope	   to	  move	   to	  eight	  policy	  meetings	  a	  year;	  
plan	   to	  hold	   four	   joint	  meetings	  between	   the	  Monetary	   and	   Financial	   Policy	  Committees	   in	   2016.	  
Alongside	  these	  measures,	  the	  Bank	  also	  proposed	  a	  simpler	  structure	  for	  its	  governing	  bodies	  and	  a	  
clearer	  commitment	  to	  accountability”151.	  




The	  need	  to	  hold	   into	  account	  executive	  members	  of	  B&F	  authorities	   is	  a	  fundamental	  democratic	  
tool	  that	  counterbalances	  their	  institutional	  and	  operational	  independence.	  	  
Tools	  already	  embedded	  in	  the	  law	  risk	  being	  empty	  shells	  if	  the	  Authorities	  are	  not	  receptive.	  What	  
we	  have	  seen	  so	  far	  is	  that	  authorities	  respond	  well	  to	  the	  Treasury	  Committee	  requests	  and	  that	  in	  
some	   cases	   Authorities	   are	   also	   able	   to	   go	   beyond	   what	   is	   required.	   In	   those	   fewer	   instances	   in	  
which	   they	   resisted	   changing,	   they	  did	  not	  do	   so	  arbitrarily	  but	  with	   the	   clear	   focus	  of	  preserving	  
their	   necessary	   independence.	   Authorities	   have	   also	   been	   willing	   to	   take	   initiative,	   to	   start	   self	  
assessment	  processes	  and	  to	  put	  the	  relevant	  evaluations	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  
The	  understanding	  of	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  may	  require	  some	  technical	  knowledge	  which	  the	  general	  
public	   lacks.	   It	   is	   then	   important	   that	   communication	   from	   the	   authority	   on	   the	   matter	   is	  
appropriate	  as	  to	  avoid	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  public	  trust.	  
                                                
151	   See	   Bank	   of	   England,	  News	   Release	   Bank	   of	   England	   announces	  measures	   to	   bolster	   transparency	   and	  
accountability,	  11	  December	  2014	  
	  
 Objectivity	  
Objectivity:	  Holders	  of	  public	  office	  must	  act	  and	  take	  decisions	  impartially,	  fairly	  and	  on	  merit,	  using	  
the	  best	  evidence	  and	  without	  discrimination	  or	  bias.	  	  
	  
Objectivity	   shall	   certainly	   be	   applied	   to	   both	   enforcement	   and	   policy	   making	   activities	   of	   B&F	  
authorities.	   However,	   against	   the	   set	   definition,	   objectivity	   is	   best	   analysed	  within	   the	   context	   of	  
their	   enforcement	   actions	   because	   decisions	   over	   monetary	   policy	   and	   financial	   stability	   will	  
naturally	  entail	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  subjective	  judgement.	  What	  comes	  into	  consideration	  in	  this	  case	  is	  
the	   objectivity	   of	   the	   process	   that	   brought	   about	   the	   actual	   policy.	   Transparent	   procedures,	  
consultation	  papers,	  impact	  assessment,	  policy	  making	  documents,	  board	  composition	  and	  dialogue,	  
and	   accountability	  mechanisms	   are	   the	   gatekeepers	   of	   fair	   and	   substantiated	   decisions.	   A	   further	  
indicator	  of	  objectivity	  may	  be	  the	  quality	  and	  type	  of	  approach	  taken	  by	  regulators	   in	  discharging	  
their	   functions.	   This	   would	   require	   an	   analysis	   of	   principle,	   risk,	   forward	   looking	   and	   judgement	  
based	   regulation	  but	   it	   falls	   outside	   the	   scope	  of	   the	  CSPL	   review.	   To	  our	   aims,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
highlight	  that	  as	  a	  consequence	  to	  the	  crisis	  B&F	  regulators	  stood	  ready	  to	  admit	  their	  approach	  to	  
supervision	  had	   failed	   to	  achieve	   the	   intended	  outcomes	  and	  decided	   to	  amend	   it	  promptly.	  Both	  
the	  FCA	  and	  the	  PRA	  also	  publish	  policy	  documents	  detailing	  their	  approach	  to	  supervision.	  The	  FCA	  
also	  launches	  investigations	  on	  regulatory	  failure.	  	  	  
In	  their	  supervisory	  roles,	  the	  FCA	  and	  the	  PRA	  have	  the	  powers	  to	  enforce	  their	  rules	  and	  challenge	  
firms	  on	  other	  grounds152	  and	  can	  do	  so	  either	  directly	  or	  via	  an	  independent	  office.	  The	  underlying	  
rationale	  for	  their	  powers	  rests	  in	  the	  need	  to	  achieve	  their	  statutory	  objectives.	  Whereas	  laws	  and	  
regulations	   set	   forth	   the	   statutory	   powers	   for	   supervisory	   and	   regulatory	   actions,	   B&F	   authorities	  
retain	  discretion	  over	  the	  quomodo,	  ie	  over	  the	  design	  of	  processes	  and	  procedures.	  That	  is	  why	  it	  is	  
of	   extreme	   importance	   that	   in	   using	   discretion	   authorities	   are	   objective,	   fair,	   and	   just	   and	   that	  
decisions	  are	  based	  on	  the	  best	  evidence.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  both	  substantial	  and	  procedural	  due	  process	  
must	  be	  observed.	  However,	  B&F	  authorities	  may	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  gather	  enough	  evidence	  to	  prove	  
individual	   culpability,	  especially	  when	   the	  person	  works	   for	  a	   complex	  and	   large	  organisation.	   It	   is	  
not	  surprising	  then	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  FSA	  was	  rarely	  successful	  in	  bringing	  individuals	  to	  
account	  for	  misconduct153.	  	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  the	  authority	  should	  prove	  that	  the	  person	  failed	  to	  
                                                
152	  For	   instance	  the	  FCA	  can	  questions	  firms	  over	  the	   inclusion	  of	  unfair	  terms	   in	  standard	  forms	  consumer	  
contracts.	  	  
	  
153	  Exemplary	  to	  this,	  is	  the	  Pottage	  case	  (Pottage	  v	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  -­‐	  [2012]	  All	  ER	  (D)	  26	  (Sep).	  	  
Despite	  the	  extensive	  investigation	  of	  the	  FSA	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  evidence	  gathered,	  upon	  appeal	  the	  Upper	  
Tribunal	   found	   that	   “the	   FSA	   had	   established	   serious	   flaws	  with	   respect	   to	   a	   number	   of	  weaknesses	   in	   the	  
operational	  risk	  framework,	  serious	  deficiencies	   in	  management	   information	  and	  a	  number	  of	  deficiencies	   in	  
the	   compliance	   monitoring	   arrangements	   in	   place	   in	   the	   firm	   in	   2007.	   However,	   it	   fell	   to	   be	   determined	  
whether	  the	  FSA	  had	  made	  out	  its	  case	  of	  misconduct	  against	  the	  applicant.”	  See	  par	  140	  of	  the	  judgment	  and	  
the	  relevant	  digest	  published	  by	  Lexis	  Nexis.	  
	  
 take	  all	   reasonable	  steps	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	   firm	  complied	  with	   regulations	  and	  standards,	  or	   that	  
there	  were	  serious	   flaws	   in	   the	   internal	  governance	  or	  on	   the	  management	  of	   the	  event,	  which	   is	  
tantamount	   as	   entrusting	   the	   authority	   with	   the	   difficult	   task	   of	   scrutinising	   the	   details	   of	   firms’	  
internal	  controls	  and	  functions.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  difficulties	  in	  proving	  that	  the	  person	  had	  fallen	  below	  
the	  standards	  of	  reasonableness,	  the	  Parliamentary	  Commission	  of	  Banking	  Standard	  suggested	  the	  
burden	  of	  proof	  be	  reverted,	  which	  means	  senior	  managers	  would	  have	  individual	  responsibility	  for	  
proving	   that	   they	   had	   fulfilled	   their	   regulatory	   obligations,	   rather	   than	   regulators	   having	   to	   prove	  
that	  they	  had	  not154.	  This	  had	  been	  included	  in	  the	  initial	  version	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Bill,	  but	  was	  
subsequently	   scrapped	   because	   it	  was	   seen	   as	   unfair,	   as	   fostering	   a	   ticking	   box	   culture,	   as	   giving	  
incentives	  to	  managers	  to	  game	  the	  system,	  or	  for	  the	  most	  talented	  people	  not	  to	  take	  on	  the	  job,	  
and,	   not	   least,	   it	   would	   go	   against	   the	   ancient	   common	   law	   principle	   of	   “innocent	   until	   proven	  
guilty”155.	  
Enforcement	  decisions	  will	  be	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  in	  case	  of	  appeal.	  In	  case	  of	  mediation	  
and	  settlement,	  process	  transparency	  and	  due	  process	  should	  be	  guaranteed	  too.	  	  
Another	   issue	   relevant	   to	   objectivity	   relates	   to	   the	   criteria	   used	   to	   select	   which	   cases	   will	   be	  
investigated.	   Investigations	   are	   time	   consuming	   and	   resource	   intensive	   so	   the	   authority	   will	  
inevitably	  make	   a	   judgement	   as	   to	  which	   prioritise.	   Unless	   the	   criteria	   are	   clear,	   there	  may	   be	   a	  
perception	  of	  arbitrariness.	  Referral	  criteria	  should	  strike	  the	  right	  balance	  between	  objectivity	  and	  
consistency	  with	   the	   final	   aim	  of	   enforcement,	   namely	   (credible)	   deterrence.	  However,	   the	   actual	  
meaning	  of	  “fairness”	  in	  this	  context	  may	  not	  be	  entirely	  clear	  as	  the	  then	  FCA	  head	  of	  enforcement,	  
Tracy	  McDermott,	  highlighted:	  	  “Consistency	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  FCA	  assesses	  which	  cases	  should	  be	  
investigated	  by	  EFCD	  is	  important.	  The	  process	  must	  also	  be	  fair.	  However,	  fairness	  does	  not	  require	  
that	   no	   firm	   is	   ever	   investigated	   unless	   every	   other	   firm	  meeting	   the	   same	   criteria	   has	   also	   been	  
investigated.	  The	  decision	  to	  conduct	  an	  Enforcement	  investigation,	  rather	  than	  using	  a	  supervisory	  
tool	   in	   a	  particular	   area	   is	  not,	   in	   the	   view	  of	   the	  FCA,	   fundamentally	   a	  matter	  which	  goes	   to	   the	  
question	   of	   fairness.	   Rather,	   this	   is	   a	   question	   of	   how	   the	   FCA	   puts	   into	   practice	   its	   risk-­‐based	  
approach,	   how	   it	   uses	   its	   resources	   effectively	   and	   efficiently	   and	   how	   best	   to	   achieve	   credible	  
deterrence.”156.	   In	   fact,	   in	   deciding	  whether	   to	   start	   an	   investigation	   supervisors	  will	   also	   have	   to	  
make	  a	  careful	   judgement	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  supervisory	  action	  should	  be	  preferred.	  This	  again	  puts	  
them	  at	  risk	  of	  making	  arbitrary	  decisions,	  or	  at	  least	  of	  being	  perceived	  as	  arbitrary.	  	  
                                                
154	  See	  PCBS,	  Changing	  Banking	  for	  Good,	  ch	  6,	  Vol	  2.	  
	  
155	  See	  the	  HL	  debate	  of	  11	  November	  2015	  from	  column	  2015	  onwards.	  
	  
156	   See	  A	  Practitioner’s	  Guide	   to	   Financial	   Services	   Investigations	   and	   Enforcement,	   3rd	   Edition,	   Sweet	   and	  
Maxwell,	  2014.	  	  	  
	  
	  
 Finally,	   in	   December	   2014	   the	   Treasury	   conducted	   a	   review	   of	   the	   B&F	   authorities	   enforcement	  
decision	  making	  process	  with	  a	  view	  to	  seek	  whether	   the	  arrangement	  and	  processes	  support	   the	  
fair	   and	   effective	   use	   of	   enforcement	   powers157.	   The	   report	   made	   several	   recommendations	   for	  
improvement	  but	  acknowledged	  stakeholders’	  overall	  satisfaction	  with	  current	  arrangements.	  	  
In	  what	   follow	  we	  will	   focus	  on	   the	  enforcement	  activities	  of	   the	  FCA	  and	   the	  PRA.	  Therefore	   the	  
Bank’s	   and	   MPC’s	   policy	   making	   processes	   will	   not	   be	   analysed.	   However	   objectivity	   is	   strongly	  
enshrined	  in	  the	  Banks’	  culture	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  Deputy	  Governors	  declaration	  upon	  taking	  up	  
the	  appointment	  is	  the	  following158:	  	  «I,	  A	  B,	  having	  been	  appointed	  to	  the	  office	  of	  a	  director	  of	  the	  
Corporation	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  Company	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  do	  solemnly	  and	  sincerely	  declare	  
that	  in	  the	  said	  office	  I	  will	  be	  indifferent	  and	  equal	  to	  all	  manner	  of	  persons:	  and	  I	  will	  give	  my	  best	  
advice	   and	   assistance	   for	   the	   support	   and	   good	   Government	   of	   the	   said	   Corporation:	   and	   in	   the	  
execution	  of	  the	  said	  office	  I	  will	  faithfully	  and	  honestly	  demean	  myself	  according	  to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  
skill	  and	  understanding».	  
The	  indicators	  considered	  are	  the	  existence	  and	  clarity	  of	  enforcement	  policies	  and	  the	  objectivity	  of	  
the	  relevant	  decision-­‐making	  mechanisms;	  and	  whether	  the	  same	  applies	  for	  settlement	  processes.	  	  
	  
FCA	  
The	   FCA	   is	   extremely	   transparent	   on	   its	   enforcement	   procedures	   and	   criteria.	   The	   FCA	   handbook	  
includes	  chapters	  on	  “decision	  procedures	  and	  penalties”	  and	  on	  “enforcement	  guide”.	  Both	  are	  also	  
available	  on	   the	  FCA	  website.	  There	   is	  also	  an	  “Enforcement	   Information	  Guide”	  which	  provides	  a	  
snapshot	  of	  all	  the	  relevant	  information,	  including	  stylized	  information	  on	  the	  actual	  process.	  	  
The	   FCA	   also	   publishes	   details	   on	   the	   composition	   and	   functioning	   of	   their	   Regulatory	   Decision	  
Committee	   (RDC).	   This	   is	   an	   independent	   body	   comprised	   of	   representatives	   from	   the	   industry,	  
business,	   and	   consumers159	   operationally	   separated	   from	   the	   FCA.	   RDC	   members	   represent	   the	  
public	  interest	  and	  are	  accountable	  to	  the	  FCA	  board.	  	  
The	   enforcement	   process	   works	   as	   follows:	   1)	   FCA	   internal	   	   investigators	   are	   appointed;	   2)	   they	  
scope	  the	  discussion	  with	  the	  firm	  and	  start	   the	  actual	   investigation;	  3)	   following	  the	   investigation	  
work,	   there	   is	   an	   internal	   legal	   review	   of	   the	   case	   by	   a	   lawyer	   who	   has	   not	   been	   part	   of	   the	  
investigation;	  4)	  if	  appropriate	  a	  Preliminary	  Investigation	  Report	  is	  sent	  to	  the	  firm	  or	  the	  individual	  
who	  have	  28	  days	  to	  respond;	  5)	  If,	  following	  their	  investigation,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  action	  is	  justified,	  
                                                
157	   See,	   HM	   Treasury,	  Chancellor	   launches	   review	   of	   enforcement	   decision-­‐making	   at	   the	   financial	   services	  
regulators,	   News	   Story,	   6	   May	   2014,	   available	   here	   www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-­‐launches-­‐
review-­‐of-­‐enforcement-­‐decision-­‐making-­‐at-­‐the-­‐financial-­‐services-­‐regulators;	   and	   HM	   Treasury,	   Review	   of	  
enforcement	  decision-­‐making	  at	  the	  financial	  services	  regulators:	  final	  report,	  December	  2014	  
	  
158	  See	  Bank	  of	  England	  Charter	  1998,	  Schedule;	  Form	  of	  Declaration.	  
	  
159	  See	  RDC	  Members’	  biographies,	  available	  at	  www.fca.org.uk/about/structure/committees/rdc-­‐biographies	  
	  
 investigators	   submit	   case	  papers	   to	   the	  RDC;	  6)	   If	   the	  RDC	   finds	   there	   is	  no	  case,	  either	  before	  or	  
after	  representations,	  the	  FCA	  closes	  the	   investigation,	   issuing	  a	  notice	  of	  Discontinuance;	  7)	   if	  the	  
RDC	  thinks	   there	   is	   room	  for	  enforcement,	   the	  enforcements	  process	  starts	  and	  terminates	  with	  a	  
statutory	   notice	   (warning;	   supervisory	   and	   decisions).	   The	   FCA	   website	   page	   on	   the	   RDC	   has	   a	  
specific	  heading	  on	  “making	  fair	  decisions”	  which	  basically	  refers	  to	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  RDC160	  
from	  the	  FCA	  and	   the	   Investigation	   team,	   to	   its	   composition,	  and	   to	   the	  possibility	   for	   the	   firm	   to	  
have	  access	  to	  all	  the	  material	  considered	  by	  the	  panels161.	  	  
The	   penalties	   chapter	   of	   FCA	   handbook	   includes	   detailed	   guidance	   as	   to	   when	   action	   will	   be	  
initiated:	  “The	  FCA	  will	  consider	   the	   full	  circumstances	  of	  each	  case	  when	  determining	  whether	  or	  
not	  to	  take	  action	  for	  a	  financial	  penalty	  or	  public	  censure.	  Set	  out	  below	  is	  a	  list	  of	  factors	  that	  may	  
be	  relevant	  for	  this	  purpose.	  The	  list	  is	  not	  exhaustive:	  not	  all	  of	  these	  factors	  may	  be	  applicable	  in	  a	  
particular	  case,	  and	  there	  may	  be	  other	  factors,	  not	  listed,	  that	  are	  relevant.	  
(1)	  The	  nature,	  seriousness	  and	  impact	  of	  the	  suspected	  breach,	  including:	  
(a)	  whether	  the	  breach	  was	  deliberate	  or	  reckless;	  
(b)	  the	  duration	  and	  frequency	  of	  the	  breach;	  
(c)	  the	  amount	  of	  any	  benefit	  gained	  or	  loss	  avoided	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  breach;	  
(d)	   whether	   the	   breach	   reveals	   serious	   or	   systemic	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   management	   systems	   or	  
internal	  controls	  relating	  to	  all	  or	  part	  of	  a	  person's	  business;	  
(e)	   the	   impact	   or	   potential	   impact	   of	   the	  breach	  on	   the	   orderliness	   of	  markets	   including	  whether	  
confidence	  in	  those	  markets	  has	  been	  damaged	  or	  put	  at	  risk;	  
(f)	  the	  loss	  or	  risk	  of	  loss	  caused	  to	  consumers	  or	  other	  market	  users;	  	  
(g)	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  any	  financial	  crime	  facilitated,	  
occasioned	  or	  otherwise	  attributable	  to	  the	  breach;	  and	  
(h)	   whether	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   smaller	   issues,	   which	   individually	   may	   not	   justify	   disciplinary	  
action,	  but	  which	  do	  so	  when	  taken	  collectively.	  
(2)	  The	  conduct	  of	  the	  person	  after	  the	  breach,	  including	  the	  following:	  
(a)	  how	  quickly,	   effectively	   and	   completely	   the	  person	  brought	   the	  breach	   to	   the	  attention	  of	   the	  
FCA	  or	  another	  relevant	  regulatory	  authority;	  
                                                
160	   It	   shall	   be	   noted	   that	   concerns	   were	   expressed	   in	   the	   Corporate	   Governance	   review	   as	   to	   the	   lack	   of	  
involvement	   of	   the	   Board	   in	   these	   matters.	   More	   specifically	   the	   report	   mentions	   that	   “The	   FCA	   Board’s	  
decision	   to	   remain	   apart	   from	   individual	   regulatory	   matters	   is	   a	   reasonable	   one	   which	   avoids	   any	   risk	   of	  
undermining	  management	  and/or	  the	  RDC.	  However,	  if	  the	  FCA	  were	  a	  corporate,	  its	  board	  would	  be	  involved	  
in	  decisions	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  have	  significant	  impact	  on	  reputation	  or	  strategy”.	  Par	  51	  p	  7.	  However,	  
RDC	  accountability	  to	  the	  Board	  should	  help	  mitigating	  this	  concern.	  	  
	  
161	  	  See	  http://www.fca.org.uk/about/structure/committees/rdc	  
	  
 (b)	  the	  degree	  of	  co-­‐operation	  the	  person	  showed	  during	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  breach;	  
(c)	  any	  remedial	  steps	  the	  person	  has	  taken	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  breach;	  
(d)	   the	   likelihood	   that	   the	   same	   type	   of	   breach	   (whether	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   person	   under	  
investigation	  or	  others)	  will	  recur	  if	  no	  action	  is	  taken;	  
(e)	   whether	   the	   person	   concerned	   has	   complied	   with	   any	   requirements	   or	   rulings	   of	   another	  
regulatory	  authority	   relating	   to	  his	  behaviour	   (for	  example,	  where	   relevant,	   those	  of	   the	  Takeover	  
Panel	  or	  an	  RIE);	  and	  
(f)	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  any	  false	  or	  inaccurate	  information	  given	  by	  the	  person	  and	  whether	  the	  
information	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  given	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  knowingly	  mislead	  the	  FCA.	  
(3)	  The	  previous	  disciplinary	  record	  and	  compliance	  history	  of	  the	  person	  including:	  
(a)	  whether	  the	  FCA	  (or	  any	  previous	  regulator)	  has	  taken	  any	  previous	  disciplinary	  action	  resulting	  
in	  adverse	  findings	  against	  the	  person;	  
(b)	  whether	  the	  person	  has	  previously	  undertaken	  not	  to	  do	  a	  particular	  act	  or	  engage	  in	  particular	  
behaviour;	  
(c)	  whether	  the	  FCA	  (or	  any	  previous	  regulator)	  has	  previously	  taken	  protective	  action	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  
firm,	  using	  its	  own	  initiative	  powers,	  by	  means	  of	  a	  variation	  of	  a	  Part	  4A	  permission	  or	  otherwise,	  or	  
has	  previously	  requested	  the	  firm	  to	  take	  remedial	  action,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  action	  has	  
been	  taken;	  and	  
(d)	   the	   general	   compliance	   history	   of	   the	   person,	   including	   whether	   the	   FCA	   (or	   any	   previous	  
regulator)	  has	  previously	  issued	  the	  person	  with	  a	  private	  warning.	  
(4)	  FCA	  guidance	  and	  other	  published	  materials:	  
The	   FCA	  will	   not	   take	   action	   against	   a	   person	   for	   behaviour	   that	   it	   considers	   to	   be	   in	   line	   with	  
guidance,	   other	   materials	   published	   by	   the	   FCA	   in	   support	   of	   the	   Handbook	   or	   FCA-­‐confirmed	  
Industry	  Guidance	  which	  were	  current	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  behaviour	  in	  question.	  
(5)	  Action	  taken	  by	  the	  FSA	  or	  FCA	  in	  previous	  similar	  cases.	  
(6)	  Action	  taken	  by	  other	  domestic	  or	  international	  regulatory	  authorities:	  
Where	  other	  regulatory	  authorities	  propose	  to	  take	  action	   in	  respect	  of	  the	  breach	  which	   is	  under	  
consideration	  by	   the	  FCA,	  or	  one	   similar	   to	   it,	   the	  FCA	  will	   consider	  whether	   the	  other	  authority's	  
action	  would	  be	  adequate	  to	  address	  the	  FCA's	  concerns,	  or	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  for	  the	  
FCA	  to	  take	  its	  own	  action.”162	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  See	  FCA	  Handbook,	  DEPP	  6/4,	  Release	  2,	  	  January	  2016	  
	  
 It	   shall	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   FCA	   powers	   extend	   beyond	   the	   administrative	   reach	   to	   include	   the	  
possibility	  of	  bringing	  charges	  to	  the	  Criminal	  and	  Civil	  courts.	  Those	  are	  covered	  in	  separate	  sections	  
of	  the	  Handbook.	  	  
A	   shorter	   list	   of	   their	   referral	   criteria	   is	   also	   indicated	   on	   their	   website	   together	   with	   a	   list	   of	  
alternative	  options	  to	  enforcement163.	  
The	   FCA	   makes	   very	   clear	   the	   criteria	   underpinning	   the	   use	   of	   their	   discretion.	   The	   overarching	  
question	   FCA	   staff	   would	   have	   to	   answer	   in	   deciding	   to	   initiate	   action	   is	   whether	   enforcement	  
investigation	   is	   likely	   to	   further	   FCA’s	   aims	   and	   statutory	   objectives.	   And	   in	   doing	   so	   the	   FCA	  
provides	  a	  list	  of	  factor	  to	  consider,	  such	  as:	  1)	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  evidence	  and	  the	  proportionality	  
and	  impact	  of	  opening	  an	  investigation;	  2)	  what	  purpose	  or	  goal	  would	  be	  served	  if	  the	  FCA	  were	  to	  
end	  up	  taking	  enforcement	  action	  in	  the	  case;	  3)	  relevant	  factors	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  purposes	  of	  




Chapter	   5	  of	   FCA	  enforcement	   guide	  deals	   specifically	  with	   settlements.165	   There	   is	   also	   a	   specific	  
FAQ	   section	   on	   the	   FCA	   website166.	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   mediation167.	   Settlement	   processes	   and	  
criteria	  are	  less	  transparent	  than	  those	  underlying	  enforcement	  actions.	  However,	  settlement	  should	  
still	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	  formal	  regulatory	  process.	  In	  fact	  settlement	  discussions	  do	  start	  once	  
the	   enforcement	   process	   has	   been	   initiated	   and	   happen	  without	   prejudice	   to	   the	   latter.	   The	   FCA	  
guide	   explains	   that	   “the	   FCA	   will	   only	   engage	   in	   such	   discussions	   once	   it	   has	   a	   sufficient	  
understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  gravity	  of	  the	  suspected	  misconduct	  or	  issue	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  
assessment	   of	   the	   appropriate	   outcome.	   At	   the	   other	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum,	   the	   FCA	  expects	   that	  
                                                









167	  Mediation	  is	  the	  process	  of	  appointing	  an	  independent	  third	  party	  (a	  mediator)	  to	  facilitate	  negotiations	  
and	   agreement.	   The	   mediator	   does	   not	   decide	   the	   case.	   The	   FCA	   will	   appoint	   a	   	   mediator	   when	   “in	  
circumstances	  where	  settlement	  might	  not	  otherwise	  be	  achieved	  or	  may	  not	  be	  achieved	  so	  efficiently	  and	  
effectively”	  See	  FCA,	  The	  Enforcement	  Guide,	  par	  5.20.	  However,	  “Mediation	   is	  unlikely	   to	  be	  appropriate	   in	  
cases	   involving	   allegations	   of	   criminal	   conduct”,	   or	   when	   the	   FCA	   is	   “required	   to	   take	   urgent	   action	   –	   for	  
example,	  where	  an	   injunction	   is	   required	  to	  prevent	  conduct	  continuing.	  Aside	   from	  these	   restrictions	   there	  
are	   relatively	   few	   disciplinary	   cases	   in	   which	   mediation	   will	   not	   be	   available.”	   See	   FCA,	   Settlement	   and	  
Mediation	   FAQ	   available	   here	   http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-­‐regulated/enforcement/how-­‐we-­‐enforce-­‐
the-­‐law/settlement-­‐mediation?category=mediation	  
	  
 settlement	   discussions	   following	   a	   decision	   notice	   or	   second	   supervisory	   notice	   will	   be	   rare.”168	  
Settlement	  discussions	  do	  not	  involve	  the	  RDC,	  unless	  for	  instance,	  this	  is	  relevant	  “to	  an	  application	  
for	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   period	   for	   making	   representations”169.	   In	   fact	   settlement	   discussions	   are	  
carried	   out	   and	   taken	   by	   two	   senior	   FCA	  members170.	   The	   FCA	   considers	   settlement	   to	   be	   in	   the	  
public	  interest,	  especially	  when	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  earlier	  redresses	  for	  consumers	  and	  when	  it	  gives	  rise	  
to	  the	  perception	  of	  timely	  and	  effective	  action,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  send	  timely	  messages	  to	  industry	  and	  
the	  market.	   As	  mentioned	   above,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   FCA	   retains	   substantial	   discretion	   in	   deciding	  
whether	   or	   not	   starting	   settlement	   discussion	   without	   the	   need	   to	   involve	   the	   RDC.	   In	   the	   FCA	  
review	   of	   board	   effectiveness	   it	   was	   noted	   that	   “Where	   proceedings	   are	   settled,	   rather	   than	  
contested,	   the	   RDC	   plays	   no	   part,	   but	   we	   are	   told	   that	   there	   are	   internal	   governance	   processes	  
within	   Enforcement	   to	  oversee	   the	   agreements	   to	   settle	   and	   that	   the	  Board	   is	   informed	  of	  major	  
settlements	  via	  the	  quarterly	  reports	  from	  the	  Director	  of	  Enforcement	  and	  Financial	  Crime”171.	  The	  
Treasury	  Review	  included	  recommendations	  on	  settlement	  too.	  	  
	  
PRA	  
PRA’s	  enforcement	  policy	  is	  spelt	  out	  in	  a	  Statement	  of	  policy172	  which	  has	  been	  recently	  amended	  
to	   take	   into	   account	   PRA	   disciplinary	   powers	   over	   actuaries	   and	   external	   auditors173.	   A	   shorter	  
version	  is	  also	  available	  on	  the	  PRA	  website.	  The	  statement	  of	  policy	  is	  of	  statutory	  nature	  (sec	  395	  
(5)	   of	   FSMA	   requires	   authorities	   to	   issue	   a	   statement	   of	   procedure	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   issuance	   of	  
statutory	   notice	   decisions)	   and	   in	   fact	   it	   is	   more	   focused	   on	   the	   actual	   procedures	   than	   on	   the	  
explanation	  of	   the	   rationale	  used	   to	  exercise	  discretion.	   The	   statement	  does	  not	   comment	  on	   the	  
guiding	  principles	  related	  to	  the	  desirability	  of	  enforcement	  vis	  a	  vis	  the	  use	  of	  supervisory	  tools,	  nor	  
discusses	  in	  great	  length	  the	  overall	  PRA	  approach	  to	  enforcement.	  
                                                
168	  FCA,	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170	  	  See	  HM	  Treasury,	  Review	  of	  enforcement	  decision-­‐making	  at	  the	  financial	  services	  regulators:	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  report,	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  2014,	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  FCA,	  Review	  of	  board	  effectiveness	  by	  Independent	  Audit	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  See	  PRA,	  Engagement	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  external	  auditors	  and	  supervisors	  and	  commencing	  the	  PRA’s	  disciplinary	  
powers	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   external	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  policy	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  into	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  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  previous	  Consultation	  Document.	  
	  
 Unlike	   the	   FCA’s	   RDC,	   PRA’s	   enforcement	   decision	   making	   body	   comprises	   senior	   members	   of	  
staff174.	  There	  are	  four	  Decision	  Making	  Committees	  (DMC)	  responsible	  for	  issuing	  statutory	  notices:	  	  
	  
(a)	  The	  PRA	  Board	  excluding	  the	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  Chief	  Executive	  Officer	  (Board)	  	  
(b)	  Supervision,	  Risk	  and	  Policy	  Committee	  (SRPC)	  	  
(c)	  Supervision	  and	  Assessment	  Panel	  (SAP)	  	  
(d)	  Panel	  of	  Heads	  of	  Departments	  and	  Managers	  (HMP)	  	  
	  
The	  DMCs	  will	  make	  decisions	  by	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  relevant	  facts,	  the	  law	  and	  the	  PRA’s	  priorities	  
and	  policies175.	  The	  decision	  making	  framework	  works	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
Statutory	  decisions	  will	  be	  divided	  into	  one	  of	  three	  categories.	  PRA	  staff	  will	  determine	  into	  which	  
category	  each	  proposed	  decision	  falls.	  	  
	  
	  
Type	  A	  	   Decisions	   which:	   (i)	   the	   PRA	   expects	   to	   have	   a	  
significant	  impact	  on	  a	  firm's	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  
business	  effectively	  or	  (ii)	  the	  PRA	  considers	  could	  
have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  its	  objectives.	  	  
	   	  
Type	  B	  	   Decisions	   which:	   (i)	   the	   PRA	   expects	   to	   have	   a	  
moderate	  impact	  on	  a	  firm's	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  
business	   effectively,	   (ii)	   the	   PRA	   considers	   could	  
have	   a	  moderate	   impact	   on	   its	   objectives	   or	   (iii)	  
                                                
174	  The	  perceived	  lack	  of	  independence	  of	  the	  committee	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  some	  concern	  among	  the	  
regulatees	  expressed	  in	  their	  responses	  to	  a	  PRA	  consultation	  document.	  However	  in	  deciding	  to	  continue	  to	  
adopt	   this	  model,	   the	  PRA	   specified	   that	   “The	  PRA	   considers	   the	  decision-­‐making	   framework	   to	  be	   fair	   and	  
proportionate.	  The	  framework	  was	  developed	  with	  due	  consideration	  of	  legal	  obligations	  on	  the	  PRA.	  Officials	  
of	  the	  PRA	  will	  be	  familiar	  with	  the	  sectors	  on	  which	  they	  will	  make	  decisions.	  The	  policy	  and	  procedure	  makes	  
it	  clear	  that	  the	  relevant	  decision-­‐making	  committee	  (DMC)	  will	  include	  at	  least	  one	  person	  who	  has	  not	  been	  
directly	  involved	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  case	  being	  considered.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  responsibility	  of	  each	  member	  
of	  a	  DMC	  to	  make	  a	  reasoned	  judgement	  based	  the	  evidence	  presented.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  PRA	  considers	  
the	  membership	  of	  the	  committees	  suitable	  and	  capable	  of	  reaching	  proportionate	  decisions”.	  See	  PRA,	  The	  
Prudential	  Regulation	  Authority’s	  approach	  to	  enforcement:	  Statutory	  statement	  of	  policy	  and	  procedure,	  April	  
2013,	  p	  3.	  
	  
175	   See	  PRA,	  The	  Prudential	   Regulation	  Authority’s	   approach	   to	   enforcement:	   Statutory	   statement	   of	   policy	  
and	  procedure,	  January	  2016,	  p	  8	  
	  
 may	   set	   a	   sensitive	   precedent	   but	   which	   would	  
otherwise	  have	  fallen	  under	  Type	  C.	  	  
Type	  C	  	   Decisions	  which:	  (i)	  the	  PRA	  expects	  to	  have	  a	  low	  
impact	  on	  a	  firm's	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	   its	  business	  
effectively,	  (ii)	  the	  PRA	  considers	  could	  have	  a	  low	  
impact	   on	   its	   objectives,	   or	   (iii)	   relate	   to	  which	   a	  
precedent	  has	  already	  been	  set.	  	  
	  
The	   choice	   of	   which	   DMC	  will	   take	   a	   decision	   will	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   category	   of	   the	   firm	   in	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  anticipated	   impact	  of	   the	  decision	  on	  a	   firm’s	  ability	   to	  carry	  out	   its	  business	  
effectively	  and/or	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  PRA’s	  objectives.	  In	  summary,	  the	  more	  significant	  the	  firm	  and	  
the	  greater	  the	  decision’s	  impact,	  the	  more	  senior	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  DMC176.	  
	  
Further	   indications	  as	   to	   the	  actual	   functioning	  of	   the	  DMC,	   its	  powers	  and	  procedures	  are	  clearly	  
detailed	  in	  the	  document.	  	  
The	  PRA	  may	  decide	   to	  exercise	   its	   statutory	   right177	   to	  “outsource”	  enforcement	   in	  addition	  or	   in	  
alternative	   to	   its	   own	   investigations.	   This	   means	   that	   investigations	   including	   the	   “gathering	   and	  
analysis	  of	  evidence	  and	  interviews	  of	  individuals”178	  will	  be	  conducted	  by	  a	  third	  party,	  which	  may	  
also	  be	  the	  FCA.	  The	  process	  will	  then	  work	  as	  follows:	  	  
“The	  PRA	  will:	  
-­‐inform	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   investigation	   that	   it	   has	   done	   so,	   and	   to	   whom	   the	   matter	   has	   been	  
outsourced;	  
-­‐take	   reasonable	  steps	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	   investigator	  makes	  clear	  when	  making	   first	  contact	  with	  
the	  subject	  of	  the	  investigation,	  or	  any	  other	  person	  in	  relation	  to	  whom	  FSMA	  powers	  are	  proposed	  
to	  be	  exercised,	  that	  the	  investigation	  is	  being	  carried	  out	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  PRA;	  and	  
-­‐ensure	   that	  any	  Notice	  of	  Appointment	  of	   investigators	   required	  under	   section	  170	  of	   FSMA	  sets	  
out	  who	   the	   investigators	   are,	   and	  where	   the	   investigators	   are	   individuals,	   of	  which	  organisations	  
they	  are	  officers	  or	  employees.	  
As	  the	  end-­‐product	  from	  an	  outsourced	  investigation,	  the	  investigator	  provides	  to	  the	  PRA	  a	  report	  
setting	  out	  what	  evidence	  it	  has	  uncovered,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  evidence	  is	  indicative	  that	  one	  or	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  Ibidem	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177	  See	  FSMA	  sec	  167-­‐169	  ,	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  apply	  to	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178	   See	   PRA’s	   enforcement	   policies,	   available	   here	  
www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/supervision/regulatoryaction/enforcement.aspx	  
	  
 more	  of	  the	  PRA’s	  regulatory	  requirements	  has	  been	  breached”179.	  The	  PRA	  will	  then	  decide	  whether	  
or	  not	  to	  exercise	  its	  supervisory	  or	  enforcement	  powers.	  	  
	  
Settlement	  	  
The	   PRA	   enforcement	   statement	   includes	   one	   chapter	   on	   settlement	   procedures.	   The	   Authority	  
recognises	  the	  advantages	  of	  early	  settlements	  and	  “In	  exercising	  its	  discretion,	  the	  matters	  to	  which	  
the	  PRA	  may	  have	  regard	   include:	   (a)	   its	  statutory	  objectives;	   	   (b)	   the	  terms	  of	   this	  policy	  and	  any	  
relevant	  guidance	  or	  other	  materials	  issued	  by	  the	  PRA;	  	  (c)	  the	  facts	  and	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case	  
in	   question;	   and	   (d)	   the	   public	   interest”180.	   As	   for	   the	   FCA,	   settlement	   falls	  within	   PRA	   regulatory	  
action	  and	  will	  be	  brought	  to	  conclusion	  only	  “if	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  settlement	  would,	   in	  PRA’s	  view,	  
represent	   an	   appropriate	   regulatory	   outcome.	   Generally,	   the	   PRA	  will	   require	   a	   settlement	   to	   be	  
sufficiently	  comprehensive	  to	  enable	  it	  to	  terminate	  the	  totality	  of	  its	  investigation	  and	  all	  proposed	  
disciplinary	  or	  other	  enforcement	  action	  pursuant	  to	  it	  against	  the	  person	  under	  investigation”181.	  In	  
exercising	   its	   discretion	   “The	   PRA	   will	   not	   normally	   agree	   to	   enter	   into	   substantive	   settlement	  
discussions	  or	  conclude	  a	  binding	  settlement	  agreement	  until:	  (a)	  it	  has	  a	  sufficient	  understanding	  of	  
the	   nature,	   seriousness	   and	   impact	   or	   potential	   impact	   of	   the	   suspected	   breach	   of	   its	   regulatory	  
requirements;	  and	  (b)	  it	  is	  able	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  assessment	  of	  any	  action,	  including	  remedial	  or	  
disciplinary	  measures	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  consequence	  of	  it.”182	  
As	  for	  the	  actual	  settlement	  procedures,	  these	  will	  be	  conducted	  by	  one	  or	  more	  PRA	  investigators	  
(but	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   whether	   they	   are	   part	   of	   the	   relevant	   DMC),	   and/or	   any	   of	   the	   PRA	   staff	  
responsible	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	  matter.	   Once	   both	   parties	   (the	   PRA	   and	   the	   firm/person)	   are	  
satisfied	  with	   the	  outcome,	  a	   “proposed	   settlement	  agreement”	  will	   be	  put	   in	  place,	  but	   the	  very	  
final	  decision	  to	  approve	  the	  agreement	  will	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  DMC	  unanimously.	  A	  decision	  
as	  to	  whether	  the	  settlement	  should	  be	  made	  public	  will	  also	  be	  taken.	  	  
Finally,	   “Subject	   to	   the	   stage	   the	   enforcement	   process	   has	   reached	   when	   a	   binding	   settlement	  
agreement	  is	  concluded,	  the	  agreement	  may	  provide	  for	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  PRA’s	  action	  to	  waive	  and	  
not	  exercise	  any	  subsisting	  rights:	  (a)	  to	  contest	  or	  further	  to	  contest	  that	  action,	  including	  the	  facts	  
and	  matters	  set	  out	  in	  any	  statutory	  notices	  which	  have	  been	  or	  are	  to	  be	  given	  to	  them	  by	  the	  PRA;	  
(b)	   to	   make	   representations	   to	   the	   relevant	   DMC;	   (c)	   to	   be	   given	   access	   to	   ‘PRA	   material’	   or	  
‘secondary	  material’	  pursuant	   to	  section	  394	  of	   the	  Act;	   (d)	   to	  object	   to	  the	  giving	  of	  any	  decision	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 notice;	  (e)	  to	  refer	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Tribunal	  and/or	  otherwise	  seek	  to	  challenge	  any	  aspect	  of	  the	  
matter,	  including	  by	  way	  of	  a	  claim	  for	  judicial	  review.”183	  	  
	  
Conclusions	  
The	  objectivity	  of	  B&F	  authorities	  has	  been	  investigated	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  their	  enforcement	  
procedures.	  	  
Authorities’	  approach	  to	  enforcement	  varies	  in	  the	  constraints,	  clarity,	  publicity	  and	  rationale	  for	  the	  
use	  of	  discretion.	  Overall,	  settlement	  procedures	  are	  less	  clear	  than	  the	  enforcement	  ones.	  	  
B&F	  authorities	  possess	  a	  high	  concentration	  of	  powers.	  Regulation,	  supervision	  and	  enforcement,	  
comparable	   to	   the	   legislative,	  executive	  and	   judiciary	  powers,	   are	   conducted	  under	  one	   roof.	   This	  
makes	  even	  more	  poignant	   the	  need	   for	  authorities	  not	  only	   to	  act	  with	  objectivity	  but	  also	   to	  be	  
beyond	  any	  suspicion	  of	  arbitrariness.	  Especially	  because	  the	  firms	  investigated	  do	  not	  enjoy	  the	  full	  
protection	  of	   laws	   in	   the	  same	  way	  they	  would	  have	  had	  had	  the	  procedure	  being	  conducted	   in	  a	  
tribunal.	  	  And	  in	  fact	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  rights	  attached	  to	  the	  firm	  while	  being	  investigated.	  
Controlling	   and	   monitoring	   powers	   of	   the	   authority	   where	   enforcement	   has	   been	   outsourced	   is	  
relevant	  too.	  	  
	  
                                                
183	  Ibidem	  p	  40.	  
	  
 Openness	  and	  Honesty	  
Openness:	  Holders	  of	  public	  office	  should	  act	  and	  take	  decisions	  in	  an	  open	  and	  transparent	  manner.	  
Information	  should	  not	  be	  withheld	  from	  the	  public	  unless	  there	  are	  clear	  and	  lawful	  reasons	  for	  so	  
doing.	  
Honesty	  Holders	  of	  public	  office	  should	  be	  truthful184.	  	  
Some	   of	   the	   indicators	   of	   honesty	   and	   openness	   have	   been	   discussed	   already,	   among	   which	  
transparency,	   accountability,	   impartiality	   and	   public	   disclosure	   of	   internal	   and	   third	   parties’	  
assessment.	  
It	   should	   be	   reminded	   here	   that	   openness	   and	   transparency	   are	   no	   panacea.	   They	   may	   not	  
necessarily	  make	  authorities	   trustworthy	  per	  se.	  Whereas	  openness	   fosters	  and	  encourages	   in	   fact	  
scrutiny	  by	   third	  parties	  and	   transparency	  allows	  authorities	   to	  operate	  “under	   the	  sun”,	   they	  can	  
both	  lead	  to	  unconstructive	  questioning,	  government	  interference	  and	  suspicion185.	  Also	  sometimes	  
too	  much	   transparency	  may	   hinder	   policy	   effectiveness,	   especially	   central	   banks’	   ones.	   	   Excessive	  
public	  scrutiny	  and	  suspicion	  may	  have	  a	  deleterious	  impact	  over	  the	  authorities’	  reputation,	  which	  
in	  turn	  affect	  the	  credibility	  of	  their	  role	  and	  the	  morale	  of	  their	  staff.	  
What	  follow	  will	  briefly	  investigate	  if	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  B&F	  authorities	  engage	  with	  the	  public	  on	  
their	  decision	  making	  processes.	  Where	  applicable,	  how	  do	  they	  set	  their	  fees	  and	  how	  do	  they	  use	  
the	  money	  from	  the	  fines	  is	  also	  relevant.	  
B&F	   authorities	   have	   strict	   confidentiality	   requirements	  which	   are	   embedded	   into	   law	   (FSMA	  and	  
Bank	   of	   England	   Charter	   1998).	   They	   are	   also	   bound	   to	   follow	   the	   principles	   of	   good	   regulation	  
which	   do	   include	   transparency.	   The	   underling	   rationale	   is	   the	   protection	   of	  market	   integrity	   from	  
speculative	  behaviour	  which	  may	  arise	  from	  the	  disclosure	  of	  sensitive	  information.	  B&F	  authorities,	  
as	  other	  regulators,	  have	  also	  a	  duty	  to	  protect	  the	  “private	  life”	  of	  the	  people	  they	  engage	  with.	  So	  
for	   instance,	   staff	   policies	   related	   to	   record	   management	   are	   publicly	   available.	   There	   can	   be	  
exceptions	   to	   confidentiality	   rules,	   but	   these	   too	   are	   strictly	   regulated.	   In	   fact	   in	   disclosing	  
information	  B&F	  authorities	  will	  have	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  “public	  interest	  test”	  from	  the	  Information	  
Commissioner	  Office’	  s	  guidance.	  Strict	  confidentiality	  rules	  stem	  also	  from	  EU	  law.	  
It	   should	   be	   borne	   in	   mind	   that	   confidentiality	   relates	   not	   only	   to	   information	   received	   but	   also	  
produced	   (for	   instance	   in	   relation	   to	   an	   investigation).	   Market	   players	   act	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   policy	  
expectations	  henceforth	  authorities	  need	  also	  be	  very	  careful	  with	  their	  communication	  strategies.	  
                                                
184	  The	  initial	  definition	  of	  Honesty	  was	  as	  follows:	  “holders	  of	  public	  office	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  declare	  any	  private	  
interests	  relating	  to	  their	  public	  duties	  and	  to	  take	  steps	  to	  resolve	  any	  conflicts	  arising	  in	  a	  way	  that	  protects	  
the	  public	  interest”.	  See	  1995	  Nolan	  Report,	  p	  14	  
	  
185	  See	  CSPL,	  (2013),	  p	  47	  
	  
 For	   obvious	   reasons	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   has	   a	   very	   strict	   secrecy	   policy	   which	   states	   that:	   "The	  
strictest	  secrecy	  is	  to	  be	  observed	  with	  respect	  to	  information	  of	  any	  kind	  acquired	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
your	   duties	   relating	   to	   the	   affairs	   and	   concerns	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	   England,	   of	   Her	   Majesty’s	  
Government,	   of	   other	   customers	   or	   of	   other	   persons,	   companies	   or	   organisations	  with	  which	   the	  
Bank	  may	  have	  dealings”186.	  This	  includes	  the	  need	  to	  obtain	  prior	  permission	  to	  take	  part	  in	  public	  
discussion,	  engage	  with	  the	  press	  or	  otherwise,	  on	  the	  affairs	  or	  policy	  of	  the	  Bank.	  	  
Despite	  most	  B&F	  duties	  are	  statutory,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  find	  a	  consolidated	  version	  of	  FSMA	  on	  
their	   website.	   The	   FCA	  website	   cross	   refers	   to	   legislation.gov	   whereas	   the	   Bank	   publishes	   only	   a	  
consolidated	  version	  of	  all	  the	  Acts	  that	  apply	  to	  them	  (which	  is	  very	  useful)	  where	  an	  extract	  from	  
FSMA	   is	   included.	   Unfortunately	   the	   legislation.gov	   website	   does	   not	   publish	   an	   updated	  
consolidated	   and	   easy	   to	   read	   version	   of	   the	   Act.	   This	   lack	   of	   transparency	  may	   run	   against	   the	  
openness	  principle	  because	  it	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  the	  lay	  person	  to	  have	  easy	  access	  to	  the	  law.	  
The	  FCA	  is	  very	  transparent	  in	  what	  can	  and	  cannot	  be	  disclosed.	  They	  have	  a	  dedicated	  section	  on	  
their	   website	   which	   explains	   their	   legal	   requirements	   and	   their	   own	   policy187.	   They	   also	   have	   a	  
specific	  section	  that	  explains	  how	  they	  engage	  with	  the	  public	  and	  which	  documents	  they	  publish.	  
These	   are	   divided	   into	   areas	   (corporate	   documents;	   papers;	   handbook	   publications;	   and	   other	  
documents)	   and	   are:	   annual	   reports;	   business	   plans;	   call	   for	   inputs;	   consultation	   papers;	   policy	  
statements;	   discussion	   papers;	   feedback	   statements;	   guidance	   consultation;	   finalised	   guidance;	  
thematic	  reviews;	  market	  studies;	  occasional	  papers;	  quarterly	  consultation	  paper;	  handbook	  notice,	  
policy	  development	  updates;	  factsheet;	  information	  sheet;	  final	  notices	  and	  decision	  notices.	  	  
Board	  minutes	  are	  public	  too.	  	  
PRA/Bank/MPC	   publications	   are	   divided	   into:	   speech	   and	   articles;	   interviews;	   monetary	   policy;	  
markets;	   financial	   stability;	  minutes;	   and	   Parliamentary	   Committee	   hearings.	   	   So	   for	   instance	   the	  
monetary	   policy	   publications	   include:	   inflation	   reports;	   minutes	   of	   the	  MPC;	   letters	   on	  monetary	  
policy;	  bank	  liabilities’	  and	  credit	  conditions	  survey;	  inflation	  attitude	  survey.	  	  
Those	  authorities	  whose	  funding	  comes	  from	  the	  industry	  have	  publicly	  available	  documents	  on	  how	  
they	  set	  their	  fees.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  proceedings	  from	  fines	  is	  now	  regulated	  by	  statute.	  	  
The	  Bank	  has	   a	   specific	   chapter	   in	   their	   code	  of	   conduct	   on	   “being	  open	   and	   accountable”	  which	  
includes	   details	   on:	   Record	   keeping;	   freedom	   of	   information	   act;	   press	   and	   media	   engagement;	  
social	  media;	  information	  security;	  data	  protection	  act;	  and	  use	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  resources	  and	  IT.	  The	  
Bank	  also	  published	  an	  abridged	  version	  and	  the	  full	  results	  of	  their	  staff	  satisfaction	  survey188.	  	  
                                                
186	  See	  Bank	  of	  England,	  Declaration	  of	  Secrecy,	  available	  at	  www.bankofengland.co.uk	  
	  
187	  See	  www.fca.org.uk/site-­‐info/information/information-­‐we-­‐can-­‐share	  
	  
188	   In	  which	   43	  %	   of	   their	   staff	  was	   favourable	   to	   the	   statement	   “the	   Bank	   is	   open	   and	   transparent	   in	   its	  
communication	  with	   its	   people”;	   31%	   neutral	   and	   26%	   unfavourable.	   See	   Bank	   of	   England,	   Viewpoint	   staff	  
survey	  result,	  July	  2015	  
 The	  FCA	  has	  a	  very	  clear	  communication	  strategy	  which	  has	  recently	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  internal	  
audit	   that	   only	   found	   minor	   issues	   to	   be	   addressed189.	   As	   a	   consequence	   to	   the	   press	   briefing	  
incident,	   the	   FCA	   communication	   strategy	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   an	   external	   inquiry	   (The	   Davis	  
report)	   whose	   findings	   have	   been	   made	   public190.	   The	   strategic	   plan	   of	   the	   Bank	   which	   places	  
emphasis	  on	  openness	  and	  transparency	  has	  been	  mentioned	  above.	  	  
	  
Conclusions	  
To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  openness	  and	  honesty	  are	  natural	  corollaries	  of	  objectivity	  and	  integrity.	  
Here	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  authorities	  are	  open	  and	  transparent	  in	  their	  decision-­‐making	  activities	  has	  
been	   investigated.	  Both	  authorities	  publish	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  documents	  and	  engage	   in	  consultation	  
processes	  prior	  adopting	  a	  policy.	  Board	  minutes	  are	  published,	   taking	   into	  account	  confidentiality	  
requirements.	   Internal	   and	   third	  parties	  assessments	  are	   in	   the	  public	  domain	   too	  and	  authorities	  
are	  transparent	  in	  their	  setting	  of	  fees.	  	  
	  
                                                                                                                                                  
	  
189	   FCA,	   FCA	   internal	   audit	   report:	   A	   review	   of	   the	   design	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   FCA’s	   external	  
communications	  strategy,	  October	  2014	  
	  
190	  See	  above,	  at	  footnote	  50.	  
	  
 Leadership	  
Leadership:	   Holders	   of	   public	   office	   should	   exhibit	   these	   principles	   in	   their	   own	   behaviour.	   They	  
should	   actively	   promote	   and	   robustly	   support	   the	   principles	   and	   be	   willing	   to	   challenge	   poor	  
behaviour	  wherever	  it	  occurs.	  
CSPL	  definition	  of	  leadership	  is	  centred	  upon	  the	  behaviour	  of	  each	  individual	  holding	  a	  public	  office,	  
which	   makes	   it	   a	   very	   aspirational	   principle	   and	   as	   such	   difficult	   to	   measure	   in	   practice.	   It	   also	  
doesn’t	   seem	   to	   distinguish	   between	   public	   and	   private	   life.	   The	   last	   part	   of	   the	   definition	  
encourages	  public	  sector	  employees	  to	  speak	  up	  whenever	  they	  witness	  instances	  of	  misbehaviour	  
(in	  the	  workplace).	  	  	  
And	  yet	  in	  any	  organisation	  the	  tone	  comes	  from	  the	  top.	  Had	  the	  definition	  been	  focussed	  on	  the	  
organisation,	  we	  would	  have	  conducted	  an	  analysis	  of	   their	   corporate	  governance,	   the	   role	  of	   the	  
board	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  able	  to	  implement	  ethical	  principles.	  We	  could	  also	  have	  analysed	  
whether	  or	  not	  B&F	  authorities’	  requirements	  related	  to	  the	  senior	  managers’	  regime	  are	  the	  same	  
as	   those	   imposed	  on	   the	   regulated	   firms	   or	   if	   they	   are	   stricter.	   Since	   some	  of	   the	   authorities	   are	  
registered	  companies,	  it	  could	  have	  been	  interesting	  to	  analise	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  comply	  with	  the	  
corporate	  governance	  code.	  	  
However,	  as	  said	  above,	   the	  aim	  of	   the	  definition	   is	   to	   impinge	  upon	  every	  single	  holder	  of	  public	  
office	   a	   duty	   to	   behave	   according	   to	   the	   principles	   of	   public	   life	   and	   in	   doing	   so,	   to	   exhibit	  
leadership.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
 PART	  3	  
	  
RECOMMENDATIONS	  
1) Make	  clear	  in	  Job	  Descriptions	  and	  in	  other	  relevant	  documents	  that	  the	  Authority	  acts	  in	  
the	  interest	  of	  the	  public	  and	  as	  such	  expects	  the	  highest	  possible	  standards	  of	  behaviour	  
by	  their	  employees,	  irrespective	  of	  roles	  and	  functions.	  	  
2) As	  part	  of	  their	  contract,	  distribute	  to	  and	  train	  all	  members	  of	  staff	  on	  the	  7	  principles	  of	  
public	  life,	  alongside	  their	  regular	  ethical	  training	  where	  present.	  	  
3) When	  possible,	  adopt	  a	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  approach	  to	  the	  Nolan	  Principles.	  Compliance	  
should	  not	  merely	  be	  a	  tick	  boxing	  exercise,	  and	  a	  section	  on	  the	  annual	  report	  could	  be	  
included	  on	  how	  the	  Authority	  has	  complied	  with	  the	  standard.	  This	  may	  also	  allow	  for	  a	  
more	  tailor-­‐made	  approach	  in	  the	  principles’	  implementation.	  
4) A	  substance	  over	  form	  approach	  to	  ethical	  behaviour	  is	  welcome,	  as	  long	  as	  there	  are	  clear	  
indicators	  of	  how	  a	  culture	  of	  ethics	  has	  been	  transferred	  from	  the	  top	  to	  the	  bottom.	  
5) The	   CSPL	   could	   consider	   redrafting	   the	   definition	   of	   selflessness	   to	   make	   its	   meaning	  
clearer.	  
6) Policies	   on	   conflicts	   of	   interests	   and	   revolving	   doors	   should	   be	   tailored	   to	   the	   different	  
roles	   and	   backgrounds	   with	   an	   increased	   level	   of	   scrutiny	   and	   severity	   for	   the	   most	  
sensible	   roles	   and	   the	   most	   striking	   conflicts.	   	   However,	   within	   their	   rigour,	   measures	  
should	  allow	  for	  a	  fair,	  just	  and	  necessary	  flexibility.	  
7) Whereas	  financial	  interests	  related	  to	  the	  holding	  of	  instruments	  issued	  by	  regulated	  firms	  
are	   insulated	  during	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  mandate,	  there	   is	   little	  management	  or	  resolution	  of	  
conflicts	   that	   may	   arise	   after	   the	   person	   has	   left	   the	   role,	   especially	   with	   respect	   to	  
external	   board	   members.	   For	   instance	   stock	   options,	   pensions	   schemes,	   and	   deferred	  
remuneration	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  receive	  a	  specific	  treatment.	  	  
8) The	   correct	   understanding	   of	   conflicts	   of	   interest	   usually	   requires	   technical	   knowledge	  
which	   the	   general	   public	   may	   lack.	   It	   is	   then	   important	   that	   communication	   from	   the	  
authority	  on	  the	  matter	  is	  appropriate	  as	  to	  avoid	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  public	  trust.	  
9) Authorities	   should	  make	  sure	   that	  procedural	  and	  substantial	  due	  process	   is	   guaranteed	  
when	   taking	   enforcement	   actions.	   With	   due	   respect	   to	   confidentiality,	   there	   could	   be	  
more	   clarity	   in	   the	   settlement	   criteria.	   Outsourcing	   of	   investigation	   should	   be	   strictly	  
monitored	  too.	  
10) At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  New	  Bank	  of	  England	  bill	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  the	  publication	  of	  
PRC	  minutes.	   The	   Bank	   should	   consider	   the	   possibility	   of	   publishing	   at	   least	   an	   extract.	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